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1 Introduction
Starting with the Sherman Acts Section 1 prohibition of any contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce(1890), the
prevention of lessening of competition through agreements among potential competitors
has been one of the two cornerstones of competition policy.1 Major applications include
the antitrust treatment of mergers and of joint marketing. [Under joint marketing, rms
co-sell their goods or licenses either through a joint subsidiary as in the case of patent
pools, through which intellectual property owners sell licenses on bundles of their patents
or through an independent entity]. If improperly structured, such cooperative practices
have the potential to lessen competition and harm consumers.
Assessing whether a cooperative agreement is likely to reduce competition and raise
price is a notably di¢ cult exercise. First, there is often a shortage of reliable price and
demand data, leading to well-known di¢ culties in assessing the impact of, say, a merger.2
For new technologies, there may even be no data at all, and yet antitrust authorities have
to approve or block acquisitions of startups by incumbents or the formation of patent
pools. Accordingly, authorities often have little information as to whether a merger will
raise prices substantially; or even whether it will raise prices at all, that is, whether
the merger involves substitutes or complements.3 And, even if data availability permits
rigorous econometric analysis, the time frame for merger approval can be an obstacle to
its achievement.
Second, the pattern of substitutability/complementarity may change over time, and a
merger that is desirable at the date of the approval may no longer be so later on. Products
evolve, as do usages. For instance, product B may be a complement to product A today,
but later become a substitute. Such an allegation was made for instance in the Microsoft
case,4 in which the browser was denitely a complement to the operating system, but was
alleged to have the potential to become an operating system itself through the writing of
extra code. Similarly, molecules A and B may be jointly needed to cure disease C, but
each may in the future su¢ ce to curing disease D. A proper merger assessment therefore
may require not only past data, but also unavailable forward-looking ones.
Third, while economists and antitrust practitioners neatly distinguish between sub-
stitutes and complements, in many industries products may exhibit dual patterns
of complementarity and substitutability: They compete with each other for consumers
having selected the technology or the platform to which the products are related; but
1Article 101 of the European Treaty provides a similar prohibition in the EU. The other cornestone
is the monitoring of abuses of dominant positions (Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Article 102 of the
European Treaty).
2See, e.g., https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Small_but_signicant_and_non-transitory_increase_in_
price.
3Mergers of complements fall in the category of conglomerate mergersin antitrust circles.
4Technically, this was an abuse of dominant position case, but the same concerns would have emerged
in a merger case.
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they also have a joint interest in keeping prices low so as to make the technology or plat-
form attractive against rival options (non-consumption or competing technologies and
platforms). For instance, a technology built around multiple patents held by di¤erent
owners becomes more attractive when licensing prices decrease, but these patents can
also be substitutes in that they enable alternative implementations of given function-
alities.5 Products can be complements at low prices and substitutes at high prices, or
the reverse. This means that local measurements of demand elasticities may mislead the
observer as to the nature of competition. Existing data, even if available to the antitrust
authority or the researcher, again may not tell the entire story.
The purpose of the paper is to add a regulatory instrument to the competition author-
itiespolicy toolbox. The new cooperative arrangement would be an agreement among
rms on price caps for their various products. Unlike in a merger or an old-style patent
pool, rms would keep control  including over pricing of their products or licenses
and would only be constrained to charge no more than the agreed-upon caps. Also,
unlike regulated price caps, the caps would be set by the rms; the validation by compe-
tition agencies could take the form of guidelines combined with business review letters,
approving the industry-initiated price cap arrangements.
Although economists have neither advocated voluntary price caps nor studied their
social desirability, such caps have surreptitiously appeared in the competition policy
landscape in at least four guises. Since 2014, European antitrust policy with regards to
patent pools requires that patent owners keep ownership of their patent (and therefore
can grant licences to them outside the pool) and that the pool unbundle its license
o¤ering;6 thus, aside from a one-stop-shopping transaction-cost benet, patent pools
amount to setting a cap on the price of individual licences. Second, and still in the
realm of intellectual property (IP), most standard setting organizations require that IP
owners commit to granting licenses either royalty-free or at a non-discriminatory, fair
and reasonable (FRAND) price; thus IP owners who consent to such a standard setting
process de facto collectively agree on capping their prices. In some cases (e.g., for standard
setting organization VITA), rms may even commit to explicit price caps prior to standard
5Contents o¤ered by a cable or satellite television operator compete among themselves for the at-
tention of the operators subscribers but are also complements to the extent that increased operator
membership benets all content providers. Likewise, payment systems using a common point-of-sale ter-
minal or interface at merchant premises compete for cardholder clientele and usage but share a common
interest in merchantsadoption of the terminals. Health care providers who are members of a health
insurance network vie for patients insured by the network but also depend on rival providers for the
attractiveness of the insurance network  see Katz (2011). Supermarkets o¤er competing brands for
many product categories, but one-stop shop benets create complementarities across categories See
Thomassen et al. (2017) for a recent empirical analysis accounting for cross-category complementarities.
Further illustrations include music performance rights (as, say, licensed by Pandora), alcoholic beverages
(as in the Grand Met-Guinness merger), retail outlets (in department stores and commercial malls),
intermodal transportation, airline alliances, or books, tickets and hotel rooms (on online platforms).
6The European Commissions guidelines on technology transfer agreements has been requiring inde-
pendent licensing since 2004 and unbundling since 2014. Other juridictions, including the US and Japan,
only require independent licensing.
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approval. Third, a rm or group of rms may release lines of codes under an open source
license; they thereby commit to a price cap equal to zero on the basic software and decide
to focus on complementary services. Finally, and relatedly, the supplier (e.g., a printer
manufacturer) who commits to dual-or-multiple-sourcing for an add-on (e.g., cartridges)
de facto caps the price of the add-on; industry incumbents that opt for an open standard
behave similarly.
We argue that, when it is unclear whether products or services are substitutes or
complements, and authorities feel hesitant about approving a merger or a joint-marketing
alliance, they may well want to consider allowing price-caps agreements instead. To make
such a case, and motivated by the lack of data that plagues merger analysis, we analyze
the general properties of price-cap coopetition. The intuition for why price caps can be
attractive is that they allow producers of complements to cooperate and solve Cournots
double marginalization problem, but do not allow competitors to collude and raise prices
of substitutes.
For multiple reasons this intuition requires scrutiny, though. First, under strategic
substitutes, imposing a cap on the price of one good may raise the price of another good
to such an extent that consumer welfare is reduced. Second, demand may either involve
a stable mix of complements and substitutes or exhibit a price-dependent pattern of
complementarity/substitutability, and it is not a priori clear how such features a¤ect the
desirability of price caps. Third, and from a longer-term perspective, price caps could
be used either to monopolize the industry by inducing the exit of some incumbent rms
or by stiing their investment, or else to deter entry of new entrants. Fourth, we need
to investigate the impact of price caps on the incentive to foreclose rivals. Fifth, under
repeated interactions, price caps may change both the benet from deviating from a
collusive path and the feasible punishments of such deviations. These ve extensions will
lead us to qualify our analysis and to propose concrete policy recommendations to limit
potential harms of price caps.
Section 2 rst sets up the model, which allows for asymmetry among rms, for de-
mand substitutability/complementarity, for strategic complementarity/substitutability,
as well as for hybrid cases it indeed provides two examples where these characteristics
depend on price levels; in the rst example (technology adoption) complementary patents
become substitutes as prices rise, whereas in the second example (di¤erentiated goods
with network externalities) substitutes become complements at higher prices.
Section 2 then characterizes the set of prices sustainable through price caps in the
absence of repeated interaction. In duopoly settings and under an assumption that holds
trivially for strategic complements and under reasonable conditions for strategic substi-
tutes, price caps can only improve consumer welfare relative to independent and uncon-
strained price setting. Furthermore, letting rms negotiate price caps benets them (and
consumers as well, from the previous result) when goods are complements and have no
impact when goods are substitutes. So, unlike mergers, price-caps agreements are always
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socially benecial. Finally, these insights are extended to symmetric oligopoly settings, to
oligopolistic competition with strategic complementarity, and to our examples of hybrid
demands.
Section 3 steps back and considers the impact of price caps in the presence of invest-
ment, entry and exit decisions. This analysis leads us to issue several caveats for the
encouraging results of Section 2 and associated policy recommendations. Section 3.1 rst
investigates how the prospect of price caps a¤ects the incentive to innovate and introduce
products. For substitutes, price caps do not a¤ect prots and thus have no impact on
entry or investment either. For complements, price caps, when they benet all rms,
enhance product variety by encouraging entry.
Section 3.2 then looks at whether incumbent rms could set price caps so as to reduce
competition, either among themselves through a reduced incentive to invest or from
rivals who would be discouraged by the prospect of low prices (a collective version of
the Modigliani-Sylos Labini limit-pricing paradigm). We show that two conditions are
necessary to preserve the benets of price caps: a) consumers cannot ask courts to enforce
the price-caps agreement among rms; b) the agreement becomes void if none of the
parties wishes to enforce it.
Section 3.3 then points out that price caps may dominate a merger even when the
competition authority knows that products are complements. As is well-known, a merger
between producers of complements may raise market power by facilitating foreclosure,
that is, by deterring entry (or triggering exit) of competitors: The merged entity may
practice technological or commercial (tari¤-based) bundling to preserve its dominance at
the system level. Price caps, like a merger, solve the double-marginalization problem.
But, unlike a merger, they preserve the component producersautonomy; the latter in-
dividually have no incentive to reduce competition among complementary components
through closed standards or to cross-subsidize external products to squeeze an entrant.
We thus conclude that price caps may have benets over mergers even in situations where
there is no ambiguity about the complementarity pattern.
Price caps might facilitate tacit collusion (called coordinated e¤ectsin merger analy-
sis) by reducing the set of possible deviations on the equilibrium path or in punishment
phases. Section 4 accordingly extends our study to allow rms to coordinate tacitly
through repeated interaction. Alas, even in the absence of price caps, the repeated-game
literature has focused on the case of substitutes, and often on perfect substitutes. Before
trying to assess the desirability of price caps, the paper must therefore start lling the gap
and study tacit collusion with arbitrary degrees of substitutability or complementarity.
It obtains two sets of results.
Section 4.1 focuses on symmetric stationary paths in symmetric oligopoly settings.
In this context, the lessons of the static analysis are conrmed for both substitutes and
complements, provided that substitutes are strategic complements (as is usually assumed
in economic analysis). The intuition is as follows. What prevents rms from achieving
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perfect coordination through repeated interaction is their incentives to deviate so as to
increase their short-run prots. In the case of substitutes, where collectively rms wish to
collude and raise prices, the protable individual deviations consist in undercutting the
collusive prices, and price caps cannot be used to limit or better punish these deviations.
By contrast, in the case of complements, rms want to cooperate on lowering their prices
so as to eliminate the double marginalization; in this case, price caps actually inhibit
deviations from such low prices, both on- and o¤-equilibrium, and rmsand consumers
interests are aligned in preventing such deviations.
Section 4.2 goes further in the study of tacit collusion for the above-mentioned tech-
nology adoption model in which individual users must select a) which licenses to purchase
in the technological class and b) whether to adopt the technology at all. The rst choice
depends on the extent of patent substitutability within the class, while the second cap-
tures the complementarity dimension. We measure the essentialityof o¤erings through
the reduction in the value of the technology when users forego an o¤ering for the sake of
tractability, users have the same preferences along this dimension, and only di¤er along
another dimension: the cost of adopting the technology, or equivalently their opportu-
nity cost of not adopting another technology. The model allows for a smooth transition
between perfect substitutes and perfect complements.
Within this framework, we derive general results about the sustainability of tacit
collusion (coordinated increase in price) or tacit cooperation (coordinated decrease
in price), that is, about bad and good coordination through repeated interaction. We
then note that price-caps agreements are equivalent to setting a joint-marketing entity
combining two features, individual licensing and unbundling, and that both features are
needed to ensure that consumer welfare always (weakly) increases under the agreement.
Finally, Section 4.3 discusses the issue of equilibrium selection, and Section 5 con-
cludes.
Related literature. Our paper contributes to three literatures: static oligopoly, tacit
collusion in oligopoly, and an emerging literature that looks for information-free (or -light)
regulatory tools.
The literature on static oligopoly, well-reviewed by Vives (1999), is large, but has not
emphasized the themes of this paper. The study of price-cap-constrained competition
in particular is new. By contrast there is a large literature on the impact of mergers
under non-repeated interaction. This line of research was initiated by the seminal paper
of Farrell and Shapiro (1990), who consider Cournot, homogenous-goods competition,
provide a necessary and su¢ cient condition for a merger to raise price, and warn against
the hazards of using concentration indices.
Second, there is an extensive theoretical literature on repeated games, with and with-
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out observability of actions,7 as well as a large theoretical and empirical literature on
collusion in oligopoly.8 Less attention has been devoted to the role of substitutability
and complementarity, however, despite the importance of these factors in the antitrust
treatment of mergers or marketing alliances. The exception is a literature which, fol-
lowing Deneckere (1983) and Wernerfelt (1989), studies the impact of product di¤eren-
tiation. The conventional view, pioneered by Stigler (1964), is that homogeneous cartels
are more stable than non-homogeneous ones (Jéhiel (1992) calls this the principle of
minimum di¤erentiation). In the context of symmetric horizontal di¤erentiation, Ross
(1992) shows however that stability does not increase monotonically with substitutabil-
ity, because product di¤erentiation both lowers the payo¤ from deviation and reduces
the severity of punishments (if one restricts attention to Nash reversals; Häckner (1996)
shows that Abreus penal codes can be used to provide more discipline than Nash re-
versals, and nds that product di¤erentiation facilitates collusion).9 Building on these
insights, Lambertini et al. (2002) argue that, by reducing product variety, joint ventures
can actually destabilize collusion. In a context of vertical di¤erentiation, where increased
product di¤erentiation also implies greater asymmetry among rms, Häckner (1994) nds
that collusion is instead easier to sustain when goods are more similar (and thus rms
are more symmetric). Building on this insight, Ecchia and Lambertini (1997) note that
introducing or raising a quality standard can make collusion less sustainable.
Section 4 departs from the existing literature in several ways. First, it characterizes
the scope for tacit coordination in settings with (varying degrees of) complementarity
as well as substitutability. Second, it allows for explicit commercial cooperation, such as
a price-caps agreement or a patent pool, and studies its impact on the scope for tacit
coordination. Finally, it derives the regulatory implications.
Third, the paper contributes to a small but growing literature searching for regula-
tory rules that require little or no information from regulators; information-free regula-
tory rules have been studied primarily in the context of intellectual property, including
guidelines for joint marketing agreements, with and without market power and verti-
cal integration, and for standard-setting bodies (see Lerner-Tirole (2004, 2015), Boutin
(2016) and Reisinger-Tarantino (2017)).
7See Mailath and Samuelson (2006) for an excellent overview of this literature up to the mid 2000s.
8For surveys of this literature, see, for instance, Jacquemin and Slade (1998) and Marshall and Marx
(2012).
9Raith (1996) emphasizes another feature of product di¤erentiation, namely, the reduced market
transparency that tends to hinder collusion.
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2 Impact of price caps on non-repeated interactions
2.1 Setting
 Demand and supply. We consider a classic oligopoly setting with n  2 single-product10
rms, indexed by i 2 N f1; :::; ng. Let Ci (qi) denote the cost of producing a quantity
qi of good i, and Di (p) the demand for that good, as a function of the vector of prices
p = (pi)i2N 2 Rn+. We will assume that, for i 2 N , Di () and Ci () are both C2 and:11
 Ci (0) = 0 and C 0i ()  0;
 Di () > 0, @iDi () < 0 (individual demands are positive and downward sloping) andP
j2N @jDi ()  0 (a uniform increase in all prices reduces individual demands)12;
 the prot function
i (p)  piDi (p)  Ci (Di (p))
is strictly quasi-concave in pi;
 the best-response function13
Ri (p i)  arg max
pi
i (pi;p i) ;
is well-dened, C1, and bounded above.
It will be useful to consider the following familiar environments:
(S) Substitutes: @jDi () > 0 for j 6= i 2 N ;
(C) Complements: @jDi () < 0 for j 6= i 2 N .
A given pair of goods are necessarily either substitutes or complements when demands
are linear. With more general demands, however, the sign of @jDi (p) may vary with p
(see Section 2.6 for examples).
10See Section 2.5 for a generalization to multi-product rms.
11In what follows, @iF (p) denotes the rst-order derivative of the function F (p) with respect to the
price pi; likewise, @2ijF (p) denotes the second-order derivative with respect to the prices pi and pj .
12This condition is automatically satised when consumers have unit demands overall: if
fvigi2N is a consumers valuation vector (drawn from a continuous distribution), then Di (p) =
Pr [vi   pi  max fmaxj 6=i (vj   pj) ; 0g]. It is also satised if, for instance, consumers have unit demands
for each good and idiosyncratic preferences v (#S) for any combination S  N (with v (0) = 0); we then
have:
Di (p) = Pr[ maxfSNji2Sg
fv (#S) 
X
j2S
pjg  maxfSNji=2Sgfv (#S) 
X
j2S
pjg];
which decreases when all prices increase uniformly (as this can only induce consumers to switch to smaller
baskets). When n = 2, the condition is satised for any preferences v (S) such that v (?) = 0.
13As usual, it is sometimes convenient to express the price vector p = (p1; :::; pn) as p = (pi;p i),
where p i = (p1; :::; pi 1; pi+1; :::; pn) denotes the vector of all prices but pi.
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(SC) Strategic complementarity: @jRi () > 0 for j 6= i 2 N .
(SS) Strategic substitutability: @jRi () < 0 for j 6= i 2 N .
In our setting, strategic complementarity (resp., substitutability) amounts to @2iji () >
0 (< 0), and is implied by (S) ((C)) for linear demand systems and non-increasing re-
turns to scale.14 More generally, under mild regularity conditions (and indeed, in all
standard oligopoly models), prices are strategic complements (substitutes) when goods
are substitutes (complements).15
Throughout the paper, we assume that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the
unconstrained pricing game, which we denote by pN =
 
pNi

i2N . We further suppose
that, for j 2 N :16 X
i2Nnfjg
@jRi (p i) < 1: (1)
Finally, we assume that the industry prot
 (p) 
X
i2N
i (p)
is strictly quasi-concave in p and achieves its maximum at pM =
 
pMi

i2N ; let q
M
i 
Di
 
pM

denote the monopoly output of good i.
 Unconstrained benchmarks. The following lemmas provide useful properties of the
monopoly and Nash outcomes. The rst lemma shows that the monopoly outcome lies
above rmsbest-responses when goods are substitutes. When goods are complements
instead, the monopoly outcome lies below at least one rms best-response, and below
all rms best-responses in the absence of cross-subsidization, that is, if all marginal
markups are non-negative. However, with complements, it may be optimal to sell some
goods below cost in order to boost the demand for other goods; the prices of the latter
goods may then lie above the best-responses.17
Lemma 1 (monopoly prices)
(i) (S) =) 8i 2 N ; pMi > C 0i
 
qMi

and pMi > Ri
 
pM i

.
14We then have @ji (p) = [pi   C 0i (Di (p))] @jDi and thus @2iji () = [1  C
00
i () @iDi]@jDi > 0.
15See Vives (1999) for a detailed analysis.
16A stronger version, namely,
P
i2Nnfjg j@jRi (p i)j < 1, su¢ ces to guarantee the existence and
uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, and moreover ensures that it is stable under the standard tâton-
nement process; see online Appendix A. However, our analysis does not rely on equilibrium stability in
the case of strategic substitutes.
17For instance, consider the case of two goods, produced at the same constant unit cost c > 0, and with
demands respectively given by D1 (p1; p2), with @2D1 < 0, and D2 (p1; p2) = D1 (p2; p1), with  2 (0; 1).
The monopoly prices are then asymmetric, and involve cross-subsidization (namely, pM2 < c < p
M
1 ) for
 small enough (indeed, pM2 tends to or is equal to 0 as  goes to 0). Furthermore, as by construction
pM1 satises @11
 
pM

=  @12
 
pM

=    pM2   c @1D2  pM < 0, it is such that pM1 > R1  pM2 .
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(ii) (C) =) 9 (i; j) 2 N 2 such that pMi > C 0i
 
qMi

and pMj < Rj
 
pM j

; furthermore, if
n = 2, then pMi > C
0
i
 
qMi

=) pMj < Rj
 
pMi

for j 6= i.
Proof. See Appendix A.
The next lemma shows that rmsbest-responses always exceed their marginal costs:18
Lemma 2 (best responses exceed marginal costs) For any rm i 2 N and any
p i 2 Rn 1+ , Ri (p i) > C 0i (Di (Ri (p i) ;p i)).
 Price-cap constrained game. Suppose now that, prior to setting their prices, rms have
agreed on a vector of price caps, p = (p1; :::; p2) (no price capsmeans that pi = +1 for
all i). They play a symmetric-information constrained game, which we denote by Gp, in
which they simultaneously set their prices, subject to the agreed-upon price caps.19 The
game G1 in which all caps are innite is the unconstrained (no-price-cap) game.
We say that a vector of prices p is sustainable through price caps if there is some
p such that p is an equilibrium of Gp. We do not require the price-cap-constrained
equilibrium to be unique; rather, we allow for an arbitrary equilibrium selection and will
provide results that hold regardless of which equilibrium is played. However, we show
in the next sub-section that price caps can indeed be chosen so as to induce a unique
equilibrium when either n = 2 or either (SC) or (SS) holds.
 Timing. The timing unfolds as follows:
1. The competition authority decides whether to allow rms to enter into price-caps
agreements.
2. Firms choose price caps if such agreements are allowed.
3. If price-caps agreements are forbidden, or no agreement was signed, then rms play
the unconstrained pricing game G1; if instead rms agreed on a price cap vector
p, then they play the constrained pricing game Gp.
This timing by itself does not dene a proper game. First, we have not described
the information structure under which the competition authority will make its decision
at stage 1. We assume that the authority has an arbitrary prior H (G1) on possible
unconstrained games (cost and demand functions).20 Of course, the model is interesting
18Starting from p = (pi;p i)jpi=Ri(p i), the impact of a slight increase in pi on rm is prot is given
by [pi   C 0i (Di (p))] @iDi (p)+Di (p). If rm is margin were non-positive, this impact would be positive
(as @iDi () < 0 < Di ()), a contradiction. Hence, Ri (p i) > C 0i (Di (Ri (p i) ;p i)).
19This of course assumes that the products are well-specied and so price caps cannot be evaded
indirectly through reductions in product quality. We will later extend some of our results to allow for
such evasion.
20Constrained games Gp are derived from G1 by keeping the same payo¤ functions i (p) for pi  pi
and setting i (p) =  1 for pi > pi:
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only if H is not degenerate. If the stage-3 game does not have a unique equilibrium, we
can augment H to include beliefs about which equilibrium will prevail. Our results will
pertain to all prior beliefs, making the conclusions particularly robust.
Second, we assume that the competition authoritys objective function is consumer
welfare. This implies that when price caps are allowed, they a fortiori increase a broader
notion of welfare if they raise industry prot.21
Third, the green light given at stage 1 by the competition authority may introduce
specic rules about the mechanisms that can be used to reach such an agreement (see
in particular Section 3); however, in line with our information-free objective, we do not
allow it to depend on actual levels of the price caps.
Finally, we voluntarily refrain from specializing the negotiation process underlying
stage 2. The normative focus of our analysis focuses on stage 1 and asks whether price-
caps agreements can harm consumers, regardless of how they come about; we thus provide
results that hold for any price caps. We therefore do not specify any extensive form for
the negotiation; neither do we require that agreements be reached among all rms, or for
that matter even within a single coalition of rms.
We also ask whether price-caps agreements can benet rms themselves, which of
course conditions the outcome of the stage-2 negotiation, regardless of the particular
bargaining game that is implicit in that stage. The existence of caps benetting rms
requires some discussion, for several reasons. a) Reminiscent of the literature on cartel
formation or merger negotiations,22 an e¢ cient agreement may not be reached as some
rms try to free ride on the others. For example, with complements, a rm may try
to benet from the other rmsagreement to reduce price through price caps without
contributing to the public good themselves. b) Di¤erent coalitions may form, that have
antagonistic interests. Section 2.7 notes that agreements between platforms and their
apps may create a prisoners dilemma. c) Firms may need to operate lump-sum transfers
among themselves in order to reach agreement. For example, a rm may benet from
another rms lowering its price, but the converse may not hold, in which case some
compensation is required.
To address this latter issue, when discussing rms incentives we will occasionally
consider two scenarios, with and without lump-sum transfers at the time of agreement.
Let i(p) denote rm is prot in the price-cap-constrained game Gp (so i(1) = Ni ).
Assumption Consider a coalition I of rms signing a price-cap-agreement at pI ,
when the remaining rms face price caps pN=I . This price cap vector is
(i) individually rational if for all i 2 I, i(pI ; pNnI)  i(1; pNnI)
21A coalition of rms may sign an agreement that increases the prot of its members but reduces total
industry prot.
22See, e.g., dAspremont et al. (1982), dAspremont and Gabszewicz (1986), Deneckere and Davidson
(1985), Donsimoni et al. (1986), and Rajan (1989).
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(ii) collectively rational if
P
i2I i(pI ; pNnI) 
P
i2I i(1; pNnI).
We assume that if (lump-sum) transfers are prohibited, agreed-upon caps are indi-
vidually rational, and that if transfers are allowed, agreed-upon caps are collectively
rational.
Of course we could make stronger assumptions: in the no-transfer case, that the caps
not only be rational but also on the Pareto frontier; in the transfer case, that the Coasian
outcome (which maximizes the coalitions total prot) be reached. But we do not need
those stronger assumptions (with the exception of Proposition 5(ii)).
Given this, we denote by G the overall, three-stage game.
2.2 Price-cap implementable allocations
The following proposition shows that such price caps can sustain any prices lying below
rmsbest responses, and only these prices:
Proposition 1 (price-cap implementable allocations)
(i) The set of prices that are sustainable through price caps is:
P p 2 Rn+ j pi  Ri (p i) for i 2 N	 :
(ii) In particular, the Nash price vector pN belongs to P and, for any other price vector
p in P, pi < pNi for some i 2 N .
Proof. (i) We rst show that price caps can sustain only prices in P. Consider a price
vector p^ that is sustainable through price caps (pi)i2N . As i (p) is strictly quasi-concave
in pi, we must have, for i 2 N :
p^i = arg max
pipi
i (pi; p^ i) = min fRi (p^ i) ; pig  Ri (p^ i) :
Hence, p^ 2 P.
Conversely, any price vector p^ 2 P is sustainable through the vector of price caps
p = p^. To see this, note that, for i 2 N : pi = p^i  Ri (p^ i); the strict quasi-concavity of
i (p) in pi then yields the result.
(ii) See Appendix B.
This proposition already establishes that rms cannot use price caps to raise all prices
above their Nash levels. More generally, as price caps prevent rms from charging high
prices, they are intuitively unlikely to harm consumers. We explore this further in the
next two subsections.
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The proof of Proposition 1 shows that any p^ in P is sustainable through the vector
of price caps p = p^; however, the constrained game Gp^ may exhibit other equilibria (in
which case any other price cap vector p sustaining p^ would also exhibit other equilibria,
as it would impose less stringent constraints on rmspricing decisions). The following
proposition shows that unique implementation can actually be obtained in a wide range
of settings:
Proposition 2 (unique implementation) In any of the following situations, any p^ 2
P is the unique equilibrium of the constrained game Gp^:
(i) duopoly;
(ii) (SC);
(iii) (SS).
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
In other settings, however, price caps may not achieve unique implementation. Online
Appendix C.2 provides an example with three rms and strictly quasi-concave prot
functions for which there is a unique Nash equilibrium, but multiple price-cap-constrained
equilibria.
2.3 Duopoly
We focus here on the case of a duopoly. Recall the intuition that price caps do not allow
competitors to collude and raise prices of substitutes, but allow producers of complements
to cooperate and solve the double marginalization problem. Based on this intuition, one
might expect that for any p and any demand system, if p is an equilibrium of G1 and p0
is an equilibrium of Gp, then p0i  pi for all i, but this is not true: a reduction in one price
may induce other rms to raise their prices; nonetheless, under the following regularity
assumption, consumers are necessarily weakly better o¤ under p0 than under p:
Assumption A: For any i 6= j 2 f1; 2g and any price pi 2 [0; pNi ), if Rj (pi) > pNi ,
then:
R0j (pi) >  
Di (pi; Rj (pi))
Dj (Rj (pi) ; pi)
:
Assumption A holds trivially when prices are strategic complements (as then R0j () >
0), as is the case with standard theoretical and empirical models of price competition. It
also follows from the usual stability condition
R0j (pi) < 1 when demand functions are
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quasi-symmetricin that pN1 = p
N
2 and pi < pj implies Di (pi; pj)  Dj (pj; pi).23 It also
holds for the hybrid demands considered in Section 2.6.24
We have:
Proposition 3 (duopoly: price caps benet consumers) For any demand system
that satises Assumption A, any price vector p 6= pN that is sustainable through price
caps yields a higher consumer surplus than pN . Therefore: (i) for any vector of price
caps p, consumers are weakly better o¤ under Gp than under G1; and (ii) in G, it is
optimal for the competition authority to allow price caps.
Proof. Consider a price vector p^ = (p^1; p^2) in Pn

pN
	
. From Proposition 1, p^i < pNi
for some i 2 f1; 2g. If the price of the other rm, j, satises p^j  pNj , then consumers
clearly prefer p^ to p^N . Suppose now that p^j > pNj ; from Proposition 1 we then have
Rj (p^i)  p^j > pNj , let:25
pi  inf

pi  p^i j Rj (pi)  pNj
	
:
By construction, pi 2 (p^i; pNi ] and Rj (pi) = pNj . Letting S (pi; pj) denote total consumer
surplus, we then have:
S (p^i; p^j)  S (p^i; Rj (p^i)) > S (pi; Rj (pi))  S
 
pNi ; p
N
j

;
where the rst inequality follows from Proposition 1, the last follows from pi  pNi and
Rj (pi) = p
N
j , and the strict one follows from pi > p^i and Assumption A, which together
imply:
S (p^i; Rj (p^i))  S (pi; Rj (pi)) =
Z pi
p^i

Di (pi; Rj (pi)) +Dj (Rj (pi) ; pi)R
0
j (pi)

dpi > 0:
This Proposition shows that, under Assumption A, rmsuse of price caps can only
benet consumers. Consider now rmsincentives to introduce price caps.
Intuitively, suppliers of substitutes wish to avoid competition and raise prices above
the Nash level; in the light of Proposition 1, price caps are unlikely to help them. By
23Fix pi < pN . As R0j (pi) < 1, we then have:
Rj (pi)  pi =
Z pi
pN

R0j (p)  1

dp > 0:
Under quasi-symmetry, we thus have Dj (Rj (pi) ; pi)  Di (pi; Rj (pi)), which, together with R0j (pi) >
 1, implies that Assumption A is satised.
24In online Appendix B, we provide a su¢ cient condition on demand ensuring that Assumption A
holds, as well as a counter-example where this assumption does not hold; in the counter-example, price
caps increase prots and reduce consumer surplus.
25The reasoning that follows relies on the range [p^i;pi], because Assumption A is required to hold only
for the prices pi < pNi that satisfy Rj (pi) > p
N
i .
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contrast, suppliers of complements wish to avoid double marginalization, and price caps
can enable them to achieve that. The following Proposition conrms this intuition:
Proposition 4 (duopoly: rmsincentives to adopt price caps)
(i) Under (S), rms cannot use price caps to increase both of their prots; if in addition
(SC) holds, then rms cannot use price caps to increase any of their prots (and
thus, a fortiori, their joint prot).
(ii) Under (C), rms can use price caps to increase both prots (and thus, a fortiori,
their joint prot); any such price caps benet consumers as well.
Proof. We start with the observation that i (Ri (pj) ; pj) increases (resp., decreases)
with pj under (S), (resp., under (C)); to see this, note that:
d
dpj
fi (Ri (pj) ; pj)g = @ji (Ri (pj) ; pj)
= [Ri (pj)  C 0i (Di (Ri (pj) ; pj))] @jDi (Ri (pj) ; pj) ;
where the rst equality follows from the envelope theorem. It follows from Lemma 2 that
the last expression has the same sign as @jDi ().
(i) Consider a price vector p^ = (p^1; p^2) in Pn

pN
	
. From Proposition 1, p^j < pNj for
some j 2 f1; 2g. Under (S), we have, for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g:
i (p^i; p^j)  i (Ri (p^j) ; p^j) < i
 
Ri
 
pNj

; pNj

= i
 
pNi ; p
N
j

;
where the weak inequality stems from the denition of Ri () and the strict inequality
follows from p^j < pNj and i (Ri (pj) ; pj) being strictly increasing in pj, as noted above.
Therefore, rms cannot use price caps (with or without transfers) to increase both of
their prots.
Furthermore, if prices are strategic complements, then any price vector p^ = (p^1; p^2)
in PnpN	 is such that p^i < pNi for i = 1; 2.26 The above argument then implies that
both rms obtain strictly less prot than in the Nash equilibrium. Hence, in that case
rms cannot use price caps to increase any of their prots.
(ii) By contrast, under (C), there exist prices in P that increase both rmsprots.
To see this, note rst that, from Lemma 2, both rmsmargins are positive at the Nash
equilibrium. It follows that, starting from the Nash equilibrium prices
 
pN1 ; p
N
2

, a small
and uniform reduction in both prices increases both rmsprots, as reducing one rms
price has only a second-order e¤ect on the prot of that rm, and a rst-order, positive
e¤ect on the other rms prot (as it increases that rms demand). To conclude the
26From Proposition 1, this has to be the case for at least one rm i; Proposition 1 and strategic
complementarity then together imply that, for the other rm, j: p^j  Rj (p^i) < Rj
 
pNi

= pNj .
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argument, it su¢ ces to note that any (p1; p2) =
 
pN2   "; pN2   "

, with " > 0, belongs to
P, as (using condition (1)):
Rj (pi)  pj =
Z "
0

1 R0j
 
pNi   x

dx > 0:
Therefore, there are prices in P that give both rms more prot than the Nash equilibrium
prices, as is required for a price cap vector to be agreed upon in the absence of transfer.
To conclude the proof, it su¢ ces to note that increasing both rmsprots requires
lowering prices below the Nash level. To see this, consider a price vector p that increases
both rmsprots above their Nash levels; we then have, for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g:
i (Ri (pj) ; pj)  i (p)  Ni = i
 
Ri
 
pNj

; pNj

;
which, under (C), implies pj  pNj . Hence, p  pN .
Proposition 4 (which does not hinge on Assumption A) shows that: (i) rms will not
select price caps when they o¤er substitutable goods (case (S)) rms would like to raise
prices, whereas price caps (which would benet consumers) can only be used to lower
prices; and (ii) price caps enable the rms to cooperate when they o¤er complements
(case (C)), in which case rmsinterests are aligned with those of consumers both long
for lower prices. Furthermore, price caps benet consumers whenever they enhance both
rmsprots.27
Finally, it is interesting to compare the use of price caps with the impact of a merger
on rmspricing policies (in the absence of merger-specic synergies). For the sake of
exposition, it is useful to suppose that either:
(MS) p
M
i  pNi for i = 1; 2, with at least one strict inequality, and Assumption A holds;
or:
(MC) p
M
i  pNi for i = 1; 2, with at least one strict inequality, and pMi  Ri
 
pMj

for
i 6= j 2 f1; 2g.
The rst situation (case (MS)) always arises under (S) and (SC).28 However, it can
also arise even when (S) does not hold. This can be the case, for instance, when goods
are substitutes for some prices but complements for other prices. For instance, neither
(S) nor (C) holds in the two examples discussed in Section 2.6, and yet one of (MS) and
(MC) is satised, depending on the specic values of some of the parameters. Note also
27Which prices rms actually choose to sustain depends on factors such as rmsrelative bargaining
power or the feasibility of side transfers.
28From Lemma 1, under (S) the monopoly outcome lies above both rmsbest-responses; under (SC),
this in turn implies that monopoly prices strictly exceed Nash levels.
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that, when rms are su¢ ciently asymmetric, then under (C) the monopoly price may lie
above the Nash level for one rm, and below it for the other rm.29 Online Appendix
F.3 provides a platform  (large number of) apps example in which, under monopoly
pricing, applications are sold at cost (say 0, and thus, below Nash prices), which allows
the platform to be priced at a price exceeding the Nash level.
The analysis above suggests that, in the absence of information about the situation
at stake, and in the absence of merger-specic e¢ ciency gains, price caps constitute a
socially safer alternative to mergers. Indeed, we have:
Proposition 5 (duopoly: price caps vs. mergers)
(i) Under (MS), a merger harms consumers, whereas price caps can only benet them.
(ii) Under (MC), allowing a merger or a price cap agreement which maximizes total
prot both yield perfect price cooperation, which benets rms and consumers.
Proof. (i) Under (MS), consumers prefer the Nash prices to the monopoly prices, and
thus a merger harms them. By contrast, from Proposition 3, price caps can only benet
consumers.
(ii) Under (MC), Ri
 
pMj
  pMi = pi for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g; from Propositions 1 and
2, charging the monopoly prices thus constitutes the unique equilibrium of GpM . Thus,
when rms can operate transfers as part of the price caps agreement, they will agree on
price caps pM , so as to generate the industry monopoly prot (as would a merger), and
use transfers to share it appropriately.
2.4 Symmetric oligopoly
We now extend the analysis to an arbitrary number of rms, and rst focus on symmetric
rms and price caps. Specically, we assume here that the n  2 rms:
 face the same cost: Ci (qi) = C (qi) for all i 2 N ;
 face symmetric demands, in the sense that other rmsprices are interchangeable:
Di (p) = D (pi; p i), whereD (pi; p i) = D (pi; (p i)) for any permutation  () of
the prices p i, for all i 2 N and (pi;p i) 2 Rn+.
It follows that all rms have the same best-response R (p i), which is moreover in-
variant under any permutation of the other rmsprices. We further assume that
@1R () >  1; (2)
29Furthermore, as noted at the end of Subsection 2.2, with complements it may be useful to price one
good below cost, in which case the price of the other good lies above the best-response.
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where @1R () denotes the partial derivative of R () with respect to its rst argument (by
symmetry, the same condition applies to the other derivatives).30
We maintain our general assumptions, which imply that the Nash equilibrium and
the monopoly outcome are not only unique but symmetric: pNi = p
N and pMi = p
M ; let
qM denote the monopoly quantity. Finally, it will be convenient to denote by s (p) 
 (p; :::; p) the individual prot achieved when all rms charge the same price p, and by
Rs (p)  R (p; :::; p) the best-response to a uniform price charged by the other rms.
Condition (1) implies Rs0 () < 1.31
Intuitively, rms wish to raise prices above the static Nash level when their goods are
substitutes, and to lower prices when their goods are complements. Indeed, we have:
Lemma 3 (symmetric oligopoly: protable prices)
(i) Under (S), pM > pN and s (p)  s  pN =) p  pN ;
(ii) Under (C), pM < pN and s (p)  s  pN =) p  pN .
Proof. See Appendix D.
From Proposition 1, rms cannot use price caps to raise their prices uniformly above
the Nash level. We now show that, conversely, symmetric price caps can only sustain
prices below the Nash level, leading to:
Proposition 6 (symmetric oligopoly: price caps benet consumers)
For any symmetric price caps p, consumers are weakly better o¤ under Gp than under
G1; therefore, it is optimal for the competition authority to allow symmetric price caps.
Proof. See Appendix E.
This Proposition extends Proposition 3 in that symmetric price caps can only result in
lower prices and thus benet consumers. Using Lemma 3, it also implies that rms have
no incentives to introduce a price cap under (S), and can instead use them to increase
their prots under (C). Indeed, we have:
Proposition 7 (symmetric oligopoly: rmsincentives)
(i) Under (S), rms cannot use symmetric price caps to sustain a more protable
symmetric outcome than that of the Nash equilibrium.
30This condition is trivially satisfy under (SC); under (SS), it is implied by the standard stability
assumption
P
i2Nnfjg @jRi (p i) >  1.
31Using symmetry and Rs0 (p) =
P
j2Nnfig @jRi (p i), we have:
Rs0 (p) =
1
n
X
i2N
X
j2Nnfig
@jRi (p i) =
1
n
X
j2N
X
i2Nnfjg
@jRi (p i) < 1;
where the inequality stems from (1).
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(ii) Under (C), rms can use (symmetric) price caps to sustain the monopoly outcome,
which increases their prots and also benets consumers, compared with the Nash
outcome; furthermore, under (SS) or (SC), or when rms face non-decreasing re-
turns to scale, the monopoly outcome is the unique equilibrium of the constrained
game GpM .32
Proof. See Appendix F.
Proposition 7 extends Proposition 4: symmetric price caps play no role when rms
o¤er substitutes, and enable rms to achieve perfect cooperation when they o¤er com-
plements, in which case this cooperation also benets consumers.
Remark: price caps versus mergers. The above ndings also extend the insight that,
in the absence of merger-specic e¢ ciency gains, price caps constitute a safer alternative
to mergers: (i) they both enable (perfect) socially desirable cooperation in case of com-
plements; and (ii) in case of substitutes, price caps are innocuous whereas mergers harm
consumers and social welfare.
2.5 Oligopolistic competition under strategic complementarity
Online Appendix C generalizes the analysis to multiproduct oligopolies when prices satisfy
(SC) both within and across rms. In the text, and as for the other accounts of online
Appendix results, we provide an informal treatment of our analysis and its intuition, and
refer the reader to the online Appendix for more detail.
We assume quasi-concave individual prot functions with product-by-product increas-
ing reaction functions (a rms optimal price on a product is non-decreasing in all prices,
its own prices on other products and those of rival rms) and, in the absence of price
caps, a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 8 (multi-product rms under (SC)) With multi-product rms under
(SC) and for any vector of price caps, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and the
equilibrium prices weakly increase with the price cap vector. Therefore: (i) for any vector
of price caps p, consumers are weakly better o¤ under Gp than under G1; and (ii) in G,
it is optimal for the competition authority to allow price caps.
With a single product per rm, the analysis follows from standard supermodularity
reasoning. For given prices charged by the other rms, a rms price reaction under a
price cap lies weakly below its unconstrained level; under (SC) this induces in turn other
rms to charge lower prices and so on.
To extend the analysis to multi-product rms, it is useful to interpret a rm i with mi
products as mi rms with a single product each and the same objective function. Indeed,
32It can be checked that this result also holds as long as costs are not too convex, namely, as long as
C 0
 
D
 
pM ; 0

< pM .
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any (constrained) best-response of the multi-product rm characterizes an individual
best-response for each of these mono-product rms. The only di¢ culty consists in ensuring
that the reverse holds (that is, that any Nash equilibriumamong these single-product
rms constitutes a best-response of the multi-product one), which is indeed the case when
the prot of the multi-product rms are quasi-concave in their prices.
Proposition 8 implies that rms have no incentive to adopt price caps when products
are substitutes, and benet from doing so when products are complements:
Corollary 1 (multi-product rmsincentives to set price caps under (SC))
(i) If all goods are substitutes, then price caps cannot increase the prot of any rm.
(ii) If instead all goods are complements, then price caps can be used to increase all
rmsprots.
Remark: segmented markets. A specic case of a multi-product rm arises when a rm
produces a single product and sells it in segmented markets. Under price discrimination,
the analysis is the same as in the single product case, as each market is a separate market;
so Proposition 8 applies. If the rms set a uniform price across markets, the analysis is
again unchanged, as aggregating demands across markets takes the analysis back to a
single market, and the (SC) property is preserved under aggregation. So Proposition 8
applies and price caps lower prices.
In both cases, suppliers of substitutes would have no incentive to introduce price
caps. By contrast, suppliers of complements can benet from the adoption of price caps
under uniform pricing, and under discriminatory pricing as well if price caps, too, can be
di¤erentiated across market segments; however, if rms can price discriminate but price
caps are restricted to be uniform, then it may be more di¢ cult to nd prot-enhancing
agreements.33
2.6 Hybrid demands
We sketch here two environments exhibiting reversals of the complementarity/substitutability
pattern. In the rst, o¤erings are complements at low prices and substitutes at higher
prices; the second exhibits the reverse pattern.
33Consider for example the case where two rms (1 and 2) are active in two markets (A and B),
in such a way that rm 1s product boosts the sales of rm 2 in market A, and conversely in market
B. Specically, DA1 (pA) = d (pA1), DA2 (pA) =  (pA1) d (pA2), DB2 (pB) = d (pB2) and DB1 (pB) =
 (pB2) d (pB1), where  () is increasing whereas d () and d () are both decreasing in their respective
arguments; all costs are zero. In the absence of price caps, the equilibrium involves the monopoly prices
pA1 = pB2 = p
m = arg max pd (p) and pA2 = pB1 = pm = arg max p d (p). In order to increase both rms
prots, price caps should decrease pA1 and pB2 below pm, which would be costly if the same caps apply
to both market segments and pm > pm and  (p) = + "p, where "! 0 (small complementarity) .
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2.6.1 Technology adoption
Consider a nested model in which (a unit mass of) users rst select among licenses to
patents covering a technology and then choose between this technology and selected
licenses and an outside option (adopting a competing technology or no technology at all).
For tractability we assume a single-dimensional heterogeneity parameter: users di¤er in
their opportunity cost or benet of adopting the technology, but not in their preferences
for the bundles of licenses within the technology. In the context of two symmetrical
patents held by two patent owners, the description goes as follows. The users obtain
value V from acquiring the two licenses, and V   e from a single one. So e 2 [0; V ] is an
essentiality parameter: e = 0 for perfect substitutes and e = V for perfect complements.
A user with adoption cost  is willing to adopt the complete technology, based on
both patents, if and only if V   + P , where P is the total licensing price; the demand
is thus
D(P )  F (V   P );
where F () denotes the cumulative distribution function of the technology adoption cost
. Similarly, the demand for the incomplete technology at price p is
D(p+ e) = F (V   e  p):
That is, an incomplete technology sold at price p generates the same demand as the
complete technology sold at price p + e; thus p + e can be interpreted as the quality-
adjusted price.
For low prices (pi < e for i = 1; 2), users secure both licenses and (assuming a
zero marginal cost) rm is prot is given by piF (V   p1   p2). So o¤erings are local
complements: each patent holder wishes that the other owner reduce her price. By
contrast, for high prices (pi > e for i = 1; 2), users do not acquire a second license
and pick the lower price one if they adopt the technology at all. So o¤erings are local
substitutes.
To ensure the concavity of the relevant prot functions, we will assume that the
demand function is well-behaved:
Assumption B: D () is twice continuously di¤erentiable and, for any P 2 [0; V ],
D0 (P ) < 0 and D0 (P ) + PD00 (P ) < 0.
If users buy the two licenses at unit price p, each rm obtains
 (p)  pD (2p) ;
which is strictly concave under Assumption B; let pM 2 [0; V ] and M denote the per-
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patent monopoly price and prot:
pM  arg max
p
 (p) ; and M    pM = pMD(2pM):
If instead users buy a single license at price p, industry prot is
~ (p)  pD (p+ e) ;
which is also strictly concave under Assumption B; let ~pM(e) denote the monopoly price
and ~M (e) the total monopoly prot for the incomplete technology:
~pM (e)  arg max
p
pD (p+ e) ; and ~M (e)  ~  ~pM (e) = ~pM (e)D(~pM (e) + e):
Like ~ (p), ~M (e) is decreasing in e: the prot derived from the incomplete technology
decreases as each patent becomes more essential.
Consider the static game in which the two rms simultaneously set their prices. When
a rm raises its price, either of two things can happen. First, technology adopters may
keep including the license in their basket, but because the technology has become more
expensive, fewer users adopt it. In reaction to price pj set by rm j, rm i sets price
r(pj) given by:
r (pj)  arg max
pi
piD (pi + pj) ;
which under Assumption B satises  1 < r0 (pj) < 0 and has a unique xed point, which
we denote by p^:
p^ = r (p^) :
The two patents are then complements and their prices strategic substitutes. Furthermore,
p^ > pM due to double marginalization.34
Second, technology adopters may stop including the license in their basket; this occurs
only when the rm raises its price above e. It follows that the Nash equilibrium is unique
and symmetric:35 both rms charge
pN  min fe; p^g ;
and face positive demand. We will denote the resulting prot by N    pN.
Along the lines of our previous results, it is easy to check that price caps can only be
benecial: if pN < pM , the equilibrium prices under a cap cannot exceed e = pN (each pi
34By revealed preference, pMD
 
2pM
  p^D (2p^)  pMD  p^+ pM and thus D  2pM  D  p^+ pM,
implying p^  pM . Assumption B moreover implies that this inequality is strict.
35See online Appendix D for a detailed exposition. The symmetric reaction function exhibits a kink,
but satises Assumption A whenever it is di¤erentiable, as well as for both right- and left-derivatives at
the kink.
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is equal to the minimum of e and rm is cap), and so letting rms agree on price caps
has no e¤ect on the outcome; if instead pN > pM , then allowing price caps lead to the
lower-price monopoly outcome.
Interestingly, a pool o¤ering the bundle at some pre-agreed price P , together with
independent licensing, achieves here the same outcome.36 Independent licensing means
that the owners of the patents keep ownership of their patent and therefore can market it
outside the pool. A price cap is equivalent to the combination of independent licensing and
unbundling, where unbundlingrefers to the requirement that the pool sells individual
licenses (at a total price below the bundle price) and not only the bundle; the pools
stand-alone prices then serve as price caps for the independent licensing pricing game.
As we will see, independent licensing alone no longer provides a perfect screen under
repeated interaction.37
2.6.2 Di¤erentiated goods with network externalities
Online Appendix E studies the properties of the Hotelling model augmented with positive
network externalities.38 The one di¤erence with the familiar Hotelling model on a line is
that the consumersvaluation is v+(q1 + q2) where  > 0 is the club-e¤ects parameter.
For low prices, the market is covered and there are no network externalities at the margin,
as total demand is xed and equal to the unit mass of consumers (q1 + q2 = 1). So
o¤erings are imperfect substitutes. For high prices the market is not covered and the
rms choose their prices as local monopolies. So each locally would like the other rm to
lower its price and create more externalities. The reaction curves are represented in Figure
1, which illustrates some of the results obtained in the online Appendix: in particular, for
v high enough, the o¤erings satisfy (S) and (SC), and the monopoly prices are greater
than the Nash prices. By contrast, if v is small enough, then for low prices the o¤erings
locally satisfy (S) and (SC), but around the Nash prices they satisfy (C) instead, and
the monopoly prices are lower than the Nash prices.
It is straightforward to check that, in this setting as well, price caps can only benet
consumers: if pN < pM (which occurs when v is high), prices are strategic complements,
implying that price caps can only lower the equilibrium prices; if instead pN > pM , then
allowing price caps leads to the lower-price monopoly outcome.39
36See Lerner and Tirole (2004). Current antitrust guidelines in Europe, Japan and the US require
patent pools to allow independent licensing.
37When n > 2, a pool with independent licensing still always admits an equilibrium with prices below
the Nash prices; but Boutin (2016) shows that it may also admit equilibria that raise prices, and that
unbundling destroys these bad equilibria.
38For related work, see Stahl (1982) and Grilo et al. (2001).
39In the intermediate case where there exist multiple equilibria, we assume that rms coordinate on
the symmetric one, which allows them to share the monopoly prot. Price caps can then only reduce
prices and benet consumers. However, within the set of equilibrium outcomes, moving away from the
symmetric one benets consumers, although this reduces rmsjoint prot, and may even lower both
of their prots. Thus, if rms were somehow (mis-)coordinating on a highly asymmetric equilibrium,
then price caps might be used to induce a less asymmetric outcome that benets both rms but harms
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Figure 1: Di¤erentiated goods with network externalities
Proposition 9 (price-dependent C=S pattern) The technology adoption and the dif-
ferentiated goods with network externalities models both exhibit a pattern of price-dependent
complementarity/substitutability: goods are complements for low (resp. high) prices in the
former (resp. latter) case. In G, it is optimal for the competition authority to allow price
caps.
2.7 Mixture of complements and substitutes
Online Appendix F rst provides an example of a welfare-decreasing price-caps agree-
ment in a mixed complement-substitute environment. Its gist is simple. Imagine that
rms 1 and 2 compete for a clientele on a Hotelling line with imperfect substitutes A1
and A2, respectively. There are two other symmetric and captive clienteles, willing to
pay some known amount for the combination of products Ai and Bi (viewed as perfect
complements). Suppose now that the rms agree on a price cap on goods B1 and B2.
The reduced price on good Bi induces rm i to increase its own price on good Ai so as to
keep capturing surplus from its captive clientele. This puppy-dog strategy softens price
competition in the Hotelling market, and reduces consumer surplus.
To obtain a positive result, we add structure by capturing a familiar environment: a
nite number of platforms compete with each other. Each platform has a large number
of applications, and each application is supplied by competing app suppliers. So there is
competition at the platform and at the app level, and complementarity between platforms
and applications. We make the standard regularity conditions (in particular strictly quasi-
concave prot functions), and mainly assume that the prices charged by rival suppliers
of an app are strategic complements, as are the prices charged by the platforms.
Consider price caps in the platform-apps model, with (SC) for platform app supplier
prices and for platform prices. There exists a unique price-constrained equilibrium, and
equilibrium prices weakly increase with the vector of price caps on platform prices and on
consumers.
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apps. Therefore: (i) for any vector of price caps p, consumers are weakly better o¤ under
Gp than under G1; and (ii) in G, it is optimal for the competition authority to allow
price caps.
With a large number of apps, app suppliersprices are independent of platform prices.
The (SC) assumption and Proposition 8 then imply that their prices move monotonically
with the caps they face. Platforms compete among each other in quality-adjusted prices
(the quality-adjusted price of a platform is its price minus the net consumer surplus
derived from its apps). Caps on a platforms app prices lower their prices and improve
platform usersexperienced quality, leading platforms to charge lower quality-adjusted
prices (although higher gross prices). Thus consumers benet from caps on apps even
in the absence of caps on platform prices. Given the (SC) assumption on platform
prices, this is a fortiori the case when platform prices are capped, following the logic of
Proposition 8.
The online Appendix also looks at the incentives to adopt caps. Price caps on apps
have two e¤ects on app suppliersprots: they increase the demand for the platform,
which unambiguously benets the app suppliers, at least if they single-home (i.e. produce
apps for a single platform; under multi-homing, the gain is weaker or even nil, as a
platforms membership gain may be another platforms loss). But enhanced competition
among the suppliers of a given app reduces their prot (unless the app supplier is a
monopolist in his market niche, in which case a slightly binding cap has only second-
order e¤ects). The e¤ect on the platforms prot is unambiguously positive.
Conversely, caps on platform prices benet app suppliers but do not benet the plat-
forms themselves, unless the apps agree on su¢ ciently low caps. More interestingly,
platforms face a prisoners dilemma: each individually wants to agree with its apps sup-
pliers on price caps for the apps and the platform so as to gain market share, reducing
the prot of all platforms and all apps in the process.
2.8 Non-veriable quality
We have assumed that the products are well-specied and so price caps cannot be evaded
indirectly through reductions in product quality. The practice of public utility regulation
has taught us that the enforcement of a price cap may trigger such quality shedding, and
a standard recommendation for regulators of public utilities is to complement price caps
with some quality control.
Online Appendix G considers the opposite polar case of non-contractable quality and
extends our main results to allow for such evasion.40 Namely, it assumes that demand
for product i takes the form Di (p^i; p^ i), where p^i = pi   si denotes rm is net price,
40One result that does not necessarily carry over is the equivalence of mergers and price caps for
complements. Both lead to lower prices for consumers, but price caps lead to some production ine¢ ciency
(suboptimal qualities) while mergers do not.
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adjusted for quality. The quality si can be produced at convex unit cost ci (si). We rst
demonstrate that a rm reduces its quality in reaction to a price cap (c0i (si) < 1), the
more so the more stringent the price cap. We then show that a su¢ cient condition for
our analysis to carry over to non-contractable qualities is that an increase in its price
cap does not induce a rm to reduce its net price. This condition is equivalent to the
curvature of the net cost function (ci (si)  si) exceeding the semi-elasticity of demand:41
c00i (si)
jc0i (si)  1j
>
j@iDi (p^i; p^ i)j
Di (p^i; p^ i)
:
Intuitively, the rm cannot substitute too easily decreases in quality for price increases.
Assuming this is the case, we show that the set of net prices that are implementable
through a price cap is again the set of price vectors that lie below the reaction curves.
Results then follow from this characterization. For example, under duopoly price caps
cannot hurt consumers under Assumption A. Under (S), duopolists cannot increase their
prot (or even their joint prot if (SC) obtains); under (C), rms can use price caps to
increase their prots. This demonstrates the robustness of our analysis to situations in
which the quality is not veriable.
3 Investment and entry
This section analyses the impact of price caps on investment and entry incentives. We
rst consider the use of price caps from an ex post perspective, once investment or entry
decisions have been made, before discussing their possible strategic use, from an ex ante
perspective, as an instrument to stie investment or deter entry.
3.1 Post-investment price caps
Let Ii denote the set of feasible investment decisions for rm i, and I = (I1; :::; In) 2
I = I1  :::  In denote the vector of these decisions. Firm is total cost is now given
by Ci (qi; Ii), and the demand for rm is goods is Di (p; I) = (D1i (p; I) ; :::; D
mi
i (p; I)).
We assume that for any investment vector, there is a unique price equilibrium in the
absence of price caps. We consider here a modied version of the timing in which stage
2 comprises two steps:
1. The competition authority decides whether to allow rms to enter into price cap
agreements.
2. (a) Firms make investment or entry decisions; these decisions are observed by all
rms.
41Note that this condition is automatically satised if the cap is close to the best reaction price, and
therefore near the Nash price vector, as in the absence of a cap c0i (si) = 1.
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(b) Firms choose price caps if such agreements are allowed.
3. If price cap agreements are forbidden, or no agreement was signed, then rms play
the unconstrained pricing game G1; if instead rms agreed on a price cap vector
p, then they play the constrained pricing game Gp.
Online Appendix H rst introduces investment decisions in the multiproduct oligopoly
setting introduced in Section 2.5. These decisions may correspond to entering or staying
in the market, developing new products, improving the quality or lowering the production
cost of existing ones...; di¤erent rms may moreover face di¤erent choices. We assume
quasi-concavity and strategic complementarity in prices, as well as the existence of a
unique continuation price equilibrium (for any investment decisions).
From Proposition 8, producers of substitutes have no incentive to set price caps in
stage 2b, regardless of their investment decisions in stage 2a. Therefore, allowing price
caps has no impact on the set of investment equilibria.
By contrast, in case of complements, price caps help rms solve double marginalization
problems; we would thus expect their use to enhance protability and foster entry. To
explore this, we consider a more restrictive entry/exit scenario in which each rm must
decide whether to be active or not. Active rms can always sign a mutually protable
agreement that benets all of them.42 However, if only a subset of rms agree to price
caps, we must consider their impact on non-signing rms. We focus here on the case
where price caps benet non-signatories as well:
Assumption C: Any active unconstrained rm is at least as well o¤ when other
active rms are constrained by price caps than when all active rms are unconstrained.
This condition is likely to hold when rms are in a rather symmetric position. For
example, the online Appendix shows that Assumption C holds under (SS) when invest-
ments impact the costs only and the demand for one rm depends on other rmsprices
only through a symmetric aggregator: Di (p) = D (pi; A (p i)).43 It also provides an
example with very asymmetric impacts (namely, each product constitutes a complement
for the next one) where a price-caps agreement can benet two rms at the expense of a
third, non-signing and therefore unconstrained one.
Another di¢ culty lies in the possible multiplicity of equilibria in stage 2a. To address
this issue, we focus on the case where, as intuition suggests, the development of additional
complementary products enhances rmsprots, and show that, for any given market
structure that arises in the absence of price caps, allowing price caps yields an equilibrium
where at least the same rms are active. This leads to:
42As in Proposition 4 for a duopoly, a uniform small reduction in prices below the Nash level is both
implementable and mutually protable.
43See, e.g., Corchón (1994), Acemoglu and Jensen (2013), and Nocke and Schutz (2017).
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Proposition 10 (investment incentives)
(i) Under (S) and (SC), the possibility of post-investment price-caps agreements has
no impact on investment/entry/exit decisions.
(ii) Under (C) and Assumption C, for any entry/exit equilibrium without price caps,
there is an equilibrium in which the same rms (and possibly others) are active
when price caps are allowed.
3.2 Pre-investment price caps
We now turn to ex-anteprice caps. Such price caps could be used as a commitment
device to induce exit, deter entry or stie investment, ultimately hurting consumers.
There are two types of concerns, which online Appendix I explores in more detail.
First, incumbents might adopt price caps as a commitment to be tough toward a
rival entrant, a collective version of the limit pricing model of Sylos Labini (1957) and
Modigliani (1958). However, limit pricing can work only if it is credible (emphasizing
this was an achievement of the early game-theoretic IO literature). One way of achieving
credibility would be to involve customers, as they would then insist on enforcing the
caps.44 We thus propose a regulation requiring that customers are not part of the price-
caps agreement. They cannot sue or ask for a money-back payment from a rm that
charges a higher price than it promised. This recommendation applies to all customers,
at all stages of the production and distribution chain, and not only to nal consumers.
Second, rms might set very low price caps (say, below minimum average cost) as a
commitment to exit/not enter. When lump-sum monetary transfers are allowed, a rm
could monopolize the industry by bribing its rival(s) into accepting such a price cap. Even
if lump-sum monetary transfers are disallowed (which precludes such self-mutilation by
the exiting rms), rms could still allocate territories or market segments among them-
selves by agreeing to exit-inducing caps on the others turf. Intuitively, though, such
commitments are not credible, as producers of substitutes have no incentive to enforce the
price caps (or, equivalently, want to renegotiate them away). Taking advantage of these
incentives leads us to propose a second recommendation, which is that the agreement
becomes void if none of the parties wishes to enforce it.
Provided that these two regulations are in place, could price caps hurt consumers
by a¤ecting entry, exit or more generally investment? To explore this, we consider the
following modied version of game G:
1. The competition authority decides whether to allow rms to enter into price cap
agreements.
44This arrangement would also be analoguous to the use of long-term contracts as a barrier to entry,
in the spirit of Aghion and Bolton (1987).
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2. (a) Firms choose price caps if such agreements are allowed.
(b) Firms make observable investment or entry decisions.
3. (a) If an agreement has been signed, rms choose whether to conrm it; the agree-
ment is enforced if and only if at least one rm conrms it.
(b) Firms set their prices.
This timing allows rms to sign price-caps agreements in order to inuence investment
decisions, but rules out non-credible threats by asking them to conrm their willingness
to enforce the agreement, once investment decisions have been made. Indeed, Proposition
4 and its variants show that price caps hurt the rms under (S) and (SC); their incentive
is thus to renegotiate away (not enforce) the initial agreement, which undermines any
attempt to stie investment stiing, deter entry or trigger exit.
Suppose that: a) customers are not part of the price-caps agreements; b) the agreement
becomes void if none of the parties wishes to enforce it. Then, when (S) and (SC)
hold, price caps have no impact on investment/entry/exit and therefore no impact on
consumers.
This result shows that, under (SC), suppliers of substitutes cannot strategically enter
into price-caps agreements in order to deter entry or expansion, or induce the exit of a
competitor. Coalitions involving producers of complements may however have an incentive
to adopt price caps for such strategic reasons. For example, an incumbent rm could
enter into a price-caps agreement with the supplier of a complementary product, so as to
commit itself to maintain lower prices and deter in this way the entry of a potential rival:
that supplier would then play a role similar to that of a customer, by opposing any
later attempt to remove the price cap. Competition authorities should therefore remain
cautious in such environments.
3.3 Foreclosure
Our analysis so far has been motivated by the observation that mergers between pro-
ducers of substitutes increase market power. But so do mergers between producers of
complements if the merger allows them to foreclose entry (or trigger exit) of competitors.
A number of theoretical contributions noted that the Chicago school argument according
to which, in a world of complements, favoring an internal division over external suppli-
ers is self-defeating, no longer holds when entry or exit decisions are at stake. Notably,
Carlton and Waldman (2002) and Choi and Stefanadis (2001) showed that bundling may
allow an integrated incumbent to deter the development of rival systems; even though
the development of a single alternative component benets the incumbent by boosting
the value of its other components (the Chicago school argument), the development of a
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full range of components, creating together an alternative system, destroys the monopoly
position.
We will not develop a complete theory of how price caps can advantageously substitute
for mergers in such environments, and content ourselves with showing, in the context of
the Choi-Stefanadis and the Carlton-Waldman frameworks, that price caps have the po-
tential to promote system expansion without facilitating the foreclosure of rival systems;
see online Appendix J.
The instrument for foreclosure may be the choice of an incompatible technology over
an open standard. Entrants can then make a prot if they develop an entire system
alternative, but not through partial entry on a component. So entry is riskier (Choi-
Stefanadis) or less protable if entry in the complementary segments cannot be synchro-
nized (Carlton-Waldman). Independent incumbent producers of complementary goods
by contrast are better o¤ picking the open standard, as they create more competition
for the complementary product(s). Prohibiting the merger of incumbent producers of
complementary products thus reduces the likelihood of foreclosure. To be certain, the
merger may also eliminate double marginalization and lower the price of the comple-
mentary components. But this property is shared by both a merger and price caps, and
price caps are a socially superior way of avoiding double marginalization, as they do not
encourage foreclosure.
Alternatively, foreclosure may result from bundling through tari¤s: an incumbent can
practice cross subsidies to squeeze an entrant in a specic segment. This too is precluded
by the absence of merger: While an integrated rm can o¤set a price reduction on a
component by raising price on the other, an independent incumbent is not willing to lose
money on its product.
In the Choi-Stefanadis and Carlton-Waldman frameworks, a merger of complements
allows foreclosure while price caps do not. Accordingly, price caps are a socially superior
way of handling double marginalization.
4 Impact of price caps on repeated interactions
We now study the scope for tacit coordination through repeated interaction. To do so,
in stage 3 of G we replace the pricing game G1 (in the absence of price caps) or Gp (if
price caps p have been adopted in stage 2 of G) with an innitely repeated game, G1 or
Gp, in which:
 in each period t = 1; 2; :::, rms set their prices fptigi2N for that period (subject to
the price cap pi adopted in stage 2 of G, if any).
 each rm i maximizes the discounted sum of its per-period prots, Pt1 ti (pt),
where  is the discount factor, common to all rms.
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To avoid technicalities, we focus on pure strategies and, in the case of substitutes,
assume that prices are bounded above by an arbitrarily large bound: rmsstrategies
are of the form fpti ()gt=1;2;:::, where pti () is a mapping from H t, the set of all possible
histories at the beginning of period t, onto [0; pmax], where pmax > max

pN ; pM
	
(> 0).45
We also focus on the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game.
It is well-known that the repetition of the static Nash equilibrium constitutes a
subgame-perfect equilibrium of this repeated game, and that multiple equilibria may
exist when the discount factor is not too small. To study the overall impact of price caps
on the scope for tacit coordination, we study the impact of price caps on the resulting
equilibrium set. Price caps can a¤ect this equilibrium set in two ways: price caps limit
feasible deviations from the equilibrium path; and they may enlarge the set of feasible
punishments following a deviation, by constraining the deviators possible actions.
4.1 Symmetric oligopoly outcomes
We consider here the symmetric oligopoly setting of Section 2.4 and focus on symmetric
price caps and stationary equilibrium paths.
We rst note that the static Nash outcome is sustainable, with or without price caps,
and that the possibility for the rms to enter into price-caps agreements can only enhance
the scope for tacit coordination. Let P+ denote the set of symmetric prices p that are
weakly more protable than the static Nash equilibrium (i.e., s (p)  s  pN) and can
be sustained in the absence of price caps, and P+c similarly denote the set of weakly more
protable symmetric prices p that can be sustained for some symmetric price caps. Note
that
 
pN 2P+  P+c : any price in P+ remains sustainable when a high-enoughprice
cap (e.g., p = pmax) is introduced. We denote by p and by pc the most protable prices
in these sets: p  arg maxp2P+ s (p) and pc  arg maxp2P+c s (p). From Lemma 3, p
and pc both lie above p
N when the two goods are substitutes, and below pN when they
are complements. Furthermore, if rms can achieve perfect coordination in the absence of
price caps, they can do so as well with high enough price caps. The more interesting case
is therefore when, in the absence of price caps, rms cannot achieve perfect coordination
through repeated interaction (i.e., pM =2 P+). We have:
Proposition 11 (screening through price caps under tacit coordination) For a
symmetric oligopoly:
(i) Under (S) and (SC), P+c = P+: the possibility for rms of setting price caps have
no impact on the scope for tacit collusion.
(ii) Under (C), if pM 2 P+, then rms can achieve perfect cooperation with and without
price caps; if instead pM =2 P+, then  pN  p > pM = pc: price caps enable the
45This upper bound ensures the existence of a worst punishment, which we use for the case of substi-
tutes.
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rms to achieve perfect cooperation, which also benets consumers and society.
Furthermore, when rms face non-decreasing returns to scale, a price cap p = pM
yields a unique continuation equilibrium, in which rms repeatedly charge pM .
Proof. See Appendix G.
The intuition underlying Proposition 11 is simple. Under (S), rms want to raise
prices. However, under (SC) the targeted prices lie above rms best-responses; as a
result, price caps cannot be used to limit rmsdeviations from these targeted prices
and, when prices are strategic complements, they cannot limit deviations from any other
feasible price either. Hence, price caps do not facilitate tacit collusion. By contrast, under
(C), rms produce complements; they thus wish to lower their prices in order to eliminate
double marginalization. In the absence of price caps, repeated interaction may not enable
rms to achieve perfect coordination, in which case the most protable sustainable price
remains higher than the monopoly level. A symmetric price cap p = pM enables instead
the rms to achieve perfect coordination; furthermore, under non-decreasing returns to
scale, each rm can again secure its share of the monopoly prot by charging the monopoly
price, ensuring that perfect coordination is the unique equilibrium.
4.2 The technology adoption model
To study more fully the impact of price caps on tacit coordination, let us return to the
hybrid demand model introduced in Section 2.6.1. Unlike in Section 4.1, we provide a
complete characterization of the prices that can be achieved through arbitrary price caps
(and so in particular in the absence of any price cap). We also provide extensions to
asymmetric demands and to an arbitrary number of rms.46
The comparison of pN , the Nash price, with pM , the monopoly price, drives the
nature of the interaction between the rms, and the coordination that they wish to
pursue.47 Under rivalry (pN < pM , which arises when the essentiality parameter e lies
below the monopoly price: e < pM , implying pN = e), the rms wish to collude by
raising their prices above the static Nash level, which harms consumers and reduces
social welfare. Charging a price above pN = e however induces users to buy at most one
license. We will assume that rms can share the resulting prot ~ (p) as they wish.48 In
this incomplete-technology region, it is optimal for the rms to raise the price up to
46This section builds on an earlier Discussion Paper entitled Cooperation vs. Collusion: How Essen-
tiality Shapes Co-opetition.
47It is tempting to refer to substitutes in case of rivalry and to complements in case of comple-
mentors. However, in this hybrid demand model, patents are always local complements for low prices,
and local substitutes for high prices. For instance, in the case of weak complementors(namely, when
pN = e > pM ), patents are complements at prices below the Nash level (e.g., at monopoly prices), and
local substitutes at higher prices.
48In our setting, they can do so by charging the same price p > e and allocating market shares among
themselves; more generally, introducing a small amount of heterogeneity in userspreferences would allow
the rms to achieve arbitrary market shares by choosing their prices appropriately.
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~pM (e)  arg maxp fpD (p+ e)g, if feasible, and share the resulting prot, ~M (e). Under
complementors (pN > pM , which arises when e > pM), the rms wish to cooperate by
lowering their prices below the static Nash level, which benets users as well as rms.
Ideally, the rms would reduce the per-patent price down to pM , and so as to obtain
per-rm prot M .
4.2.1 Repeated interaction without price caps
We rst consider the scope for tacit coordination through repeated interaction, in the
absence of price caps. Online Appendix K provides a complete characterization, the key
results of which are summarized in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Tacit coordination without price caps in the technology model
Tacit coordination is easiest, and the gain from coordination highest, when the patents
are close to being either perfect substitutes or perfect complements. Tacit coordination is
impossible when patents are weak substitutes; raising price then leads users to adopt an
incomplete version of the technology, and decreases overall prot. Collusion by contrast
is feasible when patents are strong substitutes, and all the more so as they become closer
substitutes. Likewise, the scope for cooperation increases as patents become more essen-
tial; nally, some cooperation is always feasible when patents are strong complementors.
We now consider the impact of tacit coordination on consumers. To perform a welfare
analysis we assume that, whenever equilibria exist that are more protable than the static
Nash outcome, then rms coordinate on one anyone of those equilibria.49
49We remain agnostic about equilibrium selection, as the conclusions hold for any protable coordi-
nation.
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Proposition 12 (welfare) Whenever rms coordinate on an equilibrium that is more
protable than the static Nash benchmark, such tacit coordination:
(i) harms users and reduces total welfare under rivalry (e < pM).
(ii) benets users and increases total welfare for complementors (e > pM).
Proof. See online Appendix L.
4.2.2 Impact of price caps on repeated interaction
Let us now investigate tacit coordination under price caps. Let V+c denote the set of
equilibrium payo¤s that are weakly more protable than Nash payo¤s when price caps
can be introduced, and vc denote the maximal payo¤ in this set. We have:
Proposition 13 (benets of price caps) Price caps:
(i) have no impact on protable collusion in case of rivalry: if e < pM , then V+c = V+;
(ii) enable perfect cooperation, which benets consumers as well, in case of complemen-
tors: if e  pM , then vc = M ; in particular, introducing a price cap p = pM yields
a unique continuation equilibrium, in which rms repeatedly charge pM .
It is therefore optimal for the competition authority to allow price caps in G.
Proof. See online Appendix M.
Within the context of technology adoption, Proposition 13 extends Proposition 11 in
that it considers the entire set of Nash-dominating equilibria (stationary or not, symmetric
or not), with and without price caps. The ndings can be illustrated by comparing Figure
2 with Figure 3: price caps can only benet consumers when rms use them to increase
their prots; they do not allow for any additional undesired collusion in case of rivalry,
and allow instead for perfect, desirable cooperation in case of complementors.
Remark: Independent licensing is no longer a perfect screen under repeated interac-
tion. We saw that independent licensing provides a perfect screen under non-repeated
interaction: it prevent pools from sustaining any collusion in case of rivalry, and does
not prevent pools from achieving perfect cooperation in case of complementors. Alas,
as shown in online Appendix N, this is no longer so under repeated interaction. A pool
subject to independent licensing still improves cooperation and lowers price for com-
plementors
 
e > pM

, and it also benets consumers when (ine¢ cient) collusion would
already arise in the absence of a pool, by allowing them to consume both o¤erings; how-
ever, a pool, even subject to independent licensing, may harm consumers by enabling
collusion in case of weak rivalry. These insights are illustrated in Figure 4.
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Figure 3: Tacit coordination under price caps in the technology model
Without independent licensing, a pool would enable the rms to sustain the monopoly
outcome which also benets consumers in case of complementors but harms them in case
of rivalry. Appending independent licensing does not prevent the pool from achieving the
desired cooperation in case of complementors, and in case of rivalry, it enables the rms
to collude more e¢ ciently (by selling the complete technology), which again benets
consumers when rms could already collude without the pool. However, the pool can
also enable the rms to collude when otherwise they could not, in which case it hurts
consumers. This is because, by eliminating the ine¢ ciency from selling an incomplete
technology (the corollary of an attempt to raise price in the absence of a pool), the pool
makes high prices more attractive.
Thus, by relying on independent licensing alone, authorities run the risk of generating
some welfare loss by approving a pool of weak substitutes.50 By contrast, price caps
(which, as already noted, amount to appending unbundling to independent licensing)
provide a perfect screen.
4.2.3 Asymmetric o¤erings and oligopoly
Suppose now that essentiality di¤ers across rms: The technology has value V   ei if the
user buys only patent j (for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g); without loss of generality, suppose that
e1  e2. The following proposition shows that price caps still provide a perfect screen.
50This occurs only when no collusion is sustainable in the absence of a pool (i.e.,  < R) and the pool
enables some collusion (e.g.,   R); the pool is instead benecial when ine¢ cient collusion was already
sustainable (i.e.,   R) and is neutral when collusion remains unsustainable (i.e., for  low enough).
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Figure 4: Impact of a pool with Independent Licensing (relative to no pool)
As in Section 4.2.2, let V+c denote the set of pure-strategy equilibrium payo¤s that are
weakly more protable than Nash when price caps can be introduced, and vc denote the
maximal per rm payo¤ in this set; we have:
Proposition 14 (asymmetric o¤erings) Price caps:
(i) do not a¤ect the scope for protable collusion in case of rivalry: if e1 + e2 < PM 
arg maxP PD (P ), then V+c = V+;
(ii) enable consumer-welfare-augmenting perfect cooperation in case of complementors:
if e1 + e2  PM , then vc = M ; in particular, any vector of price caps p = (p1; p2)
satisfying p1 + p2 = PM and pi  ei induces p = p in every period as unique
continuation equilibrium.
Proof. See online Appendix M.
Suppose now that there are n  2 symmetric rms: The technology has value V (m)
if the user buys m  n licenses, with 0 = V (0)  V (1)  :::  V (n) and V (n) > 0.
The demand for the bundle of n patents at total price P becomes
D (P )  F (V (n)  P ) ;
where the c.d.f. F () satises the same regularity conditions as before (that is, As-
sumption B holds). Lerner and Tirole (2004) show that, in the unique symmetric sta-
tic Nash outcome, users buy patents at price pN  min f~p; p^g, where ~p is the unique
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price p satisfying V (n)   np = maxm<n fV (m) mpg, and where p^ is now dened as
p^  arg maxp fpD (p+ (n  1) p^)g.
As in a duopoly, multiple marginalization implies p^ > pM  arg maxp npD (np),
leading to three relevant regimes:
 Rivalry when ~p < pM , implying pM > pN = ~p.
 Weak complementors when pM < ~p < p^, implying pM < pN = ~p.
 Strong complementors when ~p  p^, implying pM < pN = p^.
Our previous insights readily extend to any number of patents in the case of com-
plementors. Likewise, in the case of rivalry, we show in online Appendix O that raising
total prot above the static Nash level requires again selling an incomplete bundle. To
go further, we focus for simplicity on the stationary symmetric outcomes that can be
sustained by reversal to Nash; let P^+ (resp., P^+c ) denote the set of prices that are weakly
more protable than the static Nash equilibrium and can be sustained in the absence of
price caps (resp., with price caps)51. We have:
Proposition 15 (oligopoly) Price caps:
(i) do not a¤ect the set of protable prices that can be sustained by reversal to Nash in
case of rivalry: if pN < pM , then P^+c = P^+;
(ii) enable perfect cooperation, which benets consumers as well, in case of complemen-
tors: if pN  pM , then introducing a price cap p = pM yields a unique continuation
equilibrium, in which rms repeatedly charge pM .
Proof. See online Appendix O.
In the rivalry case, in order to increase prots rms must raise prices, which induces
users to buy only a subset of patents. But then, a rm cannot protably deviate by raising
further its price, as it would exclude itself from the basket. Price caps thus have no bite on
protable deviations, and so cannot enhance the scope for collusion. By contrast, in the
case of complementors, price caps enable the rms to increase their prots by reducing
their prices down to the monopoly level, and preventing any protable deviation towards
higher prices.
4.3 Focal points and market transparency
Proposition 13 and its extensions imply that price caps are always socially benecial
even under repeated interaction, provided that rms seize coordination opportunities
when these exist. A potential objection to the policy of allowing price caps is that, if
instead rms fail to coordinate in the absence of price caps, the latter may provide focal
51We allow for asymmetric price caps; however, given the symmetry of the environment, symmetric
price caps are as e¤ective as asymmetric ones.
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points and facilitate collusion. Caution suggests neither dismissing this possibility nor
viewing it as negating the benets of price caps. First, while progress has lately been
made on trying to understand how rms coordinate, our knowledge of the matter is still
scant, and the empirical evidence often involves additional features such as information
sharing. Second, while communication seems to have an e¤ect on collusion, it is not clear
that the type of communication involved in price-cap setting is the relevant channel. Let
us elaborate briey on these two points.
Transparency. It is well-known that transparency(making data about prices, out-
puts, or costs publicly available) has the potential to facilitate tacit collusion: see, e.g.,
Green and Porter (1984) and Rahman (2014)52 for formal analyses,53 and Ivaldi et al.
(2003), Kühn and Vives (1995), Vives (2007) and Whinston (2006) for policy discussions.
Rules restricting information exchange, as they already exist for merger negotiations,
could then be useful.
For instance, Albaek et al. (1997) study the impact of the Danish antitrust authoritys
1993 decision to gather and publish rm-specic transactions prices in the ready-mixed
concrete market. Following initial publication, average prices of reported grades increased
by 15-20 percent within one year. Similar ndings were found in other industries, includ-
ing for the episode in the US railroad industry when contract disclosure was mandated
by the Congress.
Testing the impact of (regulatory, rather than negotiated price caps) price caps on col-
lusion is made di¢ cult by the fact that price caps are often accompanied with information
disclosure, and so it is di¢ cult to identify the e¤ect of price caps. For example, Genakos
et al. (2017) study regulatory caps in the context of the Greek market for fresh fruits and
vegetables. Using a di¤-in-di¤ approach (through the comparison with ve unregulated
fruit prices), they nd that prices dropped by 6% when the regulation was lifted and
argue convincingly that it facilitated collusion before. This interesting evidence however
does not inform us on the impact of price caps per se. First, the focal prices had been
in place between 1946 and 2011; so it would seem that they would not have disappeared
overnight when caps were lifted,54 and yet most of the price reduction took place within
a few weeks. Second, the Greek regulation was a (percentage) markup regulation, and so
it involved information sharing about cost and possibly demand (if cost is computed as
an average cost).
The eld evidence on focal points is therefore di¢ cult to interpret, due to the lack
52Rahman studies a repeated Cournot game with i.i.d. price shocks. He shows that privy messages on
the possible existence of a monitoring phasethat is later made public can enable the rms to better
detect deviations and therefore may facilitate tacit collusion. As in the conventional wisdom, ex-post
exchange of information may discipline rms.
53In a recent paper, Sugaya and Wolitzky (2017) however challenge this common wisdom and show
that maintaining privacy may help rms collude by refraining to compete in each others markets, while
better information may make deviations more protable and thereby hinder collusion.
54Given that cost information was no longer collected after 2011, one would expect that in the longer
term, the focal prices would become irrelevant.
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of appropriate counterfactual. Knittel and Stangos classic paper (2003) however nd
evidence of a focal point e¤ect of regulatory price caps in the credit card industry, in
which no information exchange happened.55 During the sample period, most issuers set
rates of interest that matched the ceiling in their states; and interest rates were higher
in states with high ceilings than in states with no ceiling.
Laboratory experiments have tried to circumvent this issue, but so far have failed to
provide conclusive evidence of collusive, focal-point e¤ects. See, e.g., Engelmann-Müller
(2011) for an experiment designed to make collusion easier than in previous attempts, as
well as a review of that literature.
Communication of intentions. A potential argument against price caps is that they
may56 necessitate some communication among the parties to x the caps. There is evi-
dence that communication is the main driver of collusive coordination.57 ;58 But again one
needs to understand the channel in order to know whether the communication that is
involved in price cap setting is the actual driver of collusive coordination. The discussion
in Kühn and Tadelis (2017), which builds on Cooper and Kühn (2014), suggests that this
may not be the case. They argue that agreements on the collusive price are actually
not decisive [. . . ]. What is central to collusion is that subjects have a clear view of the
responses of the other parties to the agreement of reactions to possible cheating [. . . ].
First, the most reliable factor to achieve collusive outcomes is communication in which
clear punishments are threatened when the explicit agreement on price is violated [. . . ].
The second mechanism that very strongly supports collusion is repeated conversation
and feedback about past behavior. In particular, there is frequent and intense verbal
punishment by players who complain about the cheating by their counterparts.
Finally, let us note that the advice given in the literature on communication is really
about markets in which producers are clearly substitutes; in a sense, our contribution
is of interest only when this is not the case. If one is concerned that price caps could
facilitate tacit collusion by providing a focal point, screening out such straightforward
55As explained carefully by Knittel and Stango, testing the existence of a focal point e¤ect is complex
for multiple reasons. First, there were two prices (issuer annual fee and interest rate), one of which is
not subject to a cap; the theory of tacit collusion is not well developed for such environments, let alone
a theory of focal points. Second, the econometric specication of the dynamic competition model is not
straightforward.
56In theory, this is not quite the case. On could for example imagine sealed-bid proposals of the type
I will not charge more than x if the other does not charge more than y, with the price caps being set
by a computer or blockchain provided that demands are compatible (with a mechanism determining how
to use the slack if they are strictly compatible, as in the Nash demand game). A direct negotiation, as
it takes place for the formation of patent pools, seems more realistic. It may nonetheless be interesting
to design schemes that would limit the amount of direct communication among the rms.
57Brandts and Cooper (2007) look at methods of coordination in a one-shot coordination game. They
show that the most powerful way of communicating is directly giving instructions (rather than trying
things like indirect incentives). In a repeated interaction environment, Fonseca and Normann (2012) show
that absent communication collusion seems to be weak except under duopoly, while communication can
have important e¤ects even with a reasonably large number of players.
58Even cheap-talk communication can facilitate collusion by enhancing market transparency; see Har-
rington and Skrzypacz (2011) and Awaya and Krishna (2016).
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cases before issuing a business review letter allowing price caps makes good sense.
5 Concluding remarks
Reviews of mergers and joint marketing agreements can be hindered by poor informa-
tion associated with patchy or non-existent price and demand data as well as time- and
price-dependent patterns of complementarity/substitutability. This suggests enriching
the antitrust toolbox with new and less information-intensive regulatory instruments.
This paper is a rst attempt at meeting this challenge. It investigates price caps as a
possible alternative to mergers.
We saw that voluntary price caps raise consumer welfare for quite general demand
and cost functions in the case of non-repeated interactions and for the more specic
repeated-interactions environments we were able to analyze. We provided a novel analy-
sis, of independent interest, of coordinated e¤ects in an industry in which goods are not
necessarily substitutes, let alone perfect substitutes. We issued some caveats, and pro-
vided extensions for the cases in which demand may exhibit either a stable mix of comple-
ments and substitutes or a price-dependent pattern of complementarity/substitutability.
We also analyzed whether price caps could be used either to monopolize the industry by
programming some rmsexit, or to stie the incumbentsinvestment, or else to deter
entry of new entrants, and were led to formulate two policy recommendations to counter
potential perverse e¤ects of price caps in this dimension of industry performance. Finally,
we showed that price caps substitute advantageously for a merger of complements when
the latter enables established rms to foreclose rivals.
This paper is only a rst step in an extensive research agenda. We conclude with
six important lines for future research. First, the theory of repeated interaction with
arbitrary degrees of substitutability and complementarity should be developed for general
cost and demand functions. Second, while we have assumed that rms take advantage of
existing opportunities to coordinate tacitly, we know little about whether discussions such
as those on price caps could enhance market transparency, or create a focal point that
would help the rms to indeed achieve tacit collusion. Further experimental work could
inform us on this question. Third, we should think beyond mergers and pools. Other joint
marketing arrangements, such as alliances for instance, ought to be considered; similarly,
indirectjoint marketing through platforms should receive more attention. Fourth, the
analysis should incorporate cost synergies and look at agreements that might increase
our condence in their competitive benets.
Fifth, we could extend the analysis to competitive non-linear pricing and other forms
of price discrimination, so as to unveil the proper counterparts of price caps in such set-
tings.59 It is known that for a monopolist non-linear pricing is mathematically equivalent
59For instance, China Eastern Airlines and Qantas (which are substitutes on the Shanghai-Sydney route
and complements on connecting ights) submitted to the Australian competition agency (the ACCC) a
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to multi-product pricing, in which the individual products are the kth unit of consump-
tion. The challenge will consist in generalizing this insight to oligopoly, applying our
results and making the recommendations operational. The analysis should also be ex-
tended to two-sided markets.
Finally, in the paper we consider only the wholesale acceptance of price-caps agree-
ments by the antitrust authority. Section 3.2 qualied this approach by adding two
requirements on party enforcement. The desirability of price-caps agreements might also
be enhanced by eliciting more information from industry participants; for example, the
authority could elicit the e¤ects of price caps set by a sub-coalition of parties on other
parties by granting the latter an outright veto (giving non-participants formal author-
ity), by letting the latter express opposition (possibly giving them real authority), or
through more sophisticated mechanisms. This research would allow policy makers to run
a better-informed horserace among mergers, price caps and more sophisticated collabo-
rative agreements. We leave these and other fascinating aspects of coopetition to future
research.
coordination agreement covering schedules, frequencies and connection times, but also new fare products
and frequent yer programs  the airline industry is highly prone to yield management and loyalty
programs. To accept the agreement, the ACCC imposed minimal quantity requirements (expressed in
terms of seat capacity between Shanghai and Sydney, and of aggregate seat capacity between Shanghai
and Australia). See ACCC decision N A91470, available at http://www.accc.gov.au. We thank Graeme
Woodbridge for drawing our attention to this case.
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Appendix
A Proof of Lemma 1
We rst show that monopoly prices exceed marginal costs for at least one rm. Suppose
instead that pMi  C 0i
 
qMi

for all i 2 N , and consider a small and uniform increase in
prices: dpi = dp > 0 for i 2 N . We then have dqj =
P
i2N @iDj
 
pM

dp  0 for all
j 2 N , and thus:
d =
X
j2N

pMj   C 0j
 
qMj

dqj +
X
j2N
qMj dp > 0;
a contradiction. Therefore, pMi > C
0
i
 
qMi

for some i 2 N .
We now show that, under (S), pMi > C
0
i
 
qMi

for every i 2 N . To see this, suppose
that there exists a non-empty subset of N , N , such that pMj  C 0j
 
qMj

for every
j 2 N , and consider a small and uniform increase in these prices: dpj = dp > 0 for
j 2 N . Under (S), we then have:
 for i 2 N n N , dqi =
P
j2N  @jDi
 
pM

dp > 0, as @jDi
 
pM

> 0 for j 6= i.
 for i 2 N , dqi =
P
j2N  @jDi
 
pM

dp Pj2N @jDi  pM dp  0.
Therefore:
d =
X
j2NnN 

pMj   C 0j
 
qMj
| {z }
>0
dqj|{z}
>0
+
X
j2N 
qMj|{z}
>0
dp|{z}
>0
+
X
j2N 

pMj   C 0j
 
qMj
| {z }
0
dqj|{z}
0
> 0;
a contradiction. Therefore, under (S), pMi > C
0
i
 
qMi

for every i 2 N .
We now compare monopoly prices to rmsbest-responses. The monopoly prices sat-
isfy, for i 2 N :
0 = @i
 
pM

= @ii
 
pM

+
X
j2Nnfig
@ij
 
pM

;
and thus:
@ii
 
pM

=  
X
j2Nnfig
@ij
 
pM

=  
X
j2Nnfig

pMj   C 0j
 
qMj

@iDj
 
pM
	
: (3)
Therefore:
(i) Under (S), the right-hand side of (3) is negative, as pMj > C
0
j
 
qMj

, from the
rst part of the lemma, and @jDi () > 0 for j 6= i 2 N ; hence, for i 2 N , we have
@ii
 
pM

< 0, which, together with the quasi-concavity of i with respect to pi, implies
pMi > Ri
 
pM i

.
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(ii) Suppose that for all j 2 N , pMj  Rj
 
pM j

, implying @jj
 
pM
  0. We then
have, for j 2 N :
0  @jj
 
pM

= Dj
 
pM

+

pMj   C 0j
 
qMj

@jDj
 
pM

;
and thus, under (C), pMj > C
0
j
 
qMj

for every j 2 N . But then, as @jDi () < 0 for
j 6= i 2 N under (C), (3) implies @ii
 
pM

> 0, a contradiction. Hence, the monopoly
outcome satises pMj < Rj
 
pM j

for some rm j.
Finally, when n = 2, (3) implies, for j 6= i 2 f1; 2g:
@jj
 
pM

=   pMi   C 0i  qMi  @jDi  pM :
Under (C), @jDi () < 0 and thus pMi > C 0i
 
qMi

implies pMj < Rj
 
pMj

.
B Proof of Proposition 1(ii)
By construction, pN lies on rmsbest-responses, and thus belongs to P. Consider now
a price vector p^ in PnpN	, and suppose that p^i  pNi for all i 2 N . For every i 2 N ,
we then have:
p^i   pNi  Ri (p^ i)  pNi ;
= Ri (p^ i) Ri
 
pN i

=
Z 1
0
d
d

Ri
 
p^ i + (1  ) pN i
	
d
=
Z 1
0
f
X
j2Nnfig
@jRi
 
p^ i + (1  ) pN i
  
p^j pNj
gd:
Summing up these inequalities for i 2 N yields:
X
i2N
 
p^i   pNi
  X
i2N
Z 1
0
f
X
j2Nnfig
@jRi
 
p^ i + (1  ) pN i
  
p^j pNj
gd
=
X
j2N
 
p^j pNj
 Z 1
0
f[
X
i2Nnfjg
@jRi
 
p^ i + (1  ) pN i

]gd
<
X
j2N
 
p^j   pNj

;
where the last inequality follows from (1). We thus obtain a contradiction, implying that
p^i < p
N
i for some i 2 N .
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C On unique implementation
C.1 Proof of Proposition 2
By assumption, pN is the unique equilibrium of game G1. Consider a price vector
p^ 2 PnpN	 and the associated price-cap-constrained game Gp^. As noted in the proof
of Proposition 1, p^ is sustainable through the vector of price caps p = p^: Strict quasi-
concavity and the fact that each price must be below the rms reaction curve implies
that p^ is an equilibrium of Gp^. So the question is whether there might exist another
equilibrium p^0 6= p^, in which necessarily at least one of the prices is strictly below the
cap. We now show that this is never the case in the three settings described in the
proposition.
C.1.1 Duopoly
Suppose that n = 2. If both prices in p^0 are strictly lower than their cap, then, because
of quasi-concavity, p^0 is also an unconstrained equilibrium; but then, from Proposition
1, pNi > p^i > p^
0
i for some i 2 N , and thus we have two equilibria of the unconstrained
game, a contradiction.
Suppose instead that only one price, say p^02, is below the cap while the other, p^
0
1, is
at the cap; that is: p^02 < p^2 and p^
0
1 = p^1. From Proposition 1, p^ lies below the reaction
curves; therefore, we have:
p^02 < p^2  R2 (p^1) = R2 (p^01) :
But then, strict quasi-concavity implies that, in the p^0 equilibrium, rm 2 could increase
its prot by raising its price toward the cap p^2.
C.1.2 Strategic complementarity
Let {^ denote the rm for which the di¤erence p^i   p^0i is the largest. From the imple-
mentability of p^ and strict quasi-concavity, we have R{^ (p^ {^)  p^{^ and R{^
 
p^0 {^

= p^0i.
Furthermore, letting p {^  p^ {^ + (1  ) p^0 {^, we have:
R{^ (p^ {^) R{^
 
p^0 {^

=
Z 1
0
d
d

R{^
 
p {^

d
=
Z 1
0
X
j2Nnf{^g
@jR{^
 
p {^
  
p^j   p^0j

d

Z 1
0
X
j2Nnf{^g
@jR{^
 
p {^

(p^{^   p^0{^) d
< p^{^   p^0{^;
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where the weak inequality stems from p^{^   p^0{^  p^j   p^0j for every j 6= {^, and the strict
inequality follows from the assumption
P
j2Nnf{^g @jR{^ () < 1. But then, combining these
conditions yields:
p^{^   p^0{^ > R{^ (p^ {^) R{^
 
p^0 {^
  p^{^   p^0{^;
a contradiction.
C.1.3 Strategic substitutability
Suppose that the reaction functions satisfy (SS). Then, for some i 2 N :
p^0i < p^i  Ri(p^ i)  Ri(p^0 i);
where the last inequality stems from the fact that, by construction, p^0 i lies below the
vector of price caps p^ i. But then, strict quasi-concavity implies that rm i could increase
its prot by raising its price toward the cap p^i.
C.2 Example of multiplicity in the price-cap-constrained game
Take three rms i = 1; 2; 3 with prots 1 (p) = p1   (p1)2, 2 (p) = p2   (p2)2   (1  
p1)p2(2p3 1) and 3 = p3 (p3)2 (1 p1)p3(2p2 1), respectively. The game G1, which
has strictly concave payo¤ functions in own price, admits a unique Nash equilibrium:
pN1 = p
N
2 = p
N
3 = 1=2. But if rm 1 faces a price cap p1 = 0, then there is a continuum
of equilibria, in which rm 1 sets p1 = 0 whereas rms 2 and 3 charge any non-negative
prices satisfying p2 + p3 = 1.
D Proof of Lemma 3
We have:
pM  Rs  pM = Z pM
pN
[1 Rs0 (p)] dp;
where the integrand of the right-hand side is positive. Hence, the sign of pM   pN is the
same as that of pM   Rs  pM. Therefore, using Lemma 1, pM > pN under (S) and
pM < pN under (C). The implication for protable prices follows from the strict quasi-
concavity of the industry prot: ns (p^)  ns  pN then implies p^  pN under (S), and
p^  pN under (C).
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E Proof of Proposition 6
Suppose that all rms face the same price cap p. If p  pN , then
Rs (p)  p =
Z p
pN
[Rs0 (p)  1] dp  0;
where the inequality follows from Rs0 < 1 and p  pN . It follows that p = p constitutes
an equilibrium of Gp; furthermore, any equilibrium p^ of Gp satises p^  p  pN , and
thus consumers are weakly better o¤ under Gp than under G1.
Consider now the case where p > pN . Obviously, pN constitutes an equilibrium of
Gp. Suppose now that there exists another equilibrium, p^, in which some rm charges
strictly more than pN . By strict quasi-concavity, p^i = min fRi (p^ i) ; pg for all i 2 N . If
p^i = p for all i 2 N , then
p Rs (p) =
Z p
pN
[1 Rs0 (p)] dp > 0;
implying that each rm would protably deviate by cutting its price. Therefore, there
exists {^ 2 N for which p^{^ = R (p^ {^) < p. Conversely, if p^i = R (p^ i) for all i 2 N , then
p^ = pN , contradicting the assumption that some rm charges more than pN . Therefore,
there exists { 2 N for which p^{ = p < R (p^ {). But then, we have:
p  p^{^ < R (p^ {) R (p^ {^)
= R
 
p^{^; p^ f{^;{g
 R  p; p^ f{^;{g
=
Z p^{^
p
@1R
 
p; p^ f{^;{g

dp
< p  p^{^;
where the second inequality follows from @1R () >  1 and p > p^{^. We thus have a
contradiction, implying there exists no equilibrium of Gp in which a rm charges strictly
more than pN .
F Proof of Proposition 7
(i) From Proposition 6, price caps can only sustain prices below the Nash level; it follows
from Lemma 3 that, under (S), rms cannot use price caps to sustain more protable
symmetric outcomes.
(ii) Under (C), R
 
pM

> pM from Lemma 1, and thus pM 2 P. Furthermore, under
either (SS) or (SC), the monopoly outcome is the unique equilibrium of GpM . Suppose
now that C 00 ()  0, and rms agreed on price cap p = pM . By charging pi = pM each
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rm i 2 N can obtain
i
 
pM ;p i

= s
 
pM

+
Z Di(pM ;p i)
qM

pM   C 0 (qi)

dqi  s
 
pM

;
where the inequality stems from the fact that (a) pj  p = pM for every j 2 N implies
Di
 
pM ;p i
  Di  pM ; :::; pM, as goods are complements, and (b) using Lemma 1 and
C 00 ()  0, pM > C 0  qM  C 0 (qi) for qi  qM ; hence, i  pM ;p i  s  pM. As
each rm can secure s
 
pM

, it follows that the monopoly outcome constitutes again the
unique continuation equilibrium.
G Proof of Proposition 11
(i) We already noted that P+  P+c . Conversely, x a price p^ 2 P+c and an equilibrium
sustaining this price p^ thanks to a price cap p. Letting V^ i denote the lowest sustain-
able continuation value for rm i 2 N , consider the alternative bang-bangstrategies:
(i) along the equilibrium path, rms stick to p^; and (ii) any deviation by rm i 2 N
(from the equilibrium path, or for any other history) is punished with the continuation
value V^ i. These alternative strategies still sustain p^, as any deviation (including from
o¤-equilibrium) is punished at least as severely with the alternative strategies.
Thus, without loss of generality, consider an equilibrium sustaining p^ thanks to the
price cap p, in which any deviation by any rm i 2 N is punished with the continuation
value V^ i. At any point in time, all deviations from the prescribed continuation path
are punished in the same way; hence, the best deviation is the myopicdeviation that
maximizes the current prot. As rms individual prots are moreover strictly quasi-
concave with respect to their own prices, it follows that, for any t = 1; 2; :::, and any ht 2
H t, rm is best deviation from the prescribed price vector pt (ht) consists in charging:
Ri
 
pt i
 
ht

; p
  minRi  pt i  ht ; p	 :
By construction, p  p^; furthermore, as by assumption p^ is at least as protable as
pN , and the goods are substitutes, p^  pN . We thus have p  pN , which, using Rs0 () < 1
and Rs
 
pN

= pN , yields:
p Rs (p) =
Z p
pN
[1 Rs0 (p)] dp  0:
We thus have p  R (p) for any rm i 2 N . But by construction, any prescribed prices
pt (ht) must satisfy ptj (h
t)  p for all j 2 N . Under (SC), we thus have:
Ri
 
pt i
 
ht
  Rs (p)  p:
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It follows that the price cap p never limits rmsdeviations: in any period t = 1; 2; :::, and
for any history ht 2 H t, rm is best deviation from the prescribed price vector pt (ht),
for any i 2 N , is the same as in the absence of any price caps:
Ri
 
pt i
 
ht

; p

= min

Ri
 
pt i
 
ht

; p
	
= Ri
 
pt i
 
ht

:
Hence, the same strategies constitute an equilibrium in the absence of price caps, and
thus p^ 2 P+.
(ii) We rst establish that pM =2 P+ implies p > pM . Suppose instead that p < pM . To
prevent a deviation by rm i 2 N , there must exist a continuation payo¤ V i such that:
s (p)  (1  )  (Rs (p) ; p) + V i: (4)
However, note that, for p < pM :
d
dp
fs (p)  (1  )  (Rs (p) ; p)g = (s)0 (p)  (1  ) d
dp
f (Rs (p) ; p)g > 0;
where the inequality stems from the fact that ns (p) increases with p for p < pM , and
that, under (C), si (R
s (p) ; p) = maxpi 
s
i (pi; p) decreases as p increases when the goods
are complements:
d
dp
f (Rs (p) ; p)g = [Rs (p)  C 0 (D (Rs (p) ; p))]
X
j2Nnfig
@jDi (R
s (p) ; p; :::; p) < 0;
where the equality follows from the envelope theorem and the inequality from the margins
being positive, from Lemma 2, together with @jDi () < 0 under (C).
As p < pM by assumption, it follows from (4) that
s
 
pM
  (1  )   Rs  pM ; pM+ V i:
Hence, pM can be sustained as well, a contradiction.
Therefore, pM =2 P+ implies p > pM ; as Rs  pM > pM = p from Lemma 1, it
follows from the proof of Proposition 1 that charging pM in every period constitutes a
continuation equilibrium when rms agree on a price cap p = pM . This establishes the
rst half of part (ii).
Turning to the second part of (ii), suppose that the rms agree on a price cap p = pM .
As no rm can charge more than pM , if C 00  0, then by charging pi = pM in every period,
each rm i 2 N can secure at least s  pM = (1  ); hence, the monopoly outcome
constitutes the unique continuation equilibrium.
51
Price Caps as Welfare-Enhancing Coopetition
Online Appendix (Not for publication)
Patrick Rey and Jean Tirole
30 April 2018
A Nash equilibrium
We establish here the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium in the setting considered in
Section 2.1:
Lemma 4 (Nash equilibrium) In the setting considered in Section 2.1, if in addition
8j 2 N ;
X
i2Nnfjg
j@jRi (p i)j < 1;
then there exists a unique static Nash equilibrium, which is moreover stableunder the
standard tâtonnement process.
Proof. As it is never optimal for rm i to charge a negative price, and Ri () is bounded
above by some nite Bi (which obviously must satisfy Bi > 0), we have, for p i 2 Rn 1+ :
Ri (p i) 2 Ci  [0; Bi] ;
where Ci is a non-empty compact interval of R+. Note that, by construction, any Nash
equilibrium price vector pN =
 
pNi

i2N is such that p
N
i 2 Ci.
Next, dene  (p)  (i (p))i2N , where i (p) = Ri (p i).  is a contraction mapping
from C  C1  ::: Cn to C, endowed with the `1 norm: for any p 2 C,  (p) 2 C and, in
1
addition, for any p0 2 C:
k (p0)   (p)k =
X
i2N
ji (p0)  i (p)j
=
X
i2N
Ri  p0 i Ri (p i)
=
X
i2N
Z 1
0
d
d

Ri
 
p0 i + (1  ) p i
	
d


X
i2N
Z 1
0
f
X
j2Nnfig
@jRi  p0 i + (1  ) p i jp0j   pjjgd
=
Z 1
0
f
X
j2N
[
X
i2Nnfjg
@jRi  p0 i + (1  ) p i] jp0j   pjjgd

X
j2N
k jp0j   pjj
= k kp0   pk ;
where:
k = max
p2C;j2N
X
i2Nnfjg
j@jRi (p i)j < 1:
It follows from the Banach xed point theorem that  (p) has a unique xed point in
C, pN , and that any sequence fpngn2N satisfying pn+1 =  (xn) converges to this xed
point. Hence, pN is the unique Nash equilibrium of the static game, and it is stable under
the standard tâtonnement process.
B On Assumption A
B.1 A su¢ cient condition
We show here that Assumption A holds under the following condition:
Assumption A: For any i 6= j 2 f1; 2g and any prices pi 2 [0; pNi ) and pj > pNj :
Dj (pj; pi) @
2
11Dj (pj; pi) < 2 (@1Dj (pj; pi))
2   C 00j (Dj (pj; pi)) (@1Dj (pj; pi))3 ;
and:
Dj (pj; pi)

@1Dj (pj; pi) @2Dj (pj; pi) Dj (pj; pi) @212Dj (pj; pi)

< Di (pi; pj)

2 (@1Dj (pj; pi))
2  Dj (pj; pi) @211Dj (pj; pi)

+C 00j (Dj) (@1Dj)
2 [Dj (pj; pi) @2Dj (pj; pi) Di (pi; pj) @1Dj (pj; pi)] :
The rst part of this assumption amounts to say that, for any given price of the other
2
rm, the prot of a given rm is concave with respect to the price of that rm. It is
satised, for instance, when the cost function is weakly convex (i.e., C 00i ()  0) and
the elasticity of the inverse of the residual demand is lower than 2, as is the case for the
demand functions usually considered in oligopoly theory in particular, it holds whenever
the residual demand is log-concave (or equivalently, that the elasticity of its inverse is
lower than 1), or it is exponential (and thus log-convex) with an elasticity higher than 1.
The second part of the assumption holds, for instance, when the goods are close to
being perfect complements.1
Firm js best-response, Rj (pi), is characterized by the rst-order condition:
Rj (pi)  C 0j (Dj (Rj (pi) ; pi))

@1Dj (Rj (pi) ; pi) +Dj (Rj (pi) ; pi) = 0;
which yields (dropping the argument (Rj (pi) ; pi)):
R0j (pi) =  
@1Dj@2Dj  Dj@212Dj   C 00j (Dj) (@1Dj)2 @2Dj
2 (@1Dj)
2  Dj@211Dj   C 00j (Dj) (@1Dj)3
;
where the denominator of the right-hand side is positive under Assumption A.
Therefore, Assumption A amounts to (dropping the argument (Rj (pi) ; pi)):
Di

2 (@1Dj)
2  Dj@211Dj   C 00j (Dj) (@1Dj)3

> Dj

@1Dj@2Dj  Dj@212Dj   C 00j (Dj) (@1Dj)2 @2Dj

;
which follows from Assumption A.
B.2 A counter-example
We provide here an example where Assumption A does not hold.
B.2.1 Setting
There are two goods 1 and 2, produced at no cost by two di¤erent rms 1 and 2, and a
unit mass of consumers, indexed by x, where x is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]:
1Remember that Assumption A holds trivially when prices are strategic complements, as is usually
the case for substitutable goods. Hence, considering Assumption A is useful only when prices are
strategic substitutes, which in turn is mostly relevant when the goods are complements. But for perfect
complements, demands are of the form Di (pi; pj) = D (p1 + p2), and Assumption Athen boils down to
D ()
h
(D0 ())2  D ()D00 ()
i
< D ()
h
2 (D0 ())2  D ()D00 ()
i
+C 00j () (D0 ())2 [D ()D0 () D ()D0 ()] ;
or D () (D0 ())2 > 0, which is trivially satised. By continuity, this strict inequality still holds when the
above demands are only slightly modied.
3
 each consumer is willing to buy 1    units of good 1, and the per-unit valuation
of consumer x is v1 (x) = x; hence, the demand for good 1 is given by:
q1 = D1 (p1) =
(
(1  ) (1  p1) if p1  1;
0 if p1 > 1:
 each consumer x is willing to buy  units of good 2, and the per-unit valuation of
consumer x is v2 (x) = 1  x + xn1, where n1 = q1= (1  ) denotes the number of
consumers buying good 1; hence, in the relevant range p1 2 [0; 1] (so that n1 = 1 p1
and v2 (x) = 1  xp1), the demand for good 2 is given by:
q2 = D2 (p1; p2) =
8>><>>:
 if p2  1  p1;

1  p2
p1
if 1  p1  p2  1;
0 if p2  1:
B.2.2 Nash equilibrium
The rmsbest-responses are as follows:
 rm 1 always charges the monopoly price for its product:
R1 (p2) = p
M
1 =
1
2
:
 in the relevant range p1 2 [0; 1], rm 2 never charges a price below 1   p1 (as all
consumers are buying at that price) and thus:
R2 (p1) =
8<: 1  p1 if p1 
1
2
;
1
2
if p1  12 :
Therefore, in equilibrium, rm 1 charges the monopoly price:
pN1 = p
M
1 =
1
2
;
leading to:
nN1 = n
M
1 =
1
2
;
and thus:
qN1 = q
M
1 =
1  
2
:
In response, rm 2 charges :
pN2 = R2
 
pM1

=
1
2
;
4
leading to nN2 = 1 (that is, all consumers buy good 2) and:
qN2 = :
Consumers thus obtain a surplus equal to:
SN = (1  ) 1
8
+ 
Z 1
0

1  x
2

  1
2

dx =
1 + 
8
;
whereas rmsprot are given by:
N1 = 
M
1 =
1  
4
;
N2 = p
N
2 =

2
:
Industry prot and total welfare are thus respectively equal to:
N =
1 + 
4
;
WN = N + SN =
3
8
(1 + ) :
B.2.3 Price caps
Suppose now that a price cap p 2 [0; 1=2] is imposed on rm 1: that is, rm 1s price
must satisfy p1  p. As rm 1s prot is quasi-concave in its price and maximal for
p1 = p
M
1 = 1=2  p, in equilibrium rm 1 nds it optimal to charge a price just satisfying
the constraint; that is, it charges:
p^1 (p) = p;
leading to
n^1 (p) = 1  p
and
q^1 (p) = (1  ) (1  p) :
In response, rm 2 sells to all consumers (that is, n2 = 1 and q2 = ) by charging a price:
p^2 (p) = R2 (p) = 1  p:
Firmsprots are now given by:
^1 (p) = (1  ) p (1  p)
  N1  ;
^2 (p) = p^2 (p) =  (1  p) :
If transfers are feasible, the rms will set the price cap so as to maximize the industry
5
prot, equal to:
^ (p) = (1  ) p (1  p) +  (1  p) = (1  p) [+ (1  ) p] ;
leading to:
p = max

1
2
1  2
1   ; 0

:
In particular, p = 0 for  > 1=2; in that case, rm 1 sets its price to 0: p^1 = 0,
whereas rm 2 extracts all the surplus generated by its good: p^2 = 1. As a result:
 Price caps enable the rms to increase their joint prots:2
^ = (1  ) 0 +  1 =  > N = 1 + 
4
:
 This harms consumers when  is large enough:
S^ = (1  ) 1
2
+  0 = 1  
2
;
which is lower than SN = (1 + ) =8 whenever  > 3=5 (> 1=2).3
C Multi-product oligopoly under (SC)
We extend here the analysis to multi-product oligopolies where prices are strategic com-
plements (both within and across rms). We show that, under that assumption, price caps
cannot generate higher equilibrium prices (regardless of whether goods are complements
or substitutes). It follows that price caps can only benet consumers, and are useful for
suppliers of complements, but not for competitors o¤ering substitutes.
C.1 Setting
We consider a multi-product rm oligopoly setting with n  2 multi-product rms,
indexed by i 2 N  f1; :::; ng, each producing mi products, indexed by j 2 Mi 
f1; :::;mig; there are thus in total m 
P
i2N mi prices. Let Ci (qi), where qi =
 
qji

j2Mi ,
denote rm is cost of producing each good j 2 Mi in quantity qji , and Di (p) =
(D1i (p) ; :::; D
mi
i (p)) denote the demand for these goods, as a function of the vector
of prices p = (pi)i2N 2 Rm+ , where pi=
 
pji

j2Mi 2 R
mi
+ denotes the vector of rm is
2The inequality holds whenever  > 1=3, which is implied by  > 1=2.
3It can however be checked that total welfare is increased:
W^  = (1  ) 1
2
+  1 = 1 + 
2
> WN =
3
8
(1 + ) :
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prices. We will assume that, for i 2 N , Di () and Ci () are both C2 and that, for every
i 2 N :
 the prot function
i (p) 
X
j2Mi
pjiD
j
i (p)  Ci (Di (p))
is strictly quasi-concave in pi;
 for every j 2Mj, the product-by-productbest-response function4
rji

p
Minfjg
i ;p i

 arg max
pji
i

pji ;p
Minfjg
i ;p i

;
where

p
Minfjg
i ;p i

denotes the vector of all prices but pji , is well-dened and
bounded above.
Remark: Note that we consider here rm is price decision for one of its products,
taking as given not only the other rmsprices, but also rm is own prices for its other
products. Furthermore, as the best-response is bounded, it is interior and thus, given
the strict quasi-concavity assumption, uniquely characterized by the rst-order condition
@pji
i

rji

p
Minfjg
i ;p i

;p
Minfjg
i ;p i

= 0.
We still focus on strategic complementarity, both within rmsand across rms:
(SC) Strategic complementarity: for every i 2 N and every j 2 Mi, rji () strictly
increases in pkh for any h 2 N and any k 2Mh such that (h; k) 6= (i; j).
Finally, we assume again that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and denote by
pN =
 
pNi

i2N the equilibrium prices.
C.2 Price caps
Suppose now that each rm i 2 N faces a price cap pji for each product j inMi. Any
resulting equilibrium price vector p^ = (p^i)i2N satises p^i = Ri (p^ i; pi) for i 2 N , where:
Ri (p i; pi) =
 
Rji (p i; pi)

j2Mi  arg maxpipi i (pi;p i)
denotes rm is best-response, constrained by the price caps it faces.
We rst show that multiple price deviations cannot be more protable for a rm than
isolated ones, so that a rm best responds to its rivals if and only if each of its prices
best responds individually to all other prices, including its own. That is, letting
rji

p
Minfjg
i ;p i; p
j
i

 arg max
pjipji
i

pji ;p
Minfjg
i ;p i

4In what follows, pS denotes the projection of the vector p on the subset S; that is: pS =  pj
j2S .
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denote rm is constrained product-by-product best-response for good j 2Mi, given all
other prices (including its own) and the price cap it faces for that good, we have:
Lemma 5 (constrained best-responses) For any i 2 N , rivalsprices p i and price
caps pi =
 
pji

j2Mi, rm is constrained best-response function
Ri (p i; pi) can be char-
acterized as the unique xed point inMi of rm is constrained product-by-product best-
responses; that is:
p^i = Ri (p i; pi)()
n
p^ji = r
j
i

p^
Minfjg
i ;p i; p
j
i

for every j 2Mi
o
:
Proof. Consider rm i, for given price caps pi =
 
pji

j2Mi and given rivals prices
p i. Obviously, each price in rm is (constrained) best-response is also a (constrained)
product-by-product best-response: p^i = Ri (p i; pi) implies p
j
i = r
j
i

p
Minfjg
i ;p i; p
j
i

for
every i 2 N and every j 2 Mi; uniqueness then follows from the strict quasi-concavity
of the prot function. We now show that, conversely, any xed point of the (constrained)
product-by-product best-responses constitutes a best-response for rm i.
Thus, consider a price vector p^i =
 
p^ji

j2Mi satisfying p^
j
i = r
j
i

p^
Minfjg
i ;p i; p
j
i

for
every j 2 Mi, and suppose that p^i 6= pi Ri (p i; pi). By construction, both p^i  pi
and pi  pi, and so "pi + (1  ") p^i  pi for any " 2 (0; 1). Furthermore, as p^i consists
of product-by-product best responses, for every j 2Mi either @pjii (p^i;p i) = 0 (if p^
j
i =
rji

p^
Minfjg
i ;p i

, i.e., the price cap pji is not binding for p^i) or @pjii (p^i;p i)
 
pji   p^ji

<
0; furthermore, the latter must hold for some j 2 Mi: otherwise, p^i would be rm is
unconstrained best-response (i.e., p^i = Ri (p i)  p i), implying pi = Ri (p i) = p^i, a
contradiction. Therefore, for " positive but small we have:
i ("pi + (1  ") p^i;p i)  i (p^i;p i) '
X
j2Mi
@pji
i (p^i;p i) "
 
pji   p^ji

< 0:
Hence, i (p^i + " (pi   p^i) ;p i)  i (p^i;p i) < i (pi;p i), contradicting the strict
quasi-concavity of the prot function i.5
Lemma 5 allows us to treat the present n-player game, where each rm i 2 N has
mi products, as a m player game among single-product rms. Building on this, we now
show that price caps cannot be used to raise equilibrium prices:
Proposition 8 (incidence of price caps for multi-product rms under (SC))
With multi-product rms under (SC) and for any vector p = (pi)i2N of price caps, there
exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium prices weakly increase with the price
cap vector. Therefore: (i) for any vector of price caps p, consumers are weakly better o¤
5We use here the characterizing property that a function f (x) is strictly quasi-concave if and only if,
for any x 6= y and  2 (0; 1): f (x+ (1  ) y) > min ff (x) ; f (y)g.
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under Gp than under G1; and (ii) in G, it is optimal for the competition authority to
allow price caps.
Proof. Fix a vector of price caps p = (pi)i2N . From Lemma 5, a price vector p^ = (p^i)i2N = 
p^ji

j2Mi

i2N
constitutes a Nash equilibrium for these price caps if and only if it consti-
tutes a Nash equilibrium of the m player game in which each price pji is chosen by a dis-
tinct player (subject to the price cap pji ) so as to maximize the prot i

pji ;p
Minfjg
i ;p i

,
taking as given rm is other prices, pMinfjgi , as well as the other rmsprices, p i. In
the absence of price caps, this players behavior is given by the best-response function
rji

p
Minfjg
i ;p i

, which is bounded above by some Bji . Without loss of generality, we
can thus restrict the price pji to belong to S
j
i =

0; Bji

, and can also restrict attention
to price caps such that each pji belongs to S
j
i (as higher price caps would have no e¤ect).
From strict quasi-concavity, when facing the price cap pji the constrained best-response
can be expressed as:
rji

p
Minfjg
i ;p i; p
j
i

= arg max
pjipji
i

pji ;p
Minfjg
i ;p i

= min
n
rji

p
Minfjg
i ;p i

; pji
o
;
and is thus increasing in all arguments. Let S =
 
Sji

j2Mi

i2N
denote the (bounded)
relevant set of prices and consider the best-response function r (p; p) : SS! S, where
each price pji is given by the constrained best-response r
j
i

p
Minfjg
i ;p i; p
j
i

. Knaster-
Tarskis Lemma ensures that, for each p, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of
this m player game. To show that this equilibrium is unique, suppose instead that there
are two equilibria, p^ and p^0; one of them, say p^0, must have a lower price for at least one
product. Applying the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2 then leads to a
contradiction.6
That the unique equilibrium prices increase with every price cap follows from Theorem
2.5.2 of Topkis (1998). The last conclusion follows from the fact that the unconstrained
Nash equilibrium prices is sustainable through high enough price caps (e.g., such that
pji  Bji for every i 2 N and every j 2Mi).
Remark: bundling. The above analysis carries over when rms engage in pure or
mixed bundling. For instance, consider a case of pure bundling in which rm i of-
fers goods j 2 Bi  Mi as a bundle, and only as a bundle. Let pBi denote the
price charged for the bundle, and DBi

pBi ;p
MinBi
i ;p i

the demand for the bundle,
Dji

pBi ;p
MinBi
i ;p i

denote the demand for every other good o¤ered by rm i, for
j 2 Mi n Bi, and Dkh

pBi ;p
MinBi
i ;p i

the demand for the other rmsproducts, for
h 2 Nnfig and k 2 Mh; rm is cost function remains the same as before, with the
6See Section C.1.2 of the Appendix, using rm {^ for which the di¤erence between p^i and p^i is the
largest, and noting that strict quasi-concavity and p^0{^ < p^{^ ( p{^) together imply p^0{^ = R{^
 
p^0 {^

and
p^{^  R{^ (p^ {^).
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caveat that each unit of the bundle requires the production of one unit of each good
j 2 Bi. The previous analysis then remains valid as long as the reaction functions de-
rived from these adjusted demand and cost functions exhibit strategic complementarity.
In the case of mixed bundling, where rm i o¤ers the bundle as well as each product
j 2 Bi on a stand-alone basis, a similar reasoning applies, interpreting the bundle as an
additional good in rm is product set.
C.3 Firmsincentives
It follows from the above that, again, rms have an incentive to agree on price caps when
they o¤er complements, but not when they o¤er substitutes:
Corollary 1 (multi-product rmsincentives to set price caps under (SC)) Let
P denote the set of prices that are sustainable through price caps.
(i) If all goods are substitutes, then price caps cannot increase the prot of any rm;
that is, p^ 2 P implies i (p^)  i
 
pN

for every i 2 N .
(ii) If instead all goods are complements, then price caps can be used to increase all
rms prots; that is, there exists p^ 2 P such that i (p^) > i
 
pN

for every
i 2 N .
Proof. If goods are all substitutes, then for any p^ 2 P and any i 2 N we have:
i (p^)  max
pi
i (pi; p^ i)  max
pi
i
 
pi;p
N
 i

= i
 
pN

;
where the rst inequality reects the fact that rm i may be constrained by its price caps
pi, and the second inequality stems from the fact that price caps can only sustain prices
that are lower than pN .
If goods are all complements, the reasoning used in the proof of Proposition 4 extends
to the case of an oligopoly: starting from the Nash equilibrium prices pN , reducing all
prices by a small amount " increases all rmsprots, as rmsmargins are positive from
Lemma 2, and reducing one rms price has only a second-order e¤ect on the prot of
that rm, and a rst-order positive e¤ect on the other rmsprots. To conclude the
argument, it su¢ ces to show that the new price vector, p^ (") =
 
p^ji (")

j2Mi

i2N
, where
p^ji (") = p
jN
i   ", belongs to P; indeed, we have, for i 2 N and j 2Mi:
Rji (p^ i ("))  pji (") =
Z "
0
[1 
X
h2Nnfig
X
k2Mh
@pkhR
j
i (p^ i (x))]dx > 0;
where the inequality stems from (1). From Propositions 1 and 2, p^ (") is the unique
equilibrium of Gp^(").
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Figure 5: Nash equilibrium in the technology model
D Nash equilibrium in the technology adoption model
Consider, in the technology adoption environment described in Section 4.2, the static
game in which the two rms simultaneously set their prices. Without loss of generality
we can require prices to belong to the interval [0; V ].
From the discussion presented in the text, rm is best response to rm j setting price
pj  e is to set
pi = min fe; r (pj)g ;
where
r (p) = arg max
p
fpiD (pi + p)g
satises
 1 < r0 (pj) < 0
and has a unique xed point p^ > pM .
When instead pj > e, then rm i faces no demand if pi > pj (as users buy only the
lower-priced license), and faces demand D (pi + e) if pi < pj. Competition then drives
prices down to p1 = p2 = e. Hence, the Nash equilibrium is unique and such that both
rms charge pN  min fe; p^g.
Figure 5 summarizes this analysis.
11
E Hotelling with club e¤ects
E.1 Model
Consider the following symmetric duopoly setting, in which for notational simplicity costs
are zero (i.e., Ci (qi) = 0 for i = 1; 2) and:
 As in the standard Hotelling model, a unit mass of consumers is uniformly distrib-
uted along a unit-length segment; the two rms are located at the two ends of the
segment, and consumers face a constant transportation cost per unit of distance,
which is here normalized to 1.
 Unlike in the Hotelling model, however, consumers enjoy club e¤ects: their gross
surplus is v+Q, where v > 0,  2 (0; 1=2) reects the magnitude of these positive
externalities and Q = q1 + q2 denotes the total number of consumers.
For low enough prices, the entire market is covered (i.e., Q = 1), and as long as prices
are not too asymmetric, each rm faces the classic Hotelling demand given by:
DHi (p1; p2) 
1  pi + pj
2
:
This case arises as long as jp1   p2j < 1 (to ensure that the market is shared) and
v +   (1 + p1 + p2) =2 (to ensure that the market is covered). The two goods are then
substitutes: @2Di = 1=2 > 0.
By contrast, for high enough prices, rms are local monopolies and each rm i faces
a demand satisfying:
qi = v + Q  pi;
where now Q = q1 + q2 < 1. As long as both rms remain active, their demands are then
given by:
Dmi (p1; p2) 
v   (1  ) pi   pj
1  2 :
This case arises as long as Q < 1 and qi  0, which amounts to p1 + p2 > 2v   (1  2)
and (1  ) pi + pj  v for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g. The goods are then complements: @jDi =
 = (1  2) < 0.
E.2 Best-responses
We now study rm is best-response to the price p charged by rm j. For the sake of
exposition, we will focus on the range p 2 [0; v].7
7It can be checked that the Nash prices and the monopoly prices lie indeed in this range.
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Consider rst the case where rm j charges a price pj 2 [0; v   (1  )], so that it
would serve the entire market if rm i were to charge a prohibitive price.8 In this case,
the market remains fully covered whatever price rm i chooses to charge, and it is optimal
for rm i to obtain a positive share of that market. Firm i will thus seek to maximize
piD
H
i (p1; p2) and choose to charge:
pi = R
H (pj)  arg max
pi

piD
H
i (pi; pj)
	
=
1 + pj
2
:
Consider now the case where rm j charges a price pj 2 (v   (1  ) ; v]; the market
is then covered only if rm i charges a su¢ ciently low price, namely, if
pi  ~p (pj)  2v   (1  2)  pj:
In this range, rm i seeks to maximize piDHi (p1; p2), which is maximal for pi = R
H (pj). If
instead rm i chooses to charge a higher price, the rms are local monopolies; furthermore,
as pj  v, rm js market share remains positive, whatever price rm i chooses to charge.9
As it is optimal for rm i to maintain a positive market share as well, the demand will be
given by Dmi (pi; pj). In this range, rm i will thus seek to maximize piD
m
i (pi; pj), which
is maximal for:
pi = R
m (pj)  arg max
pi
fpiDmi (pi; pj)g =
v   pj
2 (1  ) :
Note that:
 The prot functions piDHi (p1; p2) and piDmi (p1; p2) are concave with respect to pi
in their respective relevant ranges.
 ~p (v   (1  )) = v +  > Rm (v   (1  )) = RH (v   (1  )) = (v + ) =2.
 ~p0 =  1 < (Rm)0 =  =2 (1  ) < 0 <  RH0 = 1=2.
It follows that RH (pj) > Rm (pj) in the range pj 2 (v   (1  ) ; v], and ~p (pj) >
RH (pj) in the beginning of that range. This, in turn, implies that rm is best response
is given by:
pi = R (pj)  min

RH (pj) ;max f~p (pj) ; Rm (pj)g
	
:
More precisely:
 If ~p (v)  RH (v), which amounts to v  3  4, then (Rm (pj) <)RH (pj) < ~p (pj),
and thus R (pj) = RH (pj);
8To see this, note that under full participation (i.e., Q = 1), the consumer who the farthest away
from rm j is willing to pay v +    1  pj for rm js product.
9To see this, note that even if qi = 0, the consumer whos the nearest to rm j is willing to pay at
least v  p for rm js product.
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 If RH (v) > ~p (v)  Rm (v), which amounts to 3   4 > v  2   4, then there
exists p = 4 (v + ) =3  1 such that RH (p) = ~p (p), and thus:
For pj  p, we have again (Rm (pj) <)RH (pj)  ~p (pj); hence, R (pj) =
RH (pj);
For pj > p, Rm (pj) < ~p (pj) < RH (pj); hence, R (pj) = ~p (pj);
 Finally, if Rm (v) > ~p (v), which amounts to 2   4 > v, then there also exists
p = [(3  4) v   2 (1  ) (1  2)] = (2  3) such that Rm (p) = ~p (p), and thus:
For pj  p, we still have (Rm (pj) <)RH (pj)  ~p (pj); hence, R (pj) = RH (pj);
For p < pj < p, we still haveRm (pj) < ~p (pj) < RH (pj); hence, R (pj) = ~p (pj);
For pj  p, we now have ~p (pj)  Rm (pj) < RH (pj); hence, R (pj) = Rm (pj).
It follows that for low prices (namely, for pj < min fp; vg), goods are substitutes
and prices are strategic complements: @jDi = @jDHi > 0 and R
0 =
 
RH
0
> 0. By
contrast, whenever v < 2  4 (implying p < v), then for high enough prices (namely, for
pj > p), goods are complements and prices are strategic substitutes: @jDi = @jDmi < 0
and R0 = (Rm)0 < 0.
E.3 Monopoly prices
Conditional on covering the entire market, it is optimal to raise prices until the marginal
consumer is indi¤erent between buying or not: indeed, starting from a situation where
q1 + q2 = 1, and the marginal consumer strictly prefers buying, increasing both prices
by the same amount does not a¤ect the rms quantities, q1 and q2, but increase both of
their margins. Hence, without loss of generality, we can focus on situations such that, for
some q1 2 [0; 1]: q2 = 1  q1 and pi = v +   qi for i = 1; 2. Total prot, as a function of
q1, is then given by:
H (q1) = (v +    q1) q1 + [v +    (1  q1)] (1  q1) = v +    q21   (1  q1)2 :
This prot is concave in q1 and reaches its maximum for q1 = 1=2, where it is equal to
MH  v +   
1
2
:
Alternatively, the rms may choose to cover only part of the market, in which case they
are both local monopolies. For any Q = q1 +q2 2 [0; 1) and any q1 2 [0; Q], the associated
quantity for rm 2 is then q2 = Q   q1 and the associated prices are pi = v + Q   qi;
the resulting industry prot is therefore given by:
 = (v + Q  q1) q1 + [v + Q  (Q  q1)] (Q  q1) = (v + Q)Q  q21   (Q  q1)2 :
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For any Q 2 [0; 1), it is thus optimal to choose q1 = q2 = Q=2, which yields an industry
prot equal to:
m (Q) = (v + Q)Q  Q
2
2
:
This prot is concave in Q and coincides with MH for Q = 1; furthermore, ignoring the
constraint Q  1, it is maximal for Q = v= (1  2). Therefore, the monopoly outcome
is qMi = q
M = QM=2, where:
QM = min

v
1  2 ; 1

;
and the associated prices are pM1 = p
M
2 = p
M , where:
pM = v + QM   qM = v   (1  2) qM
=
(
v
2
if v < 1  2
v    1
2
   if v  1  2 = max

v
2
; v  

1
2
  

:
E.4 Nash equilibrium
Werst note that, in equilibrium, both rms must obtain a positive market share. Starting
from a situation where all consumers are inactive, each rm could protably attract some
consumers by charging a price slightly below v. Furthermore, in a candidate equilibrium
in which only one rm attracts consumers, this rm must charge a non-negative price,
otherwise it would have an incentive to raise its price in order to avoid making a loss;
but then, the other rm could protably deviate, as charging a price only slightly higher
would attract some consumers.
It can also be checked that, when one rm charges p  v, then the prot of the other
rm is globally quasi-concave in the relevant price range [0; v + ]. To see this, note
that the prot functions piDHi (pi; pj) and piD
m
i (pi; pj) are both strictly concave in their
relevant ranges; the conclusion then follows from the fact that, at the boundary between
these two ranges, DHi (p1; p2) = D
m
i (p1; p2) and @iD
H
i (p1; p2) > @iD
m
i (p1; p2).
Suppose rst that, at the Nash equilibrium prices, the market is fully covered and the
marginal consumer strictly prefers buying (from either rm) to not buying. As both rms
must be active, their demands are given by DHi (), and remain so around the Nash prices.
Therefore, their best-responses are given by RH (). It follows that the Nash equilibrium
price is then symmetric, with both rms charging the standard Hotelling price
pH = 1:
Conversely, both rms charging pH is indeed an equilibrium if and only if the consumer
that is at equal distance from the two rms (thus facing a transportation cost equal to
1=2) then strictly prefers to be active, that is, if and only if pH + 1=2 < v + QjQ=1,
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which amounts to:
v >
3
2
    > 1 = pH :
When instead the market is not fully covered at the Nash equilibrium prices, rms
best-responses are given by Rm (). It follows that the Nash equilibrium price is again
symmetric, with both rms charging
pm =
v
2   (< v) :
Conversely, both rms charging pm is indeed an equilibrium if and only if the market is
not fully covered at these prices, that is, if and only if pm + 1=2 > v + QjQ=1, which
amounts to:
v <
2  
1  

1
2
  

:
Finally, the Nash equilibrium can also be such that the entire market is barely
covered, in that the marginal consumer is just indi¤erent between buying or not. The
prices are then such that pNi = v +    qNi and satisfy (as qN1 + qN2 = 1):
pN1 + p
N
2 = 2 (v + )  1: (5)
Furthermore, no rm i = 1; 2 should benet from a small deviation; as the market would
remain covered if rm i lowers its price, but not so if it increases its price, we must have:
@ii (p1; p2)jpj=pNj ;pi=pN i =
@
@pi

piD
H
i (p1; p2)
	
pj=pNj ;pi=p
N
i
= qNi  
pNi
2
 0;
@ii (p1; p2)jpj=pNj ;pi=pN+i =
@
@pi
fpiDmi (p1; p2)g

pj=pNj ;pi=p
N
i
= qNi  
1  
1  2p
N
i  0:(6)
Summing-up these conditions for i = 1; 2, and using qN1 + q
N
2 = 1 and (5), yields:
2  
1  

1
2
  

 v  3
2
  :
Figure 1 from Section 2.6 illustrates three possible congurations.
 In the rst situation, v is su¢ ciently high (namely, v > 3   4 (> 3=2  )) that
rms always compete for consumers in the relevant price range [0; v]. The goods are
thus substitutes
 
@jDi = @jD
H
i = 1=2 > 0

, and their prices are strategic complements
(R0i =
 
RH
0
= 1=2 > 0). Furthermore, the monopoly prices lie above the Nash level:
pM = v +    1=2 > pN = pH = 1.
 In the second, intermediate situation, rms compete again for consumers when prices
are low, as in the previous situation. However, for higher price levels, rms best-respond
to each other so as to maintain full participation; as a result the goods are at the boundary
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between substitutes and complements10 and their prices become strategic substitutes
(R0i = ~p
0 =  1 < 0). While there are multiple Nash equilibria, they all involve the same
total price, and the symmetric Nash equilibrium coincides with the monopoly outcome.
As rms are symmetric, it is natural to focus on the symmetric Nash equilibrium, which
moreover maximizes industry prot: pM = pN = v +    1=2.
 Finally, in the last situation v is su¢ ciently low (namely, v < 2   4) that rms
become local monopolies for high enough prices. The goods then become complements
(@jDi = @jD
m
i =  = (1  2) < 0) and their prices are again strategic substitutes (R0i =
(Rm)0 =  =2 (1  ) < 0); the monopoly prices then lie below the Nash level: pM =
v=2 < pN = v= (2  ).
E.5 Price caps
We now study the impact of price caps on the equilibrium prices and prots. As already
noted, in the relevant price range each rms prot function is quasi-concave with respect
to the price of that rm. It follows that rms constrained best responses are of the
form Ri (pj; pi) = min fR (pj) ; pig. Building on this insight, we now consider the three
congurations identied above.
 When v is high enough (namely, v > 3=2   ), the monopoly price lies above the
Nash level and, for prices below the Nash level, the goods are substitutes and their prices
are strategic complements. It follows that rms have no incentives to adopt price caps,
as they can only result into (weakly) lower prices and prots for both rms.
 For intermediate levels of v, rms best-respond to each other so as to maintain
full participation. Compared with symmetric Nash equilibrium, which coincides with the
monopoly outcome, price caps can only result into lower and more asymmetric prices.
Indeed, for any prices (p^1; p^2) lying below rmsbest responses:
 the average is lower than the Nash level: p^  (p^1 + p^2) =2 < pN ;
 there is asymmetry: p^1 6= p^2.
It follows that, compared with the symmetric Nash equilibrium without price caps,
these price caps can only benet consumers; to see this, it su¢ ces to decompose the move
from
 
pN ; pN

to (p^1; p^2) as:
 a rst move from  pN ; pN to (p^; p^), which obviously benets consumers, as p^  pN ;
 an additional move from (p^; p^) to (p^1; p^2), which also benets consumers keep-
ing the total price constant maintains participation, and among those outcomes
10Namely:
@jDi(p
N
i ; p
N 
j ) = @jD
H
i
 
pNi ; p
N
J

= 1=2 > 0 > @jDi(p
N
i ; p
N+
j ) = @jD
m
i
 
pNi ; p
N
J

=  = (1  2).
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consumers favor asymmetry.11
 Finally, when v is low enough (namely, v < 2  4), the monopoly price lies below
the Nash level and, for prices below the Nash level, the goods are complements and their
prices are strategic substitutes. Introducing price caps then lowers the higher of the two
equilibrium prices and, while this may be partially compensated by a limited increase in
the other price, consumers are always (weakly) better o¤ than in the absence of price
caps.12 Furthermore, rms can use price caps to maintain the monopoly outcome, which,
compared with the outcome in the absence of price caps, strictly increases both rms
prots and strictly enhances consumer surplus.
F Complements and substitutes
F.1 Welfare-reducing price caps: an example
We provide here an example with both complements and substitutes, in which the prices
of complements exhibit strategic substitutability, in such a way that capping the prices of
some of the goods may induce undesirable price increases for other goods thus violating
the spirit of Assumption A.
There are two rms, each producing (costlessly) two goods:
 rm 1 produces goods A1 and B1;
 rm 2 produces goods A2 and B2.
Let pA1 , pA2 , pB1 , pB2 denote the prices of the four goods.
Consumers are atomless and divided into three groups:
 A mass " of consumers are only interested in goods A1 and B1, which are perfect
complements and worth v to them: that is, consumers are willing to buy one unit
of both goods as long as pA1 + pB1  v.
 A mass " of consumers are only interested in goods A2 and B2, which are perfect
complements and worth v to them: that is, consumers are willing to buy one unit
of both goods as long as pA2 + pB2  v.
11Among the prices that satisfy p1 + p2 = 2p^, the symmetric outcome (p1 = p2 = p^) is the one that
maximizes consumer surplus  to see this, note that consumer surplus can be expressed as
R x
0
tydy +R 1
x
t (1  y) dy = tx2=2 + t (1  x)2 =2, where x denotes the location of the marginal consumer that is
indi¤erent between buying or not, and this expression is maximal for x = 1=2.
12To see this, note that price caps can only reduce the total price (which increases total participation
and enhances consumer surplus among symmetric price congurations) and moreover result into asym-
metric prices, which, keeping total price constant, generates higher consumer surplus than the symmetric
conguration.
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 A unit mass of consumers are only interested in goods A1 and A2, which are im-
perfect substitutes for them: the two goods are at the end of a Hotelling segment,
along which consumers are uniformly distributed; that is, the demand from these
consumers for good Ai is given by, for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g:
DAi
 
pAi ; pAj

=
1
2
  pAi   pAj
2t
;
where t denote the transportation parameter reecting the degree of di¤erentiation
between the two goods, and satises t < v.
The two rms are therefore competing with goods A1 and A2 for consumers of the
third group; we will refer to these goods as competitive. In addition, each rm i o¤ers
good Bi as a perfect complement to its competitive good to a distinct group of consumers,
over which it has monopoly power; we will refer to goods B1 and B2 as non-competitive.
F.1.1 Nash equilibrium
In the absence of price caps, and as long as the prices of the competitive goods do not
exceed v, each rm can charge a total price of v to the consumers interested in its non-
competitive good (by charging them pBi = v   pAi); hence, rm is prot is given by:
i = pAiDAi
 
pAi ; pAj

+ "v:
It follows that the standard Hotelling result prevails: each rm i o¤ers its competitive
product at a price equal to t; hence,
pNA1 = p
N
A2
= pNA = t;
pNB1 = p
N
B2
= pNB = v   t:
Each rm earns a prot equal to
N =
t
2
+ "v;
whereas consumers obtain an aggregate surplus equal to:
SN = 2
Z 1=2
0
 
V   pNA   tx

dx+ 0 + 0 = V   5t
4
;
where V denotes consumersvalue for the competitive good, and is supposed to be large
enough to ensure that all the market is always served.
F.1.2 Price caps
Suppose now that the rms face a price cap set to zero on their non-competitive goods:
pB1 = pB2 = 0. As long as their still compete for consumers of the third group, rm is
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prot is now given by:
i = pAiDAi
 
pAi ; pAj

+ "pAi = pAi

1
2
  pAi   pAj
2t

+ "pAi ;
leading to:
p^A1 = p^A2 = p^A = (1 + 2") t;
and:
1 = 2 = ^ = (1 + 2")
2 t
2
= N + " [2t (1 + ")  v] :
This constitutes indeed an equilibrium as long as:
 Consumers are still buying the non-competitive goods, which requires:
v  (1 + 2") t:
 Firms do not prefer to focus on the demand for the non-competitive goods, which
requires:
"v  (1 + 2")2 t
2
:
As total welfare remains unchanged, in this equilibrium consumers obtain a surplus
equal to:
S^ = SN   2" [2t (1 + ")  v] : (7)
Therefore, if
(1 + 2") t  v < min

2 + 2"
1 + 2"
;
1 + 2"
2"

(1 + 2") t;
price caps enable the rms to increase their prots at the expense of consumers. As " goes
to zero, these conditions boil down to to t  v < 2t and thus characterize a non-empty
set of parameters.
Remark: welfare. Total welfare is here una¤ected because total demand is inelastic;
making the aggregate demand of the last group of consumers (for whom the goods A1
and A2 are substitutes) slightly elastic13 would yield a reduction in total welfare as well.
Remark: bundling. Allowing the rms to engage in (mixed) bundling would not a¤ect
the analysis. In the absence of price caps, each rm i can (and does) extract all the surplus
from consumers interested in buying both of its goods by charging them an adequate price
on good Bi; hence, o¤ering goods Ai and Bi as a bundle, in addition to o¤ering them on
a stand-alone basis, could not increase rm is prots. When instead a price cap prevents
13Following Bénabou and Tirole (2016), a simple way is to introduce outside options, ~A1 and ~A2, also
located at the two ends of the segment and giving consumers a random value.
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rm i from charging a positive price on good Bi, the rm derives all of its prot from
selling good Ai (both to consumers interested in buying Ai only, and to those interested
in the bundle Ai   Bi); o¤ering Ai and Bi as a bundle could not increase this prot, as
consumersarbitrage would prevent rm i from charging more for the bundle than it does
for good Ai alone.
F.2 Platforms and apps
We show here that the main insights carry over to a class of situations involving both
complements and substitutes. Specically, we consider a setting in which platforms seek
to attract developers for a variety of applications.
F.2.1 Setting
There are n platforms, indexed by i 2 N  f1; :::; ng. Each platform i charges a price
Pi and hosts a continuum of applications, indexed by x 2 [0; 1]; for each application x,
there are mi;x developers, indexed by j 2 Mi;x  f1; :::;mi;xg. The per-user demand for
application j is given by dji;x (pi;x), where pi;x =
 
pji;x

j2Mi;x 2 R
mi;x
+ denotes the vector
of prices for the application, and @pki;xd
j
i;x (pi;x) > 0 for any k 2 Mi;x n fjg that is,
developers o¤er (imperfect) substitutes. Let si;x (pi;x) denote the consumer net surplus
generated by application x on platform i, as a function of the prices pi;x, and
Si (pi) =
Z 1
0
si;x (pi;x) dx
denote the aggregate net surplus that consumers can derive from the applications running
on platform i. Letting ~Pi = Pi   Si (pi) denote platform is quality-adjusted price, the
demand for that platform is then given byDi

~P

, where ~P =

~Pi

i2N
and @ ~PhDi

~P

>
0 for any h 2 Nnfig.14 All costs are normalized to zero.
Remark: application multi-homing. For the sake of exposition, we will suppose that
applications single-home that is, each particular app is present on a single platform.
However, given our assumption of atomistic apps, the pricing analysis (with or without
price caps) does not depend on whether they multi-home or single-home (as long as they
can charge platform-specic prices). By contrast, as discussed in Section F.2.4 of this
online Appendix, applicationsmulti-homing decisions may a¤ect their incentives to set
price caps.
Remark: complements and substitutes. This setting exhibits substitution among plat-
forms, as well as among the developers of any given application; by contrast, it features
complementarity between a platform and its applications, as well as among these ap-
plications (and thus, among their developers). Furthermore, the analysis that follows
14The demand for application x on platform i is therefore given by Di

~P

dji;x (pi;x).
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applies unchanged if some of the applicationsare actually (atomistic) components
of a given (non-atomistic) application. For example, for any given (nite or innite) par-
tition X = fXlgl2L of [0; 1], we could interpret L as the set of applications running on
a given platform (with possibly di¤erent sets across platforms); in this interpretation,
for any l 2 L and any x 2 Xl, the developers in Mi;x are working on component x
of application l. Developers then o¤er substitutes if they work on the same component
of an application, and complements if they work on di¤erent components or di¤erent
applications.
We maintain the following assumptions:
 Applications. For every x 2 [0; 1], every i 2 N and every j 2Mi;x:
The prot function
ji;x (pi;x)  pji;xdi;x (pi;x)
is strictly quasi-concave in pji;x;
The reaction function
rji;x
 
p ji;x
  arg max
pji;x
ji;x
 
pji;x;p
 j
i;x

is uniquely dened for any prices p ji;x of the rival application developers; it is
moreover di¤erentiable and bounded above, and satises:
(sc) Strategic complementarity across developers:
@phi;xr
j
i;x () > 0 for any h 2Mi;x n fjg :
Equilibrium: strategic complementarity yields the existence of a xed point of
the function pi;x  ! ri;x (pi;x) 
 
rji;x
 
p ji;x

j2Mi;x , for every platform i and
every application x. For the sake of exposition we assume that this xed point
is unique, and denote it by pNi;x.
 Platforms. For every i 2 N and any net surplus Si 2 R+:
The prot function15
i

~P;Si



~Pi + Si

Di

~P

is strictly quasi-concave in ~Pi;
15As will become clear, platform is pricing decision amounts to choosing the quality-adjusted price
~Pi = Pi   Si; its prot can thus be expressed as PiDi

~P

= (Pi + Si)Di

~P

.
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The reaction function
Ri

~P i;Si

= arg max
~Pi
i

~P;Si

is uniquely dened, di¤erentiable and bounded above, and satises:
(SC) Strategic complementarity across platforms:
@ ~PhRi

~P i;Si

> 0 for any h 2 Nnfig :
Equilibrium: strategic complementarity yields the existence of a xed point of
the function ~P  ! R

~P;S



Ri

~P i; Si

i2N
, for any S = (Si)i2N ; for
the sake of exposition, we assume that for SN   Si  pNi i2N this xed point
is unique, and denote it by ~PN .
The timing is as follows:
 Stage 1: platforms and application developers all set their prices simultaneously;
all prices are public.
 Stage 2: consumers learn their private benets for the various platforms and choose
which platform to join, if any; they also choose whether to buy the applications
developed for the chosen platform.
Remark: Decomposing stage 1 into two distinct stages, where platforms set their prices
before application developers do, would not a¤ect the analysis. Likewise, decomposing
stage 2 into two distinct stages, where consumers rst choose among platforms, before
buying the apps, would not a¤ect the analysis either.
F.2.2 Nash equilibrium
As applications are atomistic, a single developers price has no impact on platform adop-
tion; therefore, for every platform i and every application x, in stage 2 each developer
j 2 Mi;x seeks to maximize ji;x
 
pji;x;p
 j
i;x

Di, taking Di = Di

~P

as xed, and thus
chooses pji;x = r
j
i;x
 
p ji;x

. The above assumptions then imply that the equilibrium prices
are uniquely given by pNi;x. It follows that joining platform i 2 N gives a consumer a net
surplus given by SNi  Si
 
pNi

, where pNi =
 
pNi;x

x2[0;1] denotes the vector of equilibrium
prices for the applications running on the platform.
Given its rivalsprices, the prot of platform i can be expressed as:
Pi ~Di (P) =

~Pi + S
N
i

Di

~P

= i

~P;SNi

:
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As the platforms price has no incidence on the surplus generated by the applications, we
can take the quality-adjusted price as the relevant decision variable. It follows from the
above that platform i will choose Pi so as to induce a quality-adjusted price equal to16
~Pi = Ri

~P i;SNi

. The above assumptions then imply that the equilibrium prices are
uniquely given by PN = ~PN + SN .
F.2.3 Price caps
Suppose now that each rm faces a price cap. Let P =
 
P

i2N denote the vector of
price caps for the platforms; likewise, for every platform i and every application x on
that platform, let pi;x =
 
pji;x

j2Mi;x denote the vector of price caps for that application,
and pi = (pi;x)x2[0;1] denote the vector of price caps for all applications running on that
platform. The next proposition shows that these price caps can only benet consumers.
Proposition 16 (platforms and apps) For any price caps P =
 
Pi

i2N and p =
(pi)i2N , there exists a unique price-constrained equilibrium, and equilibrium prices weakly
increase with the vector of price caps on platform prices and on apps. Therefore: (i) for
any vector of price caps
 
P; p

, consumers are weakly better o¤ under G(P;p) than under
G1; and (ii) in G, it is optimal for the competition authority to allow price caps.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that the equilibrium prices of any given application
x on any given platform i depend only on pi;x, and not on the other price caps. From
Proposition 8, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium prices weakly
increase with pi;x. It follows that the equilibrium net surpluses that consumers derive
from the applications decrease with pi;x in particular, they are all (weakly) larger than
the Nash levels.
Let p^ = (p^i;x)i2N ;x2[0;1] denote a Nash equilibrium sustainable through the applica-
tionsprice caps p, and S^ =

S^i

i2N
, where
S^i =
Z 1
0
si;x (p^i;x) dx;
denote the associated equilibrium net surpluses. The quality-adjusted prices ~P =

~Pi

i2N
are now equal to:
~Pi = Pi   S^i:
Using again these quality-adjusted prices as strategic decision variables, platform i there-
fore seeks to solve:
max
Pi Pi
PiDi

~P

= max
~Pi Pi S^i
i

~Pi; ~P i; S^i

:
16That is, it will choose Pi = Ri

~P i;SNi

+ SNi .
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From quasi-concavity, platform i will thus choose:
~Pi = Ri

~P; S^i; Pi

 min
n
Pi   S^i; Ri

~P; S^i
o
: (8)
This reaction function still exhibits strategic complementarity across platforms: rivals
prices only a¤ect the second term, which satises @ ~PkRi

~P; S^i

> 0 for h 2 Nnfig.
Furthermore, the rst term in the right-hand side of (8) increases with Pi, and both
terms decrease with S^i: this is obvious for Pi   S^i, and for Ri

~P; S^i

this follows from
@2~PiSii

~P;Si

= @ ~PiDi

~P

< 0:
The best-response function Ri () of each platform i is therefore increasing in Pi and
decreasing in S^i. Strategic complementarity then yields the result:
 For any equilibrium net surpluses S^ =

S^i

i2N
sustainable through the application
price caps p, and any platform price caps P, there exist a unique Nash equilib-
rium for the platformsquality-adjusted prices, and the equilibrium quality-adjusted
prices weakly increase with P.
 As the set of equilibrium net surpluses S^ =

S^i

i2N
weakly decrease with p, the
overall equilibrium quality-adjusted prices weakly increase with both P and p.
F.2.4 Firmsincentives
Other things equal, introducing caps on platformsprices increases applicationsprots,
by increasing the number of platformsusers, but reduces platformsprots, both by
constraining their pricing decisions and by making their rivals more aggressive: for any
~P  ~PN ,
max
~Pi Pi SNi
i

~Pi; ~P i;SNi

 max
~Pi
i

~Pi; ~P i;SNi

 max
~Pi
i

~Pi; ~P
N
 i;S
N
i

= Ni ;
where the second inequality is strict whenever ~P  ~PN .
By contrast, introducing caps on applicationsprices can increase not only platforms
prots, by boosting their demands thanks to the greater net surplus that consumers
derive from the apps, but it can also benet the apps, by increasing the number of users.
More precisely, consider the introduction of price caps pi on the applications running on
platform i:
 This increases the net surplus Si generated by these apps, which increases platform
is prot by expanding its demand.
25
 As noted in the proof of Proposition 16, @SiRi

~P i;Si

 0; therefore, the increase
in the net surplus Si expands the equilibrium number of users on platform i.
The extent to which this increase in user participation can o¤set the direct negative
impact of the price caps pi on applications per-user protability depends on several
factors:
 Consider rst the polar case where:17
 there is a single developer for each application, so that
pNi;x = p
M
i;x  arg max
pi;x
pi;xdi;x (pi;x) ;
 applications single-home that is, the applications running on platform i run
only on that platform.
In this case, the increase in platform is user participation can indeed benet the
applications running on that platform. In particular, introducing price caps pi that
are slightly below pMi is likely to have only a second-order e¤ect on applications
per user prot (as these prots are maximal under monopoly), but a rst-order
e¤ect on platform is quality-adjusted price, and thus on the number of its users;
hence, the applications are likely to benet from the introduction of such caps.
 The potential benet of usersgreater participation is however diluted for multi-
homing applications. For example, if the applications are present on all platforms,
then this demand expansion e¤ect arises only if usersaggregate participation is
elastic. Otherwise, the number of users would remain unchanged, and the negative
e¤ect of price caps on per user prots would prevail.
 This potential benet of usersgreater participation is also lower in case of competi-
tion among developers; in particular, introducing a price cap slightly lower than the
Nash level would then have a rst-order e¤ect on applicationsper-user protability
as well as on user participation.
The elasticity of usersaggregate demand for platforms is also a key factor for the
protability of price caps at the industry level. For example, if total platform participation
is inelastic, then a platform may still benet unilaterally from capping the prices of its
applications, but this would be at the expense of the other platforms: the industry as a
whole would not benet from introducing price caps.
Consider for instance the following example, where a unit mass of consumers consider
joining one of the platforms and only one: consumers do not derive any benet from
17See for instance the monopoly example studied in the next section.
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joining additional platforms, and thus single-home;18 each user obtains a benet i from
joining platform i, and these private benets are randomly drawn from a common distrib-
ution, with cumulative distribution F () and density f () over some , with independent
drawn across both platforms and consumers. The demand for platform i is then given
by:
Di

~P

= Pr
h
i   ~Pi > j   ~Pj for every j 2 Nnfig
i
=
Z

Y
j2Nnfig
F
h
i   ~Pi + ~Pj
i
f (i) di;
and satises, for any symmetric prices ~Ps =

~P s; :::; ~P s

:
Di

~Ps

=
Z

F n 1 () f () d =
1
n
;
@ ~PiDi

~Ps

=  
Z

Y
j2Nnfig
F n 2 () f 2 () d =  ;
where the constant  is positive and does not depend on the actual level of the quality-
adjusted price ~P s.
Suppose now symmetric caps on the applications result in the same equilibrium net
surplus S for each platform. Any resulting symmetric price equilibrium ~Ps =

~P s; :::; ~P s

satises the rst-order condition:
0 = @ ~Pii

~Ps;S

= Di

~Ps

+ ~P s@ ~PiDi

~Ps

=
1
n
   ~P s;
and thus:
~P s =
1
n
:
It follows that any increase in the net surplus generated by the applications is entirely
passed on to consumers; introducing such price caps would thus benet consumers at
the expense of the applicationsprots, without any impact on the protability of the
platforms.
Such a situation generates a prisonersdilemma: each platform would have an incen-
tive to introduce price caps on its own applications (and would be willing to compensate
the applications, in case this negatively a¤ect their prots), but the benet to that plat-
form would come at the expense of the other platforms and their own applications, so
that the industry prot would be reduced as a result.
18For example, joining the platform may involve substantial xed costs (learning how to use it, set-up
costs, and so forth), accounted for in the denition of the private benet  from single-homing, but
making multi-homing undesirable. In some cases, multi-homing may be infeasible (e.g., for broadband
Internet access, consumers may choose among alternative suppliers, but only one at a time can operate
the local connection to the home).
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F.3 Platform & apps: the monopoly case
We consider here a particular case of the setting considered in the previous section,
which is used in Section 2.3 of the main text to illustrate the possibility that, even with
complements, a monopoly price may lie above the Nash level for one of the products (cf.
Figure 6). To see this, we suppose here that there is a single platform as well as a single
developer per application. We further assume for simplicity that all applications face the
same demand d (p), which is downward-sloping (i.e., d (p) < 0). It follows that, in the
absence of any price caps, all applications will charge the same price. To be consistent
with the notation used in Section 2.3, we will denote the price of the platform by p1 and
that of the applications by p2.
F.3.1 Complementarity between the platform and the applications
We rst check that the platform and the applications are indeed complements. Letting
s (p2) 
Z +1
p2
d (p) dp
denote the additional surplus that platform users derive from applications, the demand
for the platform is then given by:19
D1 (p1; p2)  D (p1   s (p2)) ;
where D (~p) denotes the demand for the platform, as a function of the quality-adjusted
price ~p = p1   s (p2). The demand for each application is thus given by:
D2 (p2; p1)  D (p1   s (p2)) d (p2) ;
and it satises:
@2D1 (p1; p2) = @1D2 (p2; p1) = D
0 (p1   s (p2)) d (p2) < 0:
F.3.2 Best-responses
We now turn to rms reaction functions, and rst note that the applications best-
response is at (i.e., R2 (p1) = 0); indeed, each application wishes to maximize its per-user
prot, which amounts to choosing a price equal to:
pN2  arg max
p2
p2d (p2) :
19As all applications are charging the same price p2, s (p2) represents both the per-application net
surplus, and the total net surplus that consumers derive from the applications.
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Note that pN2 > 0: the applications could not obtain any prot by charging a non-positive
price, whereas they can secure a positive prot by charging any positive price.20
Consider now the platforms best-response to the application price p2. The prot of
the platform can be expressed as:
1 (p1; p2)  p1D1 (p1; p2) = p1D (p1   s (p2)) :
Maximizing this prot amounts to
log (1 (p1; p2)) = log (p1) + L (p1   s (p2)) ;
where L (~p)  log (D (~p)) denotes the logarithm of the demand for the platform, and:
@2p1p2 log (1 (p1; p2)) = L
00 (p1   s (p2)) d (p2) :
Hence, from the platforms standpoint, prices are strategic substitutes (i.e., R01 () < 0)
whenever the demand for the platform is log-concave (i.e., L00 () < 0).
It follows from the above that, in equilibrium, the applications charge pN2 > 0 whereas
the platform charges pN1  R1
 
pN2

, as illustrated by Figure 6.
Figure 6: Platform & apps
Finally, we check that Assumption (A) is satised. It is obvious for the applications,
as R02 (p1) = 0, and for the platform it follows from the fact that, as noted in Section F.2,
the platforms optimal quality-adjusted price is increasing in the net surplus generated
by the applications; hence, in response to a decrease in the application price p2, and thus
to an increase in the surplus s, the platform increases its own price as R01 (p2) < 0 
but not so as to o¤set entirely the consumersbenet from the reduction in the price p2.
20Note that d ()  0 and d0 () < 0 together imply d () > 0.
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F.3.3 Monopoly outcome
We now characterize the monopoly outcome. We start with the observation that, in order
to maximize the industry prot, it is optimal to sell the applications at cost. To see this,
let us again index the applications by x 2 [0; 1]; for a given platform price p1 and given
application prices (p2x)x2[0;1], the industry prot can then be expressed as:
 (p1; (p2x)x) =

p1 +
Z 1
0
p2xd (p2x) dx

D (p1   s) ;
where
s =
Z 1
0
s (p2x) dx
denotes consumersexpected surplus from the applications. Replacing these prices with
~p2 = 0 and ~p1 = p1 + s (0)  s does not a¤ect the number of platform users (the quality-
adjusted price remains equal to p1   s), and thus the impact on industry prot is equal
to:
 =

s (0)  s 
Z 1
0
p2xd (p2x) dx

D (p1   s)
=
Z 1
0
[s (0)  s (p2x)  p2xd (p2x)] dx

D (p1   s)
> 0;
where the inequality stems from the fact that the total surplus from the applications,
s (p) + pd (p), is maximal under marginal cost pricing, i.e., for p = 0.
The monopoly prices are thus pM2 = 0 and
pM1  arg max
p1
f (p1; p2 = 0)g = arg max
p1
fp1D (p1   s (0))g = R1 (0) :
The monopoly outcome therefore lies (weakly) below rmsbest-responses (more pre-
cisely, pM2 < R2
 
pM1

and pM1 = R1
 
pM2

). However, as pM2 = 0 < p
N
2 , the application
price is (strictly) lower than its Nash level
 
pM2 < p
N
2

, but the opposite holds for the
platform: as R01 () < 0, we have:
pM1 = R1 (0) > R1
 
pN2

= pN1 :
Figure 6 illustrates these insights.
F.4 Discussion
The two situations considered in Section F.1 and in Sections F.2-F.3 both exhibit a
combination of complements and substitutes. In both instances, capping the prices of
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substitutes would benet consumers, but is not appealing to the rms.21 By contrast,
capping the prices of (some of the) complements has a more ambiguous e¤ect on rms
and consumers: the prot may be reduced on the goods for which a cap is introduced, but
it increases for their complements, thanks to an expansion in their demands. Consumers
also benet from the lower prices on the goods for which a cap is introduced, but may
face higher prices for their complements.
In the example studied in Section F.1, consumers and rms have indeed perfectly
conicting interests, and introducing price caps on the non-competitive goods can benet
either the consumers or the rms. In essence, price caps benet the rms (at the expense
of consumers) when the spirit of Assumption A is not satised, namely, when22
pA
pB
<  DB
DA
; (9)
where, for L = A;B, DL denotes the aggregate demand for good L (i.e., the sum of the
demands for L1 and L2), whereas pL denotes the variation in the prices of these goods,
following the introduction of a uniform price cap on B1 and B2.23
By contrast, the spirit of Assumption A is automatically satised in the platforms
and apps settings: as the applications are atomistic, each individual application price
has no inuence on platform participation, and so each application seeks to maximize
its per-user prot, which does not depend on platformsprices; hence, platformsprices
have no impact on applicationsprices, that is, applicationsbest-responses are at,
and Assumption A is trivially satised. More generally, we would expect the spirit of
Assumption A to hold as long as there are multiple applications, so that their pricing de-
cisions are primarily driven by competition among developers, rather than by the impact
of their prices on platform participation (and thus, indirectly, by platformsprices).
G Non-veriable quality
G.1 Setting
We consider an oligopoly with n  2 single-product rms; each rm i 2 N f1; :::; ng
can choose to o¤er at any price pi 2 R+ any quality si 2 R+ of good i, which it can
produce at constant unit cost ci (si); the demand for that good is then given by Di (p^),
where p^ = (p^i)i2N is the vector of net quality-adjusted prices: p^i  pi   si.
21In the example considered in Section F.1, capping the prices of the competitive goods, A1 and A2,
would reduce the prots derived from the consumers of the third group (for which these goods are
substitutes), without any o¤-setting increase in the prots derived from the other consumers (for which
these goods are complements to the non-competitive goods).
22Because of the inelasticity of the demand, the condition involves discrete rather than marginal price
changes.
23In the example, DA = 1 + 2" and DB = 2", whereas pA = 2"t and pB = t   v. Condition (9)
thus amounts to v < 2 (1 + ") t, the condition under which price caps reduce consumer surplus (see (7)).
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We assume that, for i 2 N , Di () and ci () are both C2 and:
 ci (0) = 0, c0i () > 0 and c0i (si) > 1 for si large enough;
 Di () > 0, @iDi () < 0 (individual demands for a good are positive and downward
sloping, as a function of the net price of that good) and
P
j2N @jDi ()  0 (a
uniform increase in all net prices reduces individual demands);
 the prot function
i (p; s)  [pi   ci (si)]Di (p1   s1; :::; pn   sn)
is strictly quasi-concave in (pi; si).
It will be convenient to use net prices rather than prices as strategic variables; we
thus dene:
^i (p^; si)  [p^i + si   ci (si)]Di (p^) :
The quasi-concavity of the individual prot functions i implies that the prot functions
^i, too, are quasi-concave:
Lemma 6 (Quasi-concavity of ^) For i 2 N , the prot function ^i (p^; s) is strictly
quasi-concave in (p^i; si).
Proof. For i 2 N , we have, for any (p^ i; s i), any (p^0i; s0i) 6= (p^i; si) and any  2 (0; 1)
(with p0i  p^0i + s0i and pi  p^i + si):
^i (p^
0
i + (1  ) p^i; p^ i; s0i + (1  ) si)
= i ( (p^
0
i + s
0
i) + (1  ) (p^i + si) ; p^ i; s0i + (1  ) si; s i)
> min fi (p^0i + s0i; p^ i + s i; s0i; s i) ; i (p^i + si; p^ i + s i; si; s i)g
= min f^i (p^0i; p^ i; s0i) ; ^i (p^i; p^ i; si)g ;
where the equalities stem from the denitions of i () and ^i (), whereas the inequality
follows from the strict quasi-concavity of the prot function i () with respect to (pi; si).
These assumptions imply that maximizing its prot ^i (p^; si) leads each rm i 2 N
to choose
si = s
M
i  c0 1i (1)
and a unique best-response
R^i (p^ i)  arg max
p^i
^i
 
p^i; p^ i; sMi

:
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We assume that this best-response is well-dened, C1, and bounded above.
As the prot of one rm depends on other rmsdecisions only through their net
prices, we can readily extend our denitions of substitutes and complements as follows:
S^

Substitutes: @jDi (p^) > 0 for j 6= i 2 N ;
C^

Complements: @jDi (p^) < 0 for j 6= i 2 N .
Finally, we still assume that:
 there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in the unconstrained pricing game, which
we denote by p^N =
 
p^Ni

i2N (together with s
N =
 
sMi

i2N );
 the best-responses satisfy, for j 2 N :X
i2Nnfjg
@jR^i (p^ i) < 1; (10)
 the industry prot
 (p; s) 
X
i2N
i (p; s) =
X
i2N
^i (p^; si)  ^ (p^; s)
is strictly quasi-concave in p and achieves its maximum at p^M =
 
pMi

i2N (together
with (sN =
 
sMi

i2N ).
As the monopoly outcome and the individual best-responses both involve si = sM for
every i 2 N , the proofs of rst two Lemmas readily carry over; that is, letting
c^Mi  ci
 
sMi
  sMi
denote the net cost corresponding to the optimal quality sMi , we have:
Lemma 7 (unconstrained net prices) For any rm i 2 N and any p^ i 2 Rn 1+ ,
R^i (p^ i) > c^Mi .
(i)

S^

=) 8i 2 N ; p^Mi > c^Mi and p^Mi > R^i
 
p^M i

.
(ii)

C^

=) 9 (i; j) 2 N 2 such that p^Mi > c^Mi and p^Mj < R^j
 
p^M j

; furthermore, if
n = 2, then p^Mi > c^
M
i =) p^Mj < R^j
 
p^Mi

for j 6= i.
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Proof. We rst show that (net) best-responses exceed (net) marginal costs. Starting from
si = s
M
i and p^ = (p^i; p^ i)jp^i=R^i(p^ i), the impact of a slight increase in p^i on rm is prot
^i is given by
 
p^i   c^Mi

@iDi (p^)+Di (p^). If rm is margin were non-positive, this impact
would be positive (as @iDi () < 0 < Di ()), a contradiction. Hence, R^i (p^ i) > c^Mi .
Next, we show that monopoly prices exceed marginal costs for at least one rm.
Suppose instead that p^Mi  c^Mi for all i 2 N , and consider a small and uniform increase
in net prices: dp^i = dp^ > 0 for i 2 N . We then have dqj =
P
i2N @iDj
 
p^M

dp^  0 for
all j 2 N , and thus:
d^ =
X
j2N
 
p^Mj   c^Mj

dqj +
X
j2N
qMj dp^ > 0;
a contradiction. Therefore, p^Mi > c^
M
i for some i 2 N .
We now show that, under

S^

, p^Mi > c^
M
i for every i 2 N . To see this, suppose that
there exists a non-empty subset of N , N , such that p^Mj  c^Mj for every j 2 N , and
consider a small and uniform increase in these net prices: dp^j = dp^ > 0 for j 2 N .
Under

S^

, we then have:
 for i 2 N n N , dqi =
P
j2N  @jDi
 
p^M

dp^ > 0, as @jDi
 
p^M

> 0 for j 6= i.
 for i 2 N , dqi =
P
j2N  @jDi
 
p^M

dp^ Pj2N @jDi  p^M dp^  0.
Therefore:
d^ =
X
j2NnN 
 
p^Mj   c^Mj
| {z }
>0
dqj|{z}
>0
+
X
j2N 
qMj|{z}
>0
dp^|{z}
>0
+
X
j2N 
 
p^Mj   c^Mj
| {z }
0
dqj|{z}
0
> 0;
a contradiction. Therefore, under

S^

, pMi > c^
M
i for every i 2 N .
We now compare monopoly prices to rmsbest-responses. The monopoly prices sat-
isfy, for i 2 N :
0 = @i^
 
p^M

= @i^i
 
p^M ; sMi

+
X
j2Nnfig
@i^j
 
pM ; sMj

;
and thus:
@i^i
 
p^M ; sMi

=  
X
j2Nnfig
@i^j
 
p^M ; sMj

=  
X
j2Nnfig
 
p^Mj   c^Mj

@iDj
 
p^M
	
: (11)
Therefore:
(i) Under

S^

, the right-hand side of (11) is negative, as p^Mj > c^
M
j , from the rst
part of the lemma, and @jDi
 
p^M

> 0 for j 6= i 2 N ; hence, for i 2 N , we have
@i^i
 
p^M ; sMi

< 0, which, together with the quasi-concavity of ^i with respect to p^i,
implies p^Mi > R^i
 
p^M i

.
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(ii) Suppose that for all j 2 N , p^Mj  R^j
 
p^M j

, implying @j^j
 
p^M ; sMj
  0. We
then have, for j 2 N :
0  @j^j
 
p^M ; sMj

= Dj
 
p^M

+
 
p^Mj   c^Mj

@jDj
 
p^M

;
and thus, under

C^

, p^Mj > c^
M
j for every j 2 N . But then, as @jDi
 
p^M

< 0 for
j 6= i 2 N under

C^

, (11) implies @i^i
 
p^M ; sMi

> 0, a contradiction. Hence, the
monopoly outcome satises p^Mj < R^j
 
p^M j

for some rm j.
Finally, when n = 2, (11) implies, for j 6= i 2 f1; 2g:
@j^j
 
p^M ; sMj

=    pMi   c^Mi  @jDi  p^M :
Under

C^

, @jDi
 
p^M

< 0 and thus p^Mi > c^
M
i implies p^
M
j < R^j
 
p^Mj

.
G.2 Constrained net best-responses
Suppose now that caps p = (pi)i2N are imposed on the prices of the goods. Each rm
i 2 N then chooses pi and si so as to maximize:
max
pi;si
i (p; s)
s.t. pi  pi
:
Let pi = i (p^ i; pi) and si = i (p^ i; pi) denote the constrained best-responses in terms
of price and quality, and ^i (p^ i; pi) the resulting best-response in terms of net price.
These best-responses can equivalently be expressed as:
(^i (p^ i; pi) ; i (p^ i; pi)) = arg max
p^i;si
^i (p^; si)  [p^i + si   ci (si)]Di (p^)
s.t. p^i + si  pi
: (P^ )
For the sake of comparative statics, we will assume:
Assumption D: For any i 2 N , any p^ i, any (p^i; si) satisfying si  sMi and p^i+si 
R^i (p^ i) + sMi :
c00i (si)
jc0i (si)  1j
>
j@iDi (p^i; p^ i)j
Di (p^i; p^ i)
:
This condition asserts that the curvature of the net costfunction c (s)  s exceeds
the semi-elasticity of demand. It is trivially satised when the price cap is close to the
best-response price (i.e., pi close to R^i (p^ i) + sMi ), as then si is close to s
M
i and thus
c0i (si) is close to 1.
We have:
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Lemma 8 (constrained net best-responses) For any i 2 N and any p^ i, as long as
pi  R^i (p^ i) + sMi , the price cap is not binding:
^i (p^ i; pi) = R^i (p^ i) ; i (p^ i; pi) = s
M
i and thus i (p^ i; pi) = R^i (p^ i) + s
M
i :
When instead pi < R^i (p^ i) + sMi :
(i) the price cap is binding (i.e., i (p^ i; pi) = pi) and the constrained optimal quality
is strictly lower than the unconstrained optimum: i (p^ i; pi) < sMi ;
(ii) in addition, under Assumption D the constrained optimal net price ^i (p^ i; pi) strictly
increases with pi, from 0 for pi = 0 to R^i (p^ i) for pi = R^i (p^ i) + sMi .
Proof. It follows from Lemma 6 that the optimization program

P^

has a unique
solution. As long as pi  R^i (p^ i) + sMi , the price cap is not binding and the rm sticks
to p^i = R^i (p^ i) and si = sMi , and thus to pi = R^i (p^ i) + s
M
i .
Part (i). It also follows from Lemma 6 that, when pi < R^i (p^ i) + sMi , the price cap
is binding: p^i + si = pi. Letting i > 0 denote the Lagrangian multiplier associated with
the constraint, the constrained best-response si = i (p^ i; pi) is then characterized by the
rst-order condition:
[1  c0i (si)]Di (p^) = i;
which implies c0i (si) < 1. It follows from the strict quasi-concavity of the prot function
^ with respect to si that si = i (p^ i; pi) < sMi .
Part (ii). When pi < R^i (p^ i) + sMi , the price cap is binding and thus pi = pi.
It follows that strict quasi-concavity of the prot function i (p; s) with respect to si
that the constrained optimal quality si = i (p^ i; pi) is the unique solution to (with a
slight abuse of notation, noting that, for j 6= i, i depends on pj and sj only through
p^j = pj   sj):
max
si
i (pi; si; p^ i) = [pi   ci (si)]Di (pi   si; p^ i) ;
and is characterized by the rst-order condition:
c0i (si)Di (pi   si; p^ i) + [pi   ci (si)] @iDi (pi   si; p^ i) = 0: (12)
Di¤erentiating this condition with respect to si and pi shows that the net price ^i (p^ i; pi) =
pi  i (p^ i; pi) increases with the price cap pi (i.e., @i=@pi < 1) if and only Assumption
D is satised.
From the above, ^i (p^ i; pi) is equal to R^i (p^ i) for pi  R^i (p^ i) + sMi , and strictly
increases with pi in the range pi 2
h
0; R^i (p^ i) + sMi
i
. To conclude the argument, it
su¢ ces to note that si = 0 constitutes the constrained optimal quality when pi = 0, as
rm is prot is then given by  ci (si)Di (p^); hence, ^i (p^ i; 0) = 0  i (p^ i; 0) = 0.
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G.3 Price-cap implementable net prices
The following proposition shows that, as in our baseline setting, price caps can sustain
any net prices lying below rmsbest responses, and only these prices:
Proposition 17 (price-cap implementable net prices) Under Assumption D:
(i) The set P^ of net prices that are sustainable through price caps is:
P^ =
n
p^ 2 Rn+ j 0  p^i  R^i (p^ i) for i 2 N
o
:
(ii) In particular, the Nash price vector p^N belongs to P^ and, for any other price vector
p^ in P^, p^i < p^Ni for some i 2 N .
Proof. (i) We rst show that price caps can sustain only prices in P^. Consider net
prices and qualities (p^i; si)i2N that are sustainable through price caps (pi)i2N ; that is,
they satisfy p^i = ^i (p^ i; pi) and si = i (p^ i; pi) for every i 2 N ). It follows from Lemma
8 that p^  0. Suppose now that p^i > R^i (p^ i) for some i 2 N . This, in turn, implies
pi < R^i (p^ i)+sMi otherwise, the price cap pi would not be binding, and rm i could thus
protably deviate to its unconstrained best-responses p^0i = R^i (p^ i) and s
0
i = s
M
i . But from
Lemma 8, in the range p0i 2
h
0; R^i (p^ i) + sMi
i
the constrained best-response ^i (p^ i; p
0
i)
increases with p0i from 0 up to R^i (p^ i); it follows that p^i = ^i (p^ i; p
0
i) < R^i (p^ i), a
contradiction.
Conversely, for any net price vector p^ 2 P^ and every i 2 N , there exists pi 2h
0; R^i (p^ i) + sMi
i
such that p^i = ^i (p^ i; pi). But then, the net price vector p^ is sustain-
able through the price caps p = (pi)i2N .
(ii) By construction, p^N lies on rmsunconstrained best-responses, and thus belongs
to P^. Consider now a price vector p^ in P^np^N	, and suppose that p^i  pNi for all i 2 N .
For every i 2 N , we then have:
p^i   pNi  R^i (p^ i)  pNi ;
= R^i (p^ i) Ri
 
pN i

=
Z 1
0
d
d
n
R^i
 
p^ i + (1  ) pN i
o
d
=
Z 1
0
f
X
j2Nnfig
@jR^i
 
p^ i + (1  ) pN i
  
p^j pNj
gd:
37
Summing up these inequalities for i 2 N yields:
X
i2N
 
p^i   pNi
  X
i2N
Z 1
0
f
X
j2Nnfig
@jR^i
 
p^ i + (1  ) pN i
  
p^j pNj
gd
=
X
j2N
 
p^j pNj
 Z 1
0
f[
X
i2Nnfjg
@jR^i
 
p^ i + (1  ) pN i

]gd
<
X
j2N
 
p^j   pNj

;
where the last inequality follows from (10). We thus obtain a contradiction, implying that
p^i < p^
N
i for some i 2 N .
G.4 Duopoly
We now focus on the case of a duopoly: N = f1; 2g. We rst consider the impact of price
caps and consumers. We start with the observation that, like the demand, consumer
surplus only depends on net prices, p^1 and p^2; indeed, letting S (p1; p2; s1; s2) denote
consumer surplus, we have:
@S
@pi
() =  Di (pi   si; pj   sj) =  @S
@si
() :
Hence, consumer surplus can be expressed as S^ (p^i; p^j). We therefore adapt the previous
baseline Assumption A, introduced to ensure that price caps can only benet consumers,
as follows:
Assumption Â: For any i 6= j 2 f1; 2g and any net price p^i 2 [0; p^Ni ), if R^j (p^i) > p^Ni ,
then:
R^0j (pi) >  
Di

p^i; R^j (p^i)

Dj

R^j (p^i) ; p^i
 :
Assumption Â holds again trivially when net prices are strategic complements (i.e.,
R^0j () > 0). We have:
Proposition 18 (non-veriable quality: price caps - duopoly) Under Assumptions
D and Â, any vector of net prices p^ 6= p^N that is sustainable through price caps yields
a higher consumer surplus than p^N . Therefore: (i) for any vector of price caps p, con-
sumers are weakly better o¤ under Gp than under G1; and (ii) in G, it is optimal for the
competition authority to allow price caps.
Proof. Consider a price vector p^ = (p^1; p^2) in P^n

p^N
	
. From Proposition 17, p^i < p^Ni
for some i 2 f1; 2g. If the price of the other rm, j, satises p^j  p^Nj , then consumers
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clearly prefer p^ to p^N . Suppose now that p^j > p^Nj ; from Proposition 17 we then have
R^j (p^i)  p^j > p^Nj , let:24
p^0i  inf
n
p^00i  p^i j R^j (p^00i )  p^Nj
o
:
By construction, p^0i 2 (p^i; p^Ni ] and R^j (p^0i) = p^Nj . Letting S^ (p^i; p^j) denote total consumer
surplus, we then have:
S^ (p^i; p^j)  S^

p^i; R^j (p^i)

> S^

p^0i; R^j (p^
0
i)

 S^  p^Ni ; p^Nj  ;
where the rst inequality follows from Proposition 17, the last follows from p^0i  p^Ni and
R^j (p^
0
i) = p^
N
j , and the strict one follows from p^
0
i > p^i and Assumption Â, which together
imply:
S^

p^i; R^j (p^i)

 S^

p^0i; R^j (p^
0
i)

=
Z p^0i
p^i
h
Di

p^i; R^j (p^i)

+Dj

R^j (p^i) ; p^i

R^0j (p^i)
i
dp^i > 0:
Hence, under Assumption Â, rms use of price caps can only benet consumers.
Consider now rmsincentives to introduce price caps. The following Proposition extends
our previous insights:
Proposition 19 (non-veriable quality: rmsincentives - duopoly)
(i) Under

S^

and Assumption D, rms cannot use price caps to increase both of their
prots; if in addition net prices are strategic complements (i.e., if R^0i () > 0 for
i = 1; 2), then rms cannot use price caps to increase any of their prots (and thus,
a fortiori, their joint prot).
(ii) Under

C^

, rms can use price caps to increase both prots (and thus, a fortiori,
their joint prot); any such price caps benet consumers as well.
Proof. (i) Consider a price vector p^ = (p^1; p^2) in P^n

p^N
	
and let s = (s1; s2) denote
the associated qualities. From Proposition 17, p^j < pNj for some j 2 f1; 2g. Under

S^

,
we have, for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g:
^i (p^i; p^j; si)  max
p^i;si
^i (p^i; p^j; si)
< max
p^i;si
^i
 
p^i; p^
N
j ; si

= ^i
 
p^Ni ; p^
N
j ; s
M
i

;
24The reasoning that follows relies on the range [p^i; p^0i], because Assumption A is required to hold only
for the prices p^i < p^Ni that satisfy R^j (p^i) > p^
N
i .
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where the strict inequality follows from p^j < pNj and
d
dp^j

max
p^i;si
^i (p^i; p^j; si)

= @j^i

R^i (p^j) ; p^j; s
M
i

=
h
R^i (p^j)  c^Mi
i
@jDi

R^i (p^j) ; p^j

; (13)
where, from Lemma 7, the last expression is positive under

S^

. Therefore, rms cannot
use price caps (with or without transfers) to increase both of their prots.
Furthermore, if prices are strategic complements, then any price vector p^ = (p^1; p^2)
in P^np^N	 is such that p^i < p^Ni for i = 1; 2.25 The above argument then implies that
both rms obtain strictly less prot than in the Nash equilibrium. Hence, in that case
rms cannot use price caps to increase any of their prots.
(ii) By contrast, under

C^

, there exist prices in P^ that increase both rmsprots.
To see this, note rst that, from Lemma 7, both rmsmargins are positive at the
Nash equilibrium. It follows that, starting from the Nash equilibrium prices
 
p^N1 ; p^
N
2

,
a small and uniform reduction in both prices increases both rmsprots, as reducing
one rms price (and adjusting the quality accordingly) has only a second-order e¤ect
on the prot of that rm, and a rst-order, positive e¤ect on the other rms prot (as
it increases that rms demand). To conclude the argument, it su¢ ces to note that any
(p^1; p^2) =
 
p^N2   "; p^N2   "

, with " > 0, belongs to P^, as:
 using condition (10), we have:
R^j (p^i)  p^j =
Z "
0
h
1  R^0j
 
p^Ni   x
i
dx > 0:
 Assumption D is trivially satised in the neighborhood of p^N , as c0i (si) is then close
to 1; hence, in this neighborhood, the constrained net best-responses are increasing
with price caps as long as these are binding, and are equal to unconstrained best-
responses otherwise. It follows that, for " small enough, there exists appropriately
chosen price caps that sustain (p^1; p^2) =
 
p^N2   "; p^N2   "

.
Therefore, there are prices in P^ that give both rms more prot than the Nash
equilibrium prices, as is required for a price cap vector to be agreed upon in the absence
of transfer.
To conclude the proof, it su¢ ces to note that increasing both rmsprots requires
lowering prices below the Nash level. To see this, consider a price vector p^ 2 P^ that
increases both rms prots above their Nash levels, and let s^ = (s^1; s^2) denote the
25From Proposition 1, this has to be the case for at least one rm i; Proposition 1 and strategic
complementarity then together imply that, for the other rm, j: p^j  R^j (p^i) < R^j
 
p^Ni

= p^Nj .
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associated qualities; we then have, for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g:
max
p^i;si
^i (p^i; p^j; si)  ^i (p^; s^i)  ^Ni = max
p^i;si
^i
 
p^i; p^
N
j ; si

;
which, using (13) and Lemma 7, implies p^j  p^Nj under

C^

. Hence, p^  p^N .
Proposition 19 (which does not hinge on Assumption Â) conrms that: (i) rms will
not select price caps when they o¤er substitutable goods (case

S^

); and (ii) price caps
enable the rms to cooperate when they o¤er complements (case

C^

), in which case
rmsinterests are aligned with those of consumers both long for lower net prices. Fur-
thermore, price caps then benet consumers whenever they enhance both rmsprots.
It is worth noting that the protability of price caps for complements does not depend
on any specic assumption on (the curvature of the net) cost function or (on the semi-
elasticity of) demand. This is because the argument relies on net prices that are in the
neighborhood of the unconstrained Nash outcome, where Assumption D is automatically
satised (as si is close to sMi , c
0
i (si) is close to 1).
Remark: Mergers versus price caps. It would be straightforward to extend condition
(MS) and show that, under this condition, a merger harms consumers whereas price caps
can only benet them. However, under the alternative condition (MC), a merger and
joint-prot maximizing price caps would produce di¤erent results: the merger would lead
to monopoly prices and qualities, whereas price caps would lead to lower qualities and,
thus, to di¤erent prices.
G.5 Symmetric oligopoly
We now extend the analysis to an arbitrary number of rms, n  2, and rst focus on
symmetric rms and outcomes; specically, rms:
 face the same constant unit cost: ci (si) = c (si) for all i 2 N ;
 face symmetric demands, in the sense that other rmsprices are interchangeable:
Di (p^) = D (p^i; p^ i), where p^j = pj   sj denotes rm js net price, adjusted for
quality, and D (p^i; p^ i) = D (p^i; (p^ i)) for any permutation  () of the net prices
p^ i, for all i 2 N and (p^i; p^ i) 2 Rn+.
We maintain the strict quasi-concavity assumption for the individual prot functions.
Our symmetry assumption implies that all rms have the same best-responses:
R^i (p^ i) = R^ (p^ i) ;
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which is moreover invariant under any permutation of the other rmsprices. We further
assume that
@1R^ () >  1; (14)
where @1R^ () denotes the partial derivative of R^ () with respect to its rst argument (by
symmetry, the same condition applies to the other derivatives).
We further assume that the unique Nash equilibrium and monopoly outcome are
symmetric: p^Ni = p^
N and p^Mi = p^
M . We have:
From Proposition 17, rms cannot use price caps to raise their prices uniformly above
the Nash level. Therefore:
Proposition 20 (non-veriable quality: price caps - symmetric oligopoly) Under
Assumption D, any symmetric vector of net prices p^ 6= pN that is sustainable through
price caps yields a higher consumer surplus than pN .
Proof. This follows directly from Proposition 17, which ensures that any such symmetric
vector of price caps is such that p^i = p^ < pN .
This Proposition extends our previous insights in that price caps can only result in
lower symmetric net prices that benet consumers. It also implies that rms have no
incentives to introduce a price cap under (S), and can instead use them to increase their
prots under (C):
Proposition 21 (non-veriable quality: incentives - symmetric oligopoly)
(i) Under

S^

and Assumption D, rms cannot use price caps to sustain a more prof-
itable symmetric outcome than that of the Nash equilibrium.
(ii) Under

C^

, rms can use price caps to generate a symmetric outcome that increases
their prots, compared with the Nash equilibrium outcome; any such use of price
caps benets consumers as well.
Proof. (i) From the above analysis, any symmetric vector of net prices that is sustainable
through price caps lies below the Nash level: p^i = p^ < p^N . It follows that, under

S^

,
any such vector of net prices is less protable than the Nash equilibrium outcome; letting
s denote the associated (symmetric) level of quality,26 we have:
^i (p^; s) = max
p^i;si
[p^i + si   ci (si)]D (p^i; p^ i)
s.t. p^i + si  p
 max
p^i;si
[p^i + si   ci (si)]D (p^i; p^ i)
 max
p^i;si
[p^i + si   ci (si)]D
 
p^i; p^
N
 i

= ^i
 
p^N ; sM

:
26Firm is associated quality level is given by si = arg maxs ^i (p^; s) and is thus symmetric: si = s for
all i 2 N .
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(ii) As for Proposition 19, it su¢ ces to note that, under

C^

, a small and uniform
reduction in all prices:
 increases all rmsprots, as reducing one rms price (and adjusting the quality
accordingly) has only a second-order e¤ect on the prot of that rm, and a rst-
order, positive e¤ect on all other rmsprots (as it increases their demands); and
 generates a symmetric vector of net prices that belongs to P^ as (Assumption D is
trivially satised in the neighborhood of p^N , so that constrained net best-responses
strictly increase with relevant price caps, and):
R^ (p^; :::; p^)  p^ =
Z "
0
"
1 
n 1X
j=1
@jR^
 
p^N   x# dx > 0;
where the inequality follows from condition (10).Using symmetry, we have:
n 1X
j=1
@jR^ (p^) =
1
n
X
i2N
X
j2Nnfig
@jR^i (p^) =
1
n
X
j2N
X
i2Nnfjg
@jR^i (p^) < 1;
where the inequality stems from (10).
Hence, there are symmetric net prices in P^ that give all rms more prot than the
Nash equilibrium outcome, as is required for price caps to be agreed upon in the absence
of transfer. To conclude the proof, it su¢ ces to note that increasing all rmsprots
requires lowering the symmetric net price below the Nash level. To see this, consider a
symmetric price vector p^ that increases all rmsprots above their Nash levels; letting
s denote the associated (symmetric) quality, we then have, for i 6= j 2 N :
max
p^i;si
^i (p^i; p^ i; si)  ^i (p^; s)  ^Ni = max
p^i;si
^i
 
p^i; p^
N
 i; si

;
which, using (13) and Lemma 7, implies p^  p^N under

C^

. Hence, p^  p^N .
G.6 Oligopoly under strategic complementarity
We extend here the analysis to oligopolies where net prices are strategic complements:cSC Strategic complementarity: for every i 2 N , R^i (p^ i) increases in p^j for any j 2
N n fig.
We show that, under this assumption (together with our previous assumptions on
the quasi-concavity of prot functions, the regularity of best-responses and Nash equi-
librium uniqueness), price caps cannot generate higher equilibrium net prices (regardless
of whether goods are complements or substitutes). It follows that price caps can only
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benet consumers, and are useful for suppliers of complements, but not for competitors
o¤ering substitutes.
Suppose that each rm i 2 N faces a price cap pi. Any resulting equilibrium price
vector p^ = (p^i)i2N satises p^i = ^i (p^ i; pi) for i 2 N , where:
^i (p i; pi) = (^i (p i; pi))j2Mi  arg maxpipi i (pi;p i)
denotes rm is best-response, constrained by the price caps it faces.
We now show that price caps cannot be used to raise equilibrium prices:
Proposition 22 (non-veriable quality: price caps benet consumers under
cSC)
Under
cSC and Assumption D, any vector of net prices p^ = (p^i)i2N that is sustainable
through price caps satises p^  p^N . Therefore, price caps can only benet consumers.
Proof. From Proposition 17, the set of net prices p^ = (p^i)i2N that are sustainable through
price caps is
P^ 
n
p^ 2 Rn+ j 0  p^i  R^i (p^ i) for i 2 N
o
;
where by assumption the best-response function R^i (p^ i) is bounded above by some B^i.
Hence, without loss of generality, we can restrict the net price p^i to belong to S^i 
h
0; B^i
i
.
Note that, by construction, the Nash equilibrium net price vector p^N =
 
p^Ni

i2N is such
that p^Ni 2 S^i.
Next, dene ^ (p^) 

^i (p^)

i2N
, where ^i (p^) = R^i (p^ i). The Nash equilibrium
vector of net prices, p^N , obviously constitutes a xed point of ^ (). Furthermore, using
the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 4, it can be checked that ^ is a contraction
mapping from S^  S^1 ::: S^n to S^, endowed with the `1 norm: for any p^ 2 S^, ^ (p^) 2 S^
and, in addition, for any p^0 2 S^:^ (p^0)  ^ (p^) = X
i2N
^i (p^0)  ^i (p^)
=
X
i2N
R^i  p^0 i  R^i (p^ i)
=
X
i2N
Z 1
0
d
d
n
R^i
 
p^0 i + (1  ) p^ i
o
d


X
i2N
Z 1
0
f
X
j2Nnfig
@jR^i  p^0 i + (1  ) p^ i j p^0j   p^jjgd
=
Z 1
0
f
X
j2N
[
X
i2Nnfjg
@jR^i
 
p^0 i + (1  ) p^ i

] j p^0j   p^jjgd

X
j2N
k^ j p^0j   p^jj
= k^ kp^0   p^k ;
44
where the fourth equality uses
cSC and:
k^  max
p^2S^;j2N
X
i2Nnfjg
@jR^i (p^ i) < 1;
where the inequality stems from (10). It follows from the Banach xed point theorem that
p^N is the unique xed point in S^, and that any sequence fp^kgk2N satisfying p^k+1 = ^ (p^k)
converges to p^N .
Next, we show that any p^ 2 P^ is such that ^ (p^) 2 P^. Thus, x p^ 2 P^ and i 2 N .
Using the constrained net price best-response ^i (p^ i; pi) dened by

P^

, it follows from
Lemma 8 that
^i (p^) = R^i (p^ i)  ^i (p^ i; pi = 0) = 0:
It remains to show that ^i (p^)  R^i

^ i (p^ i)

; using p^j () = R^j

^ j (p^)

+
(1  ) ^j (p^), we have:
R^i

^ i (p^)

  ^i (p^)
= R^i

^ i (p^)

  R^i (p^ i)
= R^i

^ i (p^) + (1  ) p^ i

=1
  R^i

^ i (p^) + (1  ) p^ i

=1
=
Z 1
0
d
d
n
R^i

^ i (p^) + (1  ) p^ i
o
d
=
Z 1
0
d
d

R^i



R^j (p^ j)

j2Nnfig
+ (1  ) (p^j)j2Nnfig

d
=
Z 1
0
8<: X
j2Nnfig
@jR^i



R^j (p^ j)

j2Nnfig
+ (1  ) (p^j)j2Nnfig

R^j (p^ j)  p^j
9=; d
 0;
where the inequality stems from
cSC (which implies @jR^i  0 for all i 6= j 2 N ) and
p^ 2 P^ (which implies R^j (p^ j)  p^j for all j 2 N ).
It follows that the sequence fp^kgk2N dened by p^0 = p^ and p^k+1 = ^ (p^k) not only
converges to p^N , but remains within P^ and is therefore such that p^k+1  p^k. Hence,
p^N = p^1  p^0 = p^.
It follows from the above that, again, rms have an incentive to agree on price caps
when they o¤er complements, but not when they o¤er substitutes:
Corollary 2 (non-veriable quality: rmsincentives under
cSC)
(i) Under

S^

and Assumption D, price caps cannot increase the prot of any rm.
(ii) Under

C^

, price caps can be used to increase all rmsprots.
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Proof. If goods are all substitutes, then for any p^ 2 P^ and associated qualities s, and
any i 2 N , we have:
^i (p^; si)  max
p^0i;s
0
i
^i (p^
0
i; p^ i; s
0
i)  max
p^0i;s
0
i
^i
 
p^0i; p^
N
 i; s
0
i

= ^Ni ;
where the rst inequality reects the fact that rm i may be constrained by its price cap
pi, and the second inequality stems from the fact that price caps can only sustain net
prices that are lower than p^N .
If goods are all complements, the reasoning used in the proof of Proposition 19 extends
to the case of an asymmetric oligopoly: starting from the Nash equilibrium prices p^N ,
reducing all net prices by a small amount " (and adjusting the qualities accordingly)
increases all rmsprots, as rmsmargins are positive from Lemma 7, and reducing
one rms price has only a second-order e¤ect on the prot of that rm, and a rst-order
positive e¤ect on the other rmsdemands. To conclude the argument, it su¢ ces to show
that the new price vector, p^ (") =
 
p^Ni   "

i2N , belongs to P^; indeed, for i 2 N we have
p^i (") = p^
N
i   " > 0 for " small enough and:
R^i (p^ i ("))  p^i (") =
Z "
0
[1 
X
j2Nnfig
@jR^i (p^ i (x))]dx > 0;
where the inequality stems from (10). As Assumption D is trivially satised in the
neighborhood of p^N , it follows from the proof of Proposition 17 that p^ (") 2 P^ for "
small enough.
H Post-investment price caps
H.1 Substitutes
Consider the multi-product rm oligopoly setting developed in online Appendix C, in
which each rm i 2 N can o¤er a set Mi  f1; :::;mig of products, and now suppose
that in addition rms must make investment decisions. These decisions may correspond
to entering or staying in the market, developing new products, improving the quality
or lowering the production cost of existing ones; di¤erent rms may moreover be facing
di¤erent choices.
Let Ii denote the set of feasible investment decisions for rm i, and I = (I1; :::; In) 2
I = I1 :::In denote the vector of these decisions. Firm is total cost is now given by
Ci (qi; Ii), and the demand for rm is goods is Di (p; I) = (D1i (p; I) ; :::; D
mi
i (p; I)). As
before, we will assume that, for all I 2 I and i 2 N , Di () and Ci () are both C2 and
that, for every i 2 N :
 the prot function i (p; I) 
P
j2Mi p
j
iD
j
i (p; I) Ci (Di (p; I) ; Ii) is strictly quasi-
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concave in pi;
 for every j 2Mj, the product-by-productbest-response function rji

p
Minfjg
i ;p i; I


arg maxpji
i

pji ;p
Minfjg
i ;p i; I

is well-dened and bounded above.
We further focus on substitutes and strategic complementarity, and assume price
equilibrium uniqueness:
 For every i 2 N and any I 2 I:
 (S) products are substitutes: @pjDi () < 0 for j 6= i 2 N .
 (SC) prices are strategic complements: @pjRi () > 0 for j 6= i 2 N .
 For any investment decisions I 2 I, in the absence of price caps there exists a
unique Nash equilibrium in prices, which we denote by pI =
 
pIi

i2N .
Suppose that investment decisions are publicly made in stage 2a, and rms can then
agree on price caps in stage 2b, before setting prices in stage 3. From Proposition 8,
for any vector of investment decisions I 2 I made in stage 2a, rms have no incentive
to adopt price-caps agreements in stage 2b; therefore, in stage 3 the continuation price
equilibrium is pI, as in when price caps are not allowed. It follows that thus allowing
price caps in stage 1 has no impact on the set of investment and price equilibria in stages
2 and 3.
H.2 Complements
H.2.1 On Assumption C
Suppliers of complements can always sign a mutually protable agreement that benet
all of them: as shown in the proof of Corollary 1, starting from the Nash equilibrium
prices pN , reducing all prices by a small amount " is sustainable through price caps, and
it increases all rmsprots, as rmsmargins are positive from Lemma 2, and reducing
one rms price has only a second-order e¤ect on the prot of that rm, and a rst-order
positive e¤ect on the other rmsprots.
Other agreements may not share this feature: The price-caps agreement signed by a
coalition of rms may benet them, but hurt others. For example, suppose that there
are three rms i = 1; 2; 3 producing at no cost products 1; 2; 3 respectively, and facing
demand Di (p) = di (pi 1)  pi (with the convention that 0 = 3), where di () > 0 > d0i ()
(that is, product i is a complement for product i+1). It is easy to show that this leads to
best-responsesRi (p i) = di (pi 1) =2 and to a unique Nash equilibrium pN .27 Introducing
27To see this, it su¢ ces to note that  (p1)  R1 (R3 (R2 (p1)))   p1 = d1 (d3 (d2 (p1) =2) =2) =2   p1
is such that  (0) > 0 and 0 (p1) = d01 () d03 () d02 (p1) =8   1 <  1. Therefore, there exists a unique
pN1 satisfying  (p1) = 0; the price vector
 
pN1 ; p
N
2  d2
 
pN1

=2; pN3  d3
 
pN2

=2

then constitutes the
unique Nash equilibrium.
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a price cap p1 slightly below pN1 then induces rm 1 to set p1 = p1, which in turn leads
rm 2 to raise p2 slightly above pN2 and rm 3 to reduce p3 slightly below p
N
3 . As a result,
rms 1 and 2 benet from the introduction of the cap (as their demands are boosted
by the reductions in p1 and p3, respectively, and because they either best-respond or are
close to their best-response), whereas rm 3 is hurt (as its demand is harmed by the
increase in p2).
The fact that price caps may benet a coalition at the expense of outsiders need not
imply that they will be adopted by the coalition, however; other agreements may be more
protable and benet others as well. For example, in the above example, introducing the
price cap p1 led to small reductions 1
 
= pN1   p1

and 3 in the prices of rms 1 and
3, and to a small increase in the price of rm 2; a uniform slight reduction in all three
prices, by   max f1;3g, would instead benet rm 3 as well, while giving at least
the same benets to rms 1 and 2. We will not develop here a full-edged model of
negotiations over price caps, and simply assume that any price-caps agreement benets
non-signatories:
Assumption C: Any active unconstrained rm is at least as well o¤ when other
active rms are constrained by price caps than when all active rms are unconstrained.
Intuitively, this Assumption is likely to hold when rms are in a rather symmetric
position. For example, under (SS) it holds for symmetric demands with an aggregative
nature, that is, when there exist an aggregator A (p1; :::; pn 1), which is symmetric and
increasing in all prices, and a function D (p;A), which decreases with both p and A, such
that
Di (p) = D (pi; A (p i)) :
A classic example is the linear demand Di (p) = d  api   b
P
j2Nnfig pj (with d > 0 and
a > b > 0).28
Suppose for simplicity that all rms are active.29 In the absence of price caps, the re-
sulting equilibrium is symmetric (pi = pN for all i 2 N ) and satises pN = R
 
pN i

;
we will assume that the symmetric best-response satises @1R () 2 ( 1; 0);30 that
is, prices are strategic substitutes (SS), but they do not respond excessively to each
other  the latter condition is implied by the usual stability condition which requiresP
j2Nnfig @jR (p i) >  1.
Suppose now that rms are constrained by price caps fpigi2N , where pi = +1 for at
28For substitutes, such demand systems include multinomial logit (Di (p) =
d exp (a  bpi) =
P
j2N exp (a  bpj), with a; b; d > 0) and CES (Di (p) = dp i =
P
j2N ap
1 
j ,
with a; d > 0 and  > 1). See Nocke and Schutz (2017) for a recent analysis of such aggregative demand
systems.
29The reasoning applies to any smaller set of active rms, with the convention that pi = +1 for any
inactive rms.
30@1R denotes here the partial derivative of R () with respect to its rst argument; by symmetry, it
applies to the other arguments as well.
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least one rm, and let p^ and ^ denote the resulting equilibrium prices and prots. We
rst note that all unconstrained rms charge the same price p^. To see this, suppose that
two unconstrained rms i and j charge di¤erent prices, e.g., p^i > p^j. Using symmetry, we
then have:
p^i   p^j = R (p^ i) R (p^ j)
= R
 
p^j; p^ fi;jg
 R  p^i; p^ fi;jg
=
Z p^j
p^i
@1R
 
p; p^ fi;jg

dp
< p^i   p^j;
a contradiction.
Next, we show that the symmetric unconstrained price p^ lies above the highest binding
price cap. To see this, let C denote the set of rms for which the price cap is binding,
{ denote the rm with the highest binding price cap (that is, p{ = maxi2C fpig), and
suppose that p^ < p{. We then have p{  R (p^ {) and p^ = R (p^ i) for any i 2 N n C;
therefore:
p{   p^  R (p^ {) R (p^ i)
= R
 
p^; p^ fi;{g
 R  p{; p^ fi;{g
=
Z p^
p{
@1R
 
p; p^ fi;{g

dp
< p{   p^;
a contradiction.
We thus have pi = pi  p^ for all i 2 C, and pi = p^ for all i 2 N n C. From
(SS), p^ < pN would then imply p^i < pNi for all i 2 N and thus, for any j 2 N n C:
p^ = R (p^ i) > R
 
pN i

= pN , a contradiction. Therefore, p^  pN . Finally, for aggregative
games the best-response R () is of the form R (p i) = R^ (A (p i)), where R^0 < 0 from
(SS). Therefore, for any unconstrained rm i 2 N n C: A (p i) = R^ 1 (p^)  R^ 1
 
pN

=
A
 
pN i

, implying that rm i obtains at least as much prot as in the unconstrained Nash
equilibrium.31
H.2.2 Entry/exit game
Consider a setting in which each rm i 2 N must decide whether to enter (or stay in) the
market and suppose further that Assumption C holds. We rst note that this assumption
implies that, as intuition suggests, the development of complementary products boosts
demand and enhances prots. To see this, consider two situations which only di¤er in that
one rm (rm i, say), is either active or not, and let p^i denote rm is (unconstrained)
31To see this, note that the price at which rm i can sell any quantity qi is decreasing with A (p i).
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equilibrium price when it is active. From the standpoint of the other rms, the entry of
rm i has the same impact as imposing a price cap pi = p^i on a rm producing the same
good as rm i but with a very large marginal cost: that rm would thus charge +1 in
the absence of a cap, and p^i when facing the cap.
Let A denote the set of active rms in an equilibrium that arises in the absence of
price caps; each rm in A is thus better o¤being active (given the presence of the others),
and it would benet from the presence of any additional rms. Hence, if price caps are
now allowed, each rm in A nds it protable to be active if the others do, regardless
of the decisions of rms outside A, and regardless of any price caps that the other rms
may agree to. The possibility of price caps can moreover be used to increase all active
rmsprots (as noted at the beginning of Section H.2.1), and from Assumption C this
may induce some of the outsiders to enter.
Summarizing this discussion yields Proposition 10.
I Pre-investment price caps
A potential concern is the use of (articially low) price caps as a way of softening com-
petition, by inducing exit, deterring entry or stiing investment.
A rst issue is the possible use of price caps as a commitment to maintain low prices,
so as to deter entry or discourage investment. This is indeed a serious concern if rms
can sign long-term contracts with their customers: rms could then credibly commit
themselves to maintain low prices, for example, by adopting most favored nation clauses
promising a compensation for any price increase: this would de facto allow customers
to buy at the initially agreed price caps, even if these caps are then renegotiated away.
In such a case, incumbent rms could adopt low price caps so as to deter entry, as in
the limit pricing model of Sylos Labini (1957) and Modigliani (1958). Ruling out this
possibility leads to:
Policy recommendation 1 : Customers are not part of the price-caps agreements.
Second, a low price cap (possibly against compensation) may act as a commitment
to exit the market. Indeed, if rm i accepts a price cap pi that is too low for operating
protably (e.g., lower than its minimum average cost), it will then choose to leave the
market. Firms could therefore use such price-caps agreements so as to bribe some rivals
out of the market; likewise, incumbent rms could induce potential entrants to stay out
of the market.32 These commitments are not credible, however, as the rms would have
no incentive to enforce the price caps. Taking advantage of these incentives leads to:
32Consider for example a symmetric duopoly in which each rm faces a constant marginal cost c and a
xed cost f > 0, and obtains a gross prot D > f . If either rm were alone, it would instead obtain the
monopoly prot M , where, due to competition M > 2D. Firm 1, say, would then have an incentive
to briberm 2 into a price-caps agreement of the form
 
p1  pM ; p2  c

: this would induce rm 2 to
exit, and enable rm 1 to increase its prot by 1 = M  D; as 1 > 2 = D f , these price caps,
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Policy recommendation 2 : The agreement becomes void if none of the parties wishes
to enforce it.
This requirement implies that, in order to remain in place, a price-caps agreement
must be conrmedby at least one party to the agreement; this contributes to undermine
the credibility of the threatsdiscussed above.
We now show that these policy recommendations indeed alleviate the above concerns
about the use of price caps as a way to deter entry or stie investment.
Consider the same setting as in Section H.1 (with quasi-concavity, strategic comple-
mentarity and unique continuation price equilibria), but modify the overall game G as
follows:
2. (a) Firms choose price caps if such agreements are allowed.
(b) Firms make observable investment or entry decisions.
3. (a) If an agreement has been signed, rms choose whether to conrm it; the agree-
ment is enforced if and only if at least one rm conrms it.
(b) Firms set their prices.
This timing allows the rms to sign price-caps agreements in order to inuence in-
vestment decisions, but rules out non-credible threats by asking rms to conrm their
willingness to enforce the agreement, once investment decisions have been made. To avoid
coordination issues, we rule out weakly dominated strategies.
From Proposition 8, for any vector of investment decisions I 2 I made in stage 2b,
in stage 3a rms have no incentive to enforce any price-caps agreement, regardless of
what they may have agreed to in stage 2a; therefore, in stage 3b the continuation price
equilibrium is pI, as when price caps are not allowed. It follows that allowing price caps
in stage 1 has no impact on the set of investment and price equilibria in stages 2 and 3.
Summarizing the above analysis yields:
Proposition 23 (commitment e¤ects of price caps) Consider the following two pre-
requisites to setting price caps: a) customers are not part of the price-caps agreements;
b) the agreement becomes void if none of the parties wishes to enforce it. Then, when
(S) and (SC) hold, price caps have no impact on investment/entry/exit and therefore no
impact on consumers.
together with any transfer T 2 (2;1), would make both rms better o¤. Furthermore, transfers may
no longer be needed when several markets are involved, as price caps could then be used to divide these
markets in a mutually protable way.
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J Foreclosure
Let us rst recall the jest of the Choi-Stefanadis foreclosure model.
 Integration and foreclosure. There are two rms: an incumbent and a potential entrant.
An integrated incumbent costlessly produces two perfect complements, A and B. We rst
assume an inelastic demand for the system: A and B together bring value v to consumers.
An entrant can invest I to develop with probability  2 (0; 1) product A0, which is an
alternative to A and brings extra surplus  2 (I=;min fI=2; vg); and similarly with
product B0 (A0 and B0 combined thus deliver consumer value v + 2). The two R&D
processes are independent.
Prior to the entrant deciding whether to undertake R&D on A0, B0 or both, the
incumbent makes a technological choice: it can choose an open standard, in which case
consumers can mix and match developed products as they like (e.g., combine A and B0,
for value v + ); alternatively, it can choose a closed standard, in which case A and B
can only be consumed together (combining A and B0, say, thus brings no value). The
technological choice is costless. It is easy to check that the entrant always invests in both
markets or none.
The entrant obtains no prot when both R&D projects fail, and 2 when both suc-
ceed. When a single R&D project succeeds, under a closed standard the entrant obtains
again no prot. Under an open standard, the incumbent and the entrant are in a Nash
demand game. As Nash observed, introducing a small noise on consumer valuation would
deliver equal sharing (v + ) =2, except that the incumbent can secure v (regardless of
the entrants price) by charging v for the monopolized component and o¤ering the other
one at cost. As  < v, the resulting outcome is that the incumbent obtains the base
value v and the entrant obtains its added value .
It follows that, under an open standard, the entrant invests and obtains a prot equal
to
2 (2) + 2 (1  ) () + (1  )2 (0)  2I = 2 (  I) > 0;
and the incumbent thus obtains:
2 (0) + 2 (1  ) v + (1  )2 (v) =  1  2 v:
Under a closed standard, entry becomes riskier and the entrant does not invest, as
2 (2)  2I = 2  2  I < 0:
The incumbents prot is then v > (1  2) v. So the incumbent is better o¤ preventing
investment by choosing the closed standard, as entry may lead to full system competition.
 Absence of merger. Suppose now that A and B are produced by two distinct incumbent
rms, a and b, and each can choose an open or closed standard. It is then a dominant
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strategy for the incumbent rms to choose the open standard. For example, if A0 is
developed but not B0, then with an open standard b can appropriate the entire surplus
v: the entrant charges , a charges 0, and b can charge v as consumers are willing to pay
v+ for the pair fA0; Bg; with a closed standard, b can only appropriate v=2.33 If A0 is not
developed, or both A0 and B0 are developed, then bs choice of technology is irrelevant.
We thus conclude that no foreclosure occurs under separate ownership. Furthermore,
allowing price-caps agreements does not enable the incumbents to deter entry, as the
adoption of price caps can only boost the demand for the alternative components.
 Downward sloping demand. An elastic demand creates a private and social benet from
either a merger or price caps: the elimination of the double marginalization. However,
price caps are a socially superior way of avoiding double marginalization, as they do not
enable foreclosure.
To illustrate this, suppose that:
 There are two types of consumers: a fraction f have value vH , whereas the oth-
ers have value vL, where 0 < vL < vH and there is double marginalization by
independent producers:
vL > fvH >
1 + f
2
vL: (15)
 The R&D cost can take two values, 0 (with probability ) and I (with probability
1  ).
We consider three scenarios: (i) in the benchmark case, the two components are
initially produced by independent rms; (ii) in case of a merger, these incumbents are
integrated; (iii) in the price caps scenario, the independent incumbents can enter into
price-caps agreements. The timing is as follows.
 Stage 0: incumbent rms choose between open and closed standards.
 Stage 1: the entrant decides whether to invest.
 Stage 2: R&D outcomes are observed by all rms; in the last scenario, they can
moreover agree on price caps
 Stage 3: rms set their prices.
From the above analysis, when both alternative components are developed, price
competition drives the incumbent rmsprices down to 0 (note that incumbents would
never agree on negative price caps). When a single alternative component is developed
and the monopolized component opted for an open standard (which is the case in the
absence of a merger), price competition drives again the price of the incumbent component
33The two incumbents are again in a Nash demand game, and introducing a small noise on consumer
valuation then delivers equal sharing.
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down to 0. The producer of the monopolized component (or the integrated rm, in case
of a merger) charges vL as, from rst inequality in (15) ; the corresponding prot, vL,
exceeds the prot derived from targeting the high-end segment, fvH . The entrant obtains
 under an open standard, and 0 otherwise.
In the absence of any alternative component, the equilibrium prices vary across sce-
narios. In the benchmark case, each incumbent charges vH=2 and thus obtains a prot
equal to fvH=2. This indeed constitutes an equilibrium, as serving the low-end segment
would require charging vL   vH=2 and thus generate a prot vL   vH=2, which, from the
second inequality in (15), is lower than fvH=2. To see that each incumbent charging vL=2
and obtaining a prot vL=2 is not an equilibrium,34 it su¢ ces to note that deviating and
targeting the high-end segment would generate a prot equal to f (vH   vL=2), which
under (15) is higher than vL=2.
In case of a merger, the integrated incumbent charges vL as, from rst inequality in
(15) ; the corresponding prot, vL, exceeds the prot derived from targeting the high-end
segment, fvH . For the same reason, in the price caps scenario, the incumbents agree on
price caps equal to vL=2.
Building on these insights:
 In the benchmark scenario, the entrant invests and consumers obtain an expected
surplus equal to:
S = 2 (1  ) f (vH   vL) + 2 [fvH + (1  f) vL] :
 In the merger scenario, the integrated incumbent opts for a closed standard and
the entrant does not invest; the merger however eliminates double marginalization
and consumers thus obtain an expected surplus equal to:
Sm = f (vH   vL)
= S + (1  )2 f (vH   vL)  2vL:
 In the price caps scenario, the entrant again invests and price caps eliminate double
marginalization when R&D projects fail; as a result, consumers obtain an expected
surplus equal:
Sp = (1  )2 f (vH   vL) + 2 (1  ) f (vH   vL) + 2 [fvH + (1  f) vL]
= S + (1  )2 f (vH   vL)
= Sm + 2vL:
Whether the merger benets consumers depend on the balance between the ex-
34The same argument as before allows us to focus on symmetric equilibria.
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pected gain from eliminating double marginalization in case of failed R&D projects,
(1  )2 f (vH   vL), and the harm resulting from the loss of competition in case of suc-
cessful projects, 2vL. By contrast, allowing price caps enables the rms to eliminate
double marginalization without giving them incentives to opt for closed standards and
deter entry in the other component. Hence, price caps do benet consumers, and consti-
tute a better alternative to mergers.
 Bundling and price squeezes.
Finally, let us ignore technological choices (that is, the only standard is an open one)
but assume that the incumbent can commit to specic pricing policies.35 A rst option
it to engage in pure bundling (i.e., to sell the two products only as a bundle). This is
irrelevant when the entrant develops 0 or 2 products, but forces consumers to buy the
bundle fA;Bg when the entrant develops only one product; contrary to the case of a
closed standard, the entrant can still sell its component (which consumers can use as a
replacement of the bundled component), but the protability of doing so however depends
on the level of production costs. To see this, suppose now that all goods are produced
at the same constant unit cost c, and interpret the above values as net of this cost.
Absent entry, the incumbent sells the bundle at price 2c + v; when instead the entrant
develops both products, it sells them at total price 2c+ . Consider now the case when
A0, say, is developed but not B0. Absent bundling, the incumbent sells B at price c + v
and the entrant sells A0 at price c + . In case of bundling, the incumbent sells A and
B at bundled price 2c + v; the entrant can then sell A0 at price , but earns a prot of
  c (instead of , absent bundling). Thus, when c is high (e.g., c > ), bundling plays
the same role of a closed standard: it deprives the entrant of a prot when it develops a
single product, and therefore deters entry.
Another option for the incumbent is to commit to (entry-contingent) prices. Even if
it is constrained by a system-wide no-loss condition (e.g., if regulators can demonstrate
the existence of a nancial loss, although not on a given product line, cross-subsidies
being hard to monitor), it can use this instrument to extract (all of part of) the added
value brought by the entrant when a single R&D project succeeds. For example, when
A0 is developed but not B0, o¤ering A at below-cost price c  s, where s 2 [0;], forces
the entrant to sell A0 at price    s. Opting for s close to  thus acts like bundling
or the choice an incompatible technology: the price squeeze deprives the entrant of any
prot when it develops a single product and not the entire system itself, which deters
entry. However, as entry is welfare-enhancing, a better option consists in setting s so as
to induce the entrant to invest, and appropriate all or most of the expected prot.36
 Sequential entry. Carlton and Waldman (2002) consider a related setting, and show
that an integrated incumbent may again deter entry when it is sequential rather than
35One may have in mind an incumbent facing repeated entry in new segments and developing a
reputation for these practices.
36That is, s should be set to that  (1  ) s =   I.
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uncertain. To see this, consider a two-period (t = 1; 2) variant of the above setting in
which: (i) R&D is always successful (i.e.,  = 1); and (ii) developing B0 is possible in
both periods, at cost IB, whereas developing A0 can only take place in period 2, at cost
IA. In this case, if the development costs satisfy IA= < 1 and IB= < 1 + , then
with an open standard E develops B0 in period 1 and A0 in period 2, but if in addition
(IA + IB) = > 2, then, with a closed standard, E does not develop any product. By
contrast, in case of independent incumbents, bs choice of standard is irrelevant, and a
opts for an open standard, inducing entry, in order to appropriate the full value v in the
rst period: in this way, a obtains a prot equal to v, which exceeds its total discounted
prot under foreclosure, which is equal to (1 + ) v=2.
Proposition 24 (price caps versus mergers: foreclosure concerns) In the Choi-
Stefanadis and Carlton-Waldman frameworks, a merger of complements allows foreclosure
while price caps do not. Accordingly, price caps are a socially superior way of handling
double marginalization.
K Repeated interaction in the technology adoption
model
Suppose that the rms play the technology adoption game repeatedly, with discount
factor  2 (0; 1). Let
v  (1  ) t0t
t
1 + 
t
2
2
denote the average of rmsdiscounted prots over a pure-strategy equilibrium path, V+
denote the set of these equilibrium payo¤s that are weakly more protable than Nash (i.e.,
such that v  N), and v denote the maximal equilibrium payo¤.37 Tacit coordination
raises prots only if v > N .
The location of e a¤ects not only the nature of tacit coordination, but also the minmax
prot:
Lemma 9 (minmax) Let  denote the minmax prot.
(i) If e  p^, the static Nash equilibrium (e; e) gives each rm the minmax prot:  =
N =  (e).
(ii) If e > p^, the minmax prot is the incomplete-technology per-period monopoly prot:
 = ~M (e) < N =  (p^).
37This maximum is well dened, as the set V+ of Nash-dominating subgame perfect equilibrium payo¤s
is non-empty (it includes N ) and compact (see Mailath and Samuelson (2006), chapter 2). Also, although
we restrict attention to pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria here, the analysis could be extended
to public mixed strategies (where players condition their strategies on public signals) or, in the case of
private mixed strategies, to perfect public equilibria (relying on strategies that do not condition future
actions on private past history); see Mailath and Samuelson (2006), chapter 7.
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Proof. To establish part (i), note that rm i can secure its presence in the usersbasket
by charging e, thus obtaining eD(e + pj) if pj  e and eD(2e) if pj > e. Either way it
can secure at least  (e) = eD(2e). Because for e  p^ this lower bound is equal to the
static Nash prot, we have  = N =  (e).
We now turn to part (ii). If rm j sets a price pj  e, rm i can obtain at most
maxppj pD (e+ p) = ~
M (e) (as ~pM (e) = r (e) < p^ < e  pj). Setting instead a price
pj < e allows rm i to obtain at least maxpe pD (pj + p) > maxpe pD (e+ p) = ~M (e).
Therefore, setting any price above e minmaxes rm i, which then obtains ~M (e).
Hence, when e  p^, the static Nash equilibrium (e; e) yields the minmax prot; it thus
constitutes the toughest punishment for both rms. When instead e > p^, each rm can
guarantee itself the incomplete-technology monopoly prot ~M (e), which is then lower
than the prot of the static Nash equilibrium (p^; p^); Abreu (1988)s optimal penal codes
can then be used to sustain the toughest punishment.
We now characterize the scope for tacit coordination in the case of rivalry and of
complementors.
a) Rivalry: pN < pM This case arises when e < pM , implying pN = e and  = N =
 (e); collusion then implies selling the incomplete technology, and the loss in demand due
to partial consumption grows with essentiality. In particular, if e is close to pM , the Nash
equilibrium payo¤  (e) approaches the highest possible prot M , whereas pricing above
e substantially reduces the demand for the patents; as each rm can guarantee itself  (e),
there is no collusion. Specically, this occurs when patents are weak substitutes, namely,
when e  e, where e is the unique solution to
~M(e) = 2(e):
By contrast, for e close to 0, this loss in demand is small and the Nash prot is negligible;
and so collusion, if feasible, is attractive for the rms. Because users then buy only one
license, each rm can attract all users by slightly undercutting the collusive price. Like
in standard Bertrand oligopolies, maximal collusion (on ~pM (e)) is sustainable whenever
some collusion is sustainable. As symmetric collusion is easier to sustain, and deviations
are optimally punished by reverting to static Nash behavior, such collusion is indeed
sustainable if:
~M (e)
2
 (1  ) ~M (e) +  (e) ()   R (e)  1
2
1
1  (e)
~M (e)
; (16)
where R (e) is increasing in e and exceeds 1 for e  e. Building on these insights, we
have:
57
Proposition 25 (rivalry) When e < e and   R (e), V+= N ; v, and v = ~M (e) =2:
tacit collusion is feasible and the most protable collusion occurs at price ~pM(e); other-
wise, the unique equilibrium is the repetition of the static Nash one.
Proof. Let i (pi; pj) denote rm is prot. Prices such that min fp1; p2g  e cannot
yield greater prots than the static Nash:
 If p1; p2  e, total price P is below 2e; as the aggregate prot PD (P ) is concave
in P and maximal for PM = 2pM > 2e, total prot is smaller than the Nash level.
 If instead pi  e < pj, then
1 (p1; p2) + 2 (p2; p1) = piD (e+ pi)  eD (2e)  2eD (2e) = 2N ;
where the rst inequality stems from the fact that the prot ~ (p) = pD (e+ p) is
concave in p and maximal for ~pM (e) = r (e), which exceeds e in the rivalry case (as
then e < pM < p^ = r (p^)).
Therefore, to generate more prots than the static Nash prot in a given period, both
rms must charge more than e; this, in turn, implies that users buy at most one license,
and thus aggregate prots cannot exceed ~M (e). It follows that collusion cannot enhance
prots if ~M (e)  2N = 2 (e). Keeping V and thus pM constant, increasing e from 0 to
pM decreases ~M (e) = maxp pD (p+ e) but increases  (e); as ~M (0) = 2
 
pM

= 2M ,
there exists a unique e < pM such that, in the range e 2 0; pM, ~M (e) < 2N if and
only if e > e.
Thus, when e > e, the static Nash payo¤ N constitutes an upper bound on aver-
age discounted equilibrium payo¤s. But the static Nash equilibrium here yields minmax
prots, and thus also constitutes a lower bound on equilibrium payo¤s. Hence, N is the
unique average discounted equilibrium payo¤, which in turn implies that the static Nash
outcome must be played along any equilibrium path.
Consider now the case e < e, and suppose that collusion raises prots: v > N ,
where, recall, v is the maximal average discounted equilibrium payo¤. As v is a weighted
average of per-period prots, along the associated equilibrium path there must exist some
period   0 in which the aggregate prot, 1 +2, is at least equal to 2v. This, in turn,
implies that users must buy an incomplete version of the technology; thus, there exists
p such that:
~ (p) = 1 + 

2  2v:
By undercutting its rival, each rm i can obtain the whole prot ~ (p) in that period; as
this deviation could at most be punished by reverting forever to the static Nash behavior,
a necessary equilibrium condition is, for i = 1; 2:
(1  ) i + v+1i  (1  ) ~ (p) + ;
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where v+1i denotes rm is continuation equilibrium payo¤ from period  + 1 onwards.
Combining these conditions for the two rms yields:
(1  ) ~ (p) +   (1  ) 

1 + 

2
2
+ 
v+11 + v
+1
2
2
 (1  ) ~ (p
)
2
+ 
~ (p)
2
;
where the second inequality stems from v+11 + v
+1
2  2v  1 + 2 = ~ (p). This
condition amounts to 
   1
2

~ (p)   =  (e) ; (17)
which requires   1=2 (with a strict inequality if e > 0). This, in turn, implies that (17)
must hold for ~M (e) = maxp ~ (p):
   1
2

~M (e)   (e) : (18)
Conversely, if (18) is satised, then the stationary path
 
~pM(e); ~pM(e)

(with equal market
shares) is an equilibrium path, as the threat of reverting to the static Nash behavior
ensures that no rm has an incentive to deviate:
~M (e)
2
 (1  ) ~M (e) +  (e) ;
or
  R (e)  1
2
1
1  (e)
~M (e)
:
Finally, R (e) increases with e, as  (e) increases with e in that range, whereas ~M(e) =
maxpfpD (p+ e)g decreases as e increases.
Hence, greater essentiality hinders collusion, which is not feasible if e  e; furthermore,
as the threshold R (e) increases with e, for any given  2 (1=2; 1), in the entire rivalry
range e 2 0; pM there exits a unique e^ () 2 (0; e) such that collusion is feasible if and
only if e < e^ (). This is because the toughest punishment, given by the static Nash
prot, becomes less e¤ective as essentiality increases; although the gains from deviation
also decrease, which facilitates collusion, this e¤ect is always dominated.
b) Complementors: pM < pN This case arises when e > pM . Like when e 2 [e; pM ],
selling the incomplete technology cannot be more protable than the static Nash out-
come.38 Firms can however increase their prot by lowering their price below the Nash
level. Furthermore, when demand is convex, it can be checked that cooperation on
38This follows from Lemma 9 for e > p^. For pM < e  p^, we have ~pM (e) = r (e)  r (p^) =
p^  e and thus e + ~pM (e)  2e > 2pM = PM ; hence, ~M (e) = ~pM (e)D  e+ ~pM (e) < 
e+ ~pM (e)

D
 
e+ ~pM (e)
  2eD (2e), where the rst inequality stems from e > 0 and the second
one from the fact that the aggregate prot PD (P ) is concave in P and maximal for PM < e+ ~pM (e).
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some total price P < 2e is easiest when it is symmetric (i.e., when pi = P=2). As
pN = min fe; p^g, we can distinguish two cases:
 Weak complementors: e < p^, in which case pM < pN  e. The static Nash
equilibrium pN = e still yields minmax prots and thus remains the toughest punishment
in case of deviation. As pj  e < p^ = r (p^) < r (pj), rm is best deviation then consists
in charging e. In particular, perfect cooperation on pM is sustainable if and only if:
M  (1  ) eD  pM + e+  (e) ; (19)
which is satised for  close enough to 1.
The following proposition characterizes the scope for tacit coordination in this case:
Proposition 26 (weak complementors) When pM < e  p^:
(i) Perfect cooperation on price pM is feasible (i.e., v = M) if and only if
  C (e)  eD
 
pM + e
  M
eD (pM + e)   (e) ;
where 
C
(e) lies strictly below 1 for e > pM , and is decreasing for e close to pM .
(ii) Furthermore, if D00  0, then protable cooperation is sustainable (i.e., v > N) if
and only if
  C(e);
where C(e) lies below 
C
(e), is decreasing in e, and is equal to 0 for e = p^. The set
of sustainable Nash-dominating per-rm payo¤s is then V+= [ (e) ; v (e; )], where
v(e; ) 2 ( (e) ; M ] is (weakly) increasing in .
Proof. (i) That perfect cooperation (on pti = p
M for i = 1; 2 and t = 0; 1; :::) is sustain-
able if and only if
  C (e) = eD
 
pM + e
  M
eD (pM + e)   (e) =
1
1 + 
M (e)
eD(pM+e) M
derives directly from (19).
For e 2 (pM ; p^], M >  (e) and eD  pM + e > M (as r  pM > r (e)  p^  e);
therefore, 
C
(e) < 1. Also, for " positive but small, we have:

C  
pM + "
 ' 1
1  00(pM )
D(2pM )+pMD0(2pM )
"
2
;
which decreases with ", as 00
 
pM

< 0 and
D
 
2pM

+ pMD0
 
2pM

=  pMD0  2pM > 0:
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(ii) Suppose that collusion enhances prots: v > N =  (e). In the most protable
collusive equilibrium, there exists again some period  in which the average prot is at
least v. And as v >  (e) > ~M (e) =2,39 users must buy the complete technology in
that period; thus, each rm i must charge a price pi not exceeding e, and the average
price p = p

1+p

2
2
must moreover satisfy
 (p ) =
1 + 

2
2
 v:
As pj  e  p^ = r (p^)  r(pj ), rm is best deviation consists in charging e. Hence, to
ensure that rm i has no incentive to deviate, we must have:
(1  ) i + v+1i  (1  ) eD
 
pj + e

+ :
Combining these conditions for the two rms yields, using  (p ) = 

1+

2
2
and  =  (e):
(1  ) eD (p

1 + e) +D (p

2 + e)
2
+  (e)  (1  )  (p ) +  v
+1
2 + v
+1
2
2
  (p ) ;
where the second inequality stems from v
+1
1 +v
+1
2
2
 v   (p ). If the demand function is
(weakly) convex (i.e., D00  0 whenever D > 0), then this condition implies H (p ; e; ) 
0, where
H (p; e; )  (p)  (1  ) eD (p+ e)   (e) : (20)
Conversely, if H (p; e; )  0, then the stationary path (p; p) is an equilibrium path.
Summing-up, when D00  0, v > N if and only if there exists p < e satisfying
 (p) > N and H (p; e; )  0. By construction, H (e; e; ) = 0. In addition,
@H
@p
(p; e; ) = D(2p) + 2pD0(2p)  (1  ) eD0 (p+ e) :
Hence, D00  0 and Assumption A (which implies that PD0 (P ) decreases with P ) ensure
that
@2H
@p2
(p; e; ) < 0:
Therefore, if J (e; )  0, where:
J(e; )  @H
@p
(e; e; ) = D(2e) + (1 + ) eD0 (2e) ;
then no cooperation is feasible, as thenH (p; e; ) < 0 for p < e. Conversely, if J (e; ) < 0,
then tacit cooperation on p is feasible for p 2 p (e; ) ; e, where p = p (e; ) is the unique
39See footnote 38.
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solution (other than p = e) to H (p; e; ) = 0. Note that
@J
@
(e; ) = eD0 (2e) < 0;
and
J (e; 0) = D(2e) + eD0 (2e)  0;
as e  p^  r (e), whereas
J (e; 1) = D(2e) + 2eD0 (2e) < 0;
as e > pM . Therefore, there exists a unique C (e) such that tacit cooperation can be
protable for  > C (e). Furthermore, Assumption A implies that eD0 (2e) is decreasing
and so
@J
@e
(e; ) = 2D0(2e) + (1 + )
d
de
(eD0 (2e)) < 0:
Hence the threshold C (e) decreases with e; furthermore, C (p^) = 0, as J (p^; 0) = D(2p^)+
p^D0 (2p^) = 0 (as p^ = r (p^)).
Finally, when  > C (e), the set of sustainable Nash-dominating per-rm payo¤s is
[ (e) ; v (e; )], where v (e; )    maxpM ; p (e; )	, and p (e; ) is the lower solution
to H (p; e; ) = 0; as H increases in ,40 p (e; ) decreases with  and thus v (e; ) weakly
increases with .
 Strong complementors: e > p^, in which case pM < pN = p^. Starting from a symmet-
ric price p 2 pM ; pN, the best deviation prot is then given by max~pe ~pD (~p+ p). The
static Nash equilibrium (p^; p^) however no longer yields the minmax payo¤, equal here to
the incomplete-technology monopoly prot:  = ~M (e); Abreu (1988)s optimal penal
codes then provide more severe punishments than the static Nash outcome. If rms are
su¢ ciently patient, these punishments can be as severe as the minmax prots,41 in which
case perfect cooperation on pM is sustainable if in addition:
M  (1  ) max
~pe
~pD (~p+ p) + ~M (e) :
In order to characterize the scope for tacit coordination in this case, we rst show that
Abreus penal codes (even when restricting attention to symmetric on- and o¤-equilibrium
paths) can sustain minmax prots when rms are su¢ ciently patient:
40For any p < e:
@H
@
(p; e; ) = e [D (p+ e) D (2e)] > 0:
41See Lemma 10 below.
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Lemma 10 (minmax with strong complementors) The minmax payo¤ is sustain-
able whenever
   (e)  ~
M (e)   (e)
 (p^)   (e) ;
where  (e) 2 (0; 1) for e 2 (p^; V ), and  (V ) = lime !p^  (e) = 0.
Proof. In order to sustain the minmax prot  = ~M (e), consider the following two-
phase, symmetric penal code. In the rst phase (periods t = 1; :::; T for some T  1),
both rms charge e, so that the prot is equal to  (e). In the rst period of the second
phase (i.e., period T +1), with probability 1 x both rms charge e, and with probability
x they switch to the best collusive price that can be sustained with minmax punishments,
which is dened as:
pC (e; )  arg max
p
pD (2p) ;
subject to the constraint
(1  ) max
~pe
~pD (p+ ~p) +   pD (2p) : (21)
Then, in all following periods, both rms charge pC . Letting  = (1  )xT + T+1 2
(0; ) denote the fraction of (discounted) time in the second phase, the average discounted
per-period punishment prot is equal to
p = (1 )  (e) +   pC ;
which ranges from  (e) <  = ~M (e) (for T = +1) to (1  )  (e) +   pC (for T = 1
and x = 1). Thus, as long as this upper bound exceeds ~M (e), there exists T  1 and
x 2 [0; 1] such that the penal code yields the minmax: p = ~M (e) = .
As pC satises (21), the nal phase of this penal code (for t > T +1, and for t = T +1
with probability x) is sustainable. Furthermore, in the rst T + 1 periods the expected
payo¤ increases over time (as the switch to pC comes closer), whereas the maximal prot
from a deviation remains constant and equal to maxpe pD (e+ p) = ~M (e) (as ~pM (e) =
r (e) < e for e > p^). Hence, to show that the penal code is sustainable it su¢ ces to check
that rms have no incentive to deviate in the rst period, which is indeed the case if
deviations are punished with the penal code:
~M (e) = (1 )  (e) +   pC  (1  ) ~M (e) + ~M (e) = ~M (e) :
There thus exists a penal code sustaining the minmax whenever the upper bound (1  )  (e)+

 
pC

exceeds ~M (e); as by construction 
 
pC
  N =  (p^), this is in particular the
case whenever
(1  )  (e) +  (p^)  ~M (e) ;
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which amounts to    (e). Finally:
  (e) 2 (0; 1) for any e 2 (p^; V ), as then:
 (p^) = max
p
pD (p^+ p) > ~M (e) = max
p
pD (e+ p) >  (e) = eD (2e) ;
  (V ) = 0, as ~M (V ) =  (V ) = 0, and
lim
e !p^
~M (e)   (e)
 (p^)   (e) =
d~M (e)
de
  d(e)
de
 d(e)
de

e=p^
=
D (2p^) + p^D0 (2p^)
D (2p^) + 2p^D0 (2p^)
= 0;
where the last equality stems from p^ = r (p^) = arg maxp pD (p^+ p).
The following proposition now characterizes the scope for tacit coordination in case
of strong complementors:
Proposition 27 (strong complementors) When e > p^:
(i) v > N : some protable cooperation is always sustainable. Perfect cooperation on
price pM is feasible (i.e., v = M) if   C (e), where C(e) continuously prolongs
the function dened in Proposition 26, lies strictly below 1, and is decreasing for e
close to V .
(ii) Furthermore, if D00  0, then there exists v(e; ) 2 (N ; M ], which continuously
prolongs the function dened in Proposition 26 and is (weakly) increasing in , such
that the set of Nash-dominating sustainable payo¤s is V+= [(p^); v(e; )].
Proof. (i) We rst show that, using reversal to Nash as punishment, rms can always
sustain a stationary, symmetric equilibrium path in which they both charge constant
price p < p^, for p close enough to p^. This amounts to K^ (p; e; )  0, where
K^ (p; e; )   (p)  (1  ) D (p; e)   (p^) ;
where
D (p; e)  max
~pe
~pD (p+ ~p) =
(
r (p)D (p+ r (p)) if r(p)  e;
eD (p+ e) if r(p) > e:
Because D (p^; e) =  (p^), K^ (p^; e; ) = 0 for any e; . Furthermore:
@K^
@p
(p^; e; ) = 0 (p^)  (1  ) p^D0 (2p^) ;
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which using 0 (p^) = p^D0 (2p^), reduces to:
@K^
@p
(p^; e; ) = p^D0 (2p^) < 0:
Hence, for p close to p^, K^ (p; e; ) > 0 for any  2 (0; 1]. If follows that cooperation on
such price p is always sustainable, and thus v > N .
We now turn to perfect cooperation. Note rst that it can be sustained by the minmax
punishment  = ~M (e) whenever
M  (1  )D  pM ; e+ ~M (e) ;
or:
  C1 (e) 
D
 
pM ; e
  M
D (pM ; e)  ~M (e) :
Conversely, minmax punishments can be sustained using Abreus optimal symmetric
penal code whenever
(1  )  (e) + M  ~M (e) ; (22)
or:
  C2 (e) 
~M (e)   (e)
M    (e) :
Therefore, we can take 
C
(e)  max
n

C
1 (e) ; 
C
2 (e)
o
.
As 
C
1 (p^) > 
C
2 (p^) = 0 and 
C
1 (V ) > 
C
2 (V ) = 0, 
C
(e) = 
C
1 (e)  
C
2 (e) for e close
to p^ and for e close to V . Furthermore, as ~M (e) is continuous and coincides with  (e)
for e = p^, and D
 
pM ; e

= eD
 
pM + e

as long as e < r
 
pM

(where r
 
pM

> p^),

C
1 (e) continuously prolongs the function 
C
(e) dened in Proposition 26. Finally, both

C
1 (e) and 
C
2 (e) lie below 1 (as ~
M (e)  ~M (p^) =  (p^) < M =   pM).
Finally, we note that

C
1 (e) =
1
1 +
M   ~M (e)
D (pM ; e)  M
decreases with e for e  r  pM: D  pM ; e = r  pMD  pM + r  pM does not vary
with e whereas ~M (e) = maxp pD (e+ p) decreases with e; and so 
C
1 (e) decreases with
e.
(ii) As in the case of weak complementors, selling the incomplete technology cannot
be more protable than the static Nash:
~M (e) = max
p
pD (e+ p) < 2N = 2 (p^) = 2 max
p
pD (p^+ p) :
Therefore, if collusion enhances prots (v > N), there must exist some period   0
in which each rm i charges a price pi not exceeding e, and the average price p
 = p

1+p

2
2
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moreover satises
 (p) =
1 + 

2
2
 v:
To ensure that rm i has no incentive to deviate, and for a given punishment payo¤ v,
we must have:
(1  ) i + v+1i  (1  ) D
 
pj ; e

+ v:
Combining these conditions for the two rms yields:
(1  ) 
D (pi ; e) + 
D
 
pj ; e

2
+ v  (1  )  (p) +  v
+1
2 + v
+1
2
2
  (p) ; (23)
where the last inequality stems from v
+1
1 +v
+1
2
2
 v   (p). But the deviation prot
D (p; e) is convex in p when D00  0,42 and thus condition (23) implies K (p; e; ; v)  0,
where
K (p; e; ; v)   (p)  (1  ) max
~pe
~pD (p+ ~p)  v: (24)
Conversely, if K (p; e; ; v)  0, then the stationary path (p; p) is an equilibrium path.
For any , from Lemma 10 the minmax ~M (e) can be used as punishment payo¤ for
e close to p^; the sustainability condition then amounts to K (p; e; )  0, where
K (p; e; )   (p)  (1  ) max
~pe
~pD (p+ ~p)  ~M (e) :
Using ~M (e) = maxp pD (e+ p) and noting that p^ = r (p^) < e implies  (p^) = maxp pD (p^+ p) =
maxpe pD (p^+ p) for  > 0, we have:
K (p^; e; ) = 

max
p
pD (p^+ p) max
p
pD (e+ p)

> 0:
Furthermore, K is concave in p if D (p; e) is convex in p, which is the case when D00  0.
Thus, there exists p(e; ) 2 [pM ; p^) such that cooperation at price p is feasible if and only
if p(e; )  p < p^, and the set of sustainable Nash-dominating per-rm payo¤s is then
[ (e) ; v (e; )], where v (e; )    maxpM ; p (e; )	. Furthermore, using ~pM (e) =
42In the range where r (p) < e, @
D
@p (p; e) = r (p)D
0 (p+ r (p)) and thus (using  1 < r0 < 0):
@2D
@p2
(p; e) = r0D0 + rD00(1 + r0) > 0:
In the range where r (p) > e, @
D
@p (p; e) = eD
0 (p+ e) and thus D is convex if D00  0. Furthermore,
the derivative of D is continuous at p = pe  r 1 (e):
lim
p!pe
p<pe
@D
@p
(p; e) = lim
p!pe
eD0 (p+ e) = eD0 (pe + e) = lim
p!pe
r (p)D0 (p+ r (p)) = lim
p!pe
p>pe
@D
@p
(p; e) :
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r (e) < p^ < e; we have, for p < p^ < e:
@K
@
(p; e; ) = D (p; e)  ~M (e) = max
~pe
~pD (p+ ~p) max
~p
~pD (e+ ~p) > 0:
Therefore, p (e; ) decreases with , and thus v (e; ) weakly increases with . Finally,
note that K (p; p^; ) = H (p; p^; ), where H is dened by (20); hence the function v (e; )
dened here prolongs that of Proposition 26.
The function v (e; ) = 
 
max

pM ; p (e; )
	
remains relevant as long as the minmax
~M (e) is sustainable. When this is not the case, then v can be replaced with the lowest
symmetric equilibrium payo¤, which, using Abreus optimal symmetric penal code, is of
the form (1  )  (pp)+ (p), where pp is the highest price in [p^; e] satisfying D (pp; e) 
 (pp)   [ (p)   (pp)], and p is the lowest price in pM ; p^ satisfying D (p; e)  
 (p)   [ (p)   (pp)]; we then have v (e; ) =  (p) and the monotonicity stems
from p and pp being respectively (weakly) decreasing and increasing with .
Together, Propositions 26 and 27 lead to:
Proposition 28 (complementors) When pM < pN :
(i) There exists 
C
(e) < 1 and C(e) < 
C
(e), where 
C
(e) is decreasing for e close
to pM , close to p^ and close to V , and C(e) is decreasing in e, and equal to 0 for
e = p^, such that
 perfect cooperation on price pM is feasible (i.e., v = M) whenever   C (e);
 protable cooperation is sustainable (i.e., v > N) whenever   C(e).
(ii) Furthermore, if D00  0, then there exists v(e; ) 2 (N ; M ], which is (weakly) in-
creasing in , such that the set of Nash-dominating sustainable payo¤s is V+= N ; v(e; ).
By contrast with the case of rivalry, where collusion ine¢ ciently induces users to adopt
the incomplete technology, avoiding double marginalization unambiguously raises prots
here. It follows that some cooperation (and even perfect cooperation) is always sustain-
able, for any degree of essentiality, when rms are su¢ ciently patient; furthermore, in the
case of strong complementors (i.e., e > p^), rms can always sustain some cooperation on
a price p < pN = p^, regardless of their discount factor: this is because starting from the
static Nash price p^, a small reduction in the price then generates a rst-order increase in
prots, but only a second-order incentive to deviate.
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L Proof of Proposition 12
When users acquire both licenses at total price P , welfare has the familiar expression:
W (P ) = S (P ) + PD (P ) ;
where S (P )  R V
P
D( ~P )d ~P . When instead users acquire a single license at price p, welfare
is
~W (p) = S (p+ e) + pD (p+ e) :
Thus under rivalry (e < pM), welfare is W (2e) in the absence of collusion and ~W (p) in
the collusive outcome, for some p > e. Note that
~W (p) = W (p+ e)  eD (p+ e) :
This expression identies the two facets of the collusive cost. First, the total price, p+ e,
exceeds the competitive price 2e as p > e. Second, there is a foregone surplus e on actual
consumption D(p + e) due to incomplete consumption. Collusion harms consumers and
reduces total welfare under rivalry.
In the case of complementors, tacit coordination is protable when rms cooperate
in o¤ering the complete technology at a price lower than the static Nash price; it then
benets users and increases total welfare.
M Proof of Propositions 13 and 14
We prove Proposition 14 in the extended setting described in Section 4.2.3, in which rms
may have asymmetric o¤erings; this, in turn, establishes Proposition 13 for the case of
symmetric o¤erings.
The case of complementors (part (ii), where e1 + e2  PM = 2pM) is straightforward,
as any vector of price caps p = (p1; p2) satisfying p1 + p2 = PM and pi  ei induces
p = p as unique continuation equilibrium: starting from any price vector p  p, any
rm o¤ering pi < pi would have an incentive to increase its price towards pi, as (using
 1 < r0 (pj) < 0) pi + pj = PM = 0 + r (0) < pj + r (pj) implies pi < r (pj)  r (pj), for
i 6= j 2 f1; 2g.
We now turn to the case of rivalry (part (i), where e1 + e2 < PM). We rst show
that, as noted in the text, this implies that both rms are constrained in the static Nash
equilibrium. Indeed, if both rms were unconstrained, then we would have pN1 = p
N
2 =
p^ = r (p^)  e2  e1 and thus e1 + e2  2p^ > PM , a contradiction. If instead rm i is
unconstrained whereas rm j is constrained, for some i 6= j 2 f1; 2g, then pNj = ej and
pNi = r (ej)  ei; hence, ei + ej  r (ej) + ej > 0 + r (0) = PM , again a contradiction.
Therefore, it must be the case that both rms are constrained: pNi = ei  r (ej) for
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i 6= j 2 f1; 2g.
This, in turn, implies that reducing prices below their Nash levels would reduce both
rmsprots: for any p  pN = e = (e1; e2), we have pi  ei  r (ej) for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g,
and thus: i (p)  i (pi; ej)  i (ei; ej), where the rst inequality stems from pj  ej,
and the second one from pi  ei  r (ej) and quasi-concavity. Furthermore, o¤ering a
price pi > V would be irrelevant. Thus, without loss of generality, suppose now that a
price cap pi 2 [ei; V ] is introduced for each patent i = 1; 2.
Next, we show that the minmax prots: (a) are the same as without price caps,
and (b) can be sustained by the repetition of the (unconstrained) static Nash outcome,
pN = e. To establish (a), it su¢ ces to note that the minmaxing strategy pj = ej ( pj)
remains available to rm is rival, and rm is best response, pi = ei ( pi), also remains
available. To establish (b), it su¢ ces to note that the static Nash outcome pN = e
remains feasible, and that deviations are only more limited than in the absence of price
caps.
We now show that any protable collusion that is sustainable through price caps is
also sustainable without them. Recall that the set of pure-strategy equilibrium payo¤s
can be characterized as the largest self-generating set of payo¤s, where, as minmax prots
are sustainable, a self-generating set of payo¤s ~W (where ~W = W in the absence of price
caps, and ~W = W c with price caps) is such that, for any payo¤ (1; 2) in ~W , there exists
a continuation payo¤ (1; 

2) in ~W and a price prole (p

1; p

2) 2 ~R1  ~R2, where ~Ri is
the set of relevant prices for rm i (more on this below), that satisfy, for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g:
i = (1  ) i
 
pi ; p

j

+ i  max
pi2 ~Ri
i
 
pi; p

j

+ i: (25)
To establish that the equilibrium payo¤s that are weakly more protable than Nash under
price caps are also equilibrium payo¤s without price caps, it su¢ ces to show that any
self-generating set with price caps (p1; p2) satisfying pi 2 [ei; V ] for i = 1; 2, is also a
self-generating set in the absence of price caps.
In the absence of price caps, without loss of generality the set of relevant prices for
rm i is Ri  [0; V ]; when a price cap pi is introduced, then the set of relevant prices
becomes Rci  [0; pi]. Consider now a self-generating set W c for given price caps (p1; p2)
satisfying pi 2 [ei; V ] for i = 1; 2, and given payo¤s (1; 2) 2 W c, with associated payo¤s
(1; 

2) 2 W c and prices

p
1
; p
2

2 Rc1 Rc2 satisfying, for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g, pi  pi and
i = (1  ) i

p
i
; p
j

+ i  max
p
i
2Rci
i

p
i
; p
j

+ i: (26)
By construction, the associated price prole

p
1
; p
2

also belongs to R1 R2. However,
the gain from a deviation may be lower than in the absence of price caps, as the set of
relevant deviating prices is smaller. To conclude the proof, we now show that, for any
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
p
1
; p
2

2 Rc1 Rc2 satisfying (26), there exists (p1; p2) 2 R1 R2 satisfying
i = (1  ) i
 
pi ; p

j

+ i  max
pi2Ri
i
 
pi; p

j

+ i: (27)
For this, it su¢ ces to exhibit a prole (p1; p

2) 2 R1 R2 yielding the same prots (i.e.,
i
 
pi ; p

j

= i

p
i
; p
j

for i = 1; 2) without increasing the scope for deviations (i.e.,
maxpi2Ri i
 
pi; p

j
  maxp
i
2Rci i

p
i
; p
j

for i = 1; 2). We can distinguish four cases for
the associated price prole

p
1
; p
2

:
Case a: p
1
 e1; p2  e2. In that case, we can pick (p1; p2) =

p
1
; p
2

; as rm is
prot from deviating to pi is then given by
i

pi; p

j

=
(
piD

p
j
+ pi

if pi  ei
0 otherwise
;
the best deviation is
arg max
piei
piD

p
j
+ pi

= ei;
which belongs to both Ri and Rci . Hence, maxpi2Rci i

p
i
; p
j

= maxpi2Ri i

pi; p

j

.
Case b: p
i
  ei  0 < pj   ej, for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g. In that case, the prole

p
1
; p
2

yields prots j

p
j
; p
i

= 0 and i

p
i
; p
j

= p
i
D

ej + p

i

, and best deviations are
respectively given by:
arg max
pj
j

pj; p

i

= arg max
pjej
pjD

p
i
+ pj

= ej;
arg max
pi
i

pi; p

j

= arg max
pipj+ei ej
piD (ej + pi) = min
n
p
j
+ ei   ej; pMi
o
:
As ej 2 Rj\Rcj,maxpj2Rcj j

p
j
; p
i

= maxpj2Rj j

pj; p

i

. Therefore, ifmin
n
p
j
+ ei   ej; pMi
o

pi (and thusmin
n
p
j
+ ei   ej; pMi
o
2 Ri\Rci), we can pick (p1; p2) =

p
1
; p
2

, as then we
also havemaxp
i
2Rci i

p
i
; p
j

= maxpi2Ri i

pi; p

j

. If insteadmin
n
p
j
+ ei   ej; pMi
o
>
pi, then we can pick pi = p

i
and pj 2 (ej; ej + pi   ei):43 the prole (p1; p2) yields the
same prots as

p
1
; p
2

, and, as the best deviations are the same, with or without price
caps:
arg max
pj
j (pj; p

i ) = arg max
pj
j

pj; p

i

= ej 2 Rj \Rcj;
arg max
pi
i
 
pi; p

j

= arg max
pipj+ei ej
piD (ej + pi) = min

pj + ei   ej; pMi
	 2 Ri \Rci ;
as min

pj + ei   ej; pMi
	  pj + ei   ej < pi.
43This interval is not empty, as pi  ei by assumption.
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Case c: 0 < p
i
  ei = pj   ej. In that case, we can pick (p1; p2) =

p
1
; p
2

, as best
deviations consist in undercutting the other rm, and this is feasible with or without
price caps.
Case d: 0 < p
i
  ei < pj   ej, for i 6= j 2 f1; 2g. In that case, the same payo¤
could be sustained through pi = p

i
and pj = p

i
+ ej   ei

< p
j

, with the convention
that technology adopters, being indi¤erent between buying a single license from i or
from j, all favor i: the prole (p1; p

2) yields the same prots as

p
1
; p
2

, j = 0 and i =
p
i
D

ej + p

i

, but reduces the scope for deviations, which now boil down to undercutting
the rival:
max
pj2Rj
j (pj; p

i ) = max
p
j
2Rcj
j

p
j
; p
i

= max
pjpi+ej ei
pjD (ei + pj) ;
max
pi2Ri
i
 
pi; p

j

= max
pipj+ei ej
piD (ej + pi)  max
p
i
2Rci
i

p
i
; p
j

= max
pipj+ei ej
piD (ej + pi) :
This moreover implies that, as in case c above, these best deviations were already feasible
with price caps. Indeed, as pk = p

h + ek   eh, for h 6= k 2 f1; 2g, we have:
arg max
pj
j (pj; p

i ) = arg max
p
j
j

p
j
; p
i

= arg max
pjpi+ej ei
pjD (ei + pj) = min

pj ; p
M
j
	
;
arg max
pi
i
 
pi; p

j

= arg max
pipj+ei ej
piD (ej + pi) = min

pi ; p
M
i
	
;
where min

pj ; p
M
j
	 2 Rj \ Rcj, as minpj ; pMj 	  pj < pj 2 Rcj ( Rj), and likewise
min

pi ; p
M
i
	 2 Ri \Rci , as minpi ; pMi 	  pi = pi 2 Rci ( Ri).
N Screening through independent licensing
Let us introduce a pool subject to independent licensing in the repeated game considered
in Section 4.2.1. The pool sets the price of the bundle44 and species a sharing rule for its
dividends: some fraction i  0 (with 1 +2 = 1) goes to rm i. In addition, each pool
member can o¤er licenses on a stand-alone basis if it chooses to. The game thus operates
as follows:
1. At date 0, the rms form a pool and x a pool price P for the bundle, as well as
the dividend sharing rule.
2. Then at dates t = 1; 2; :::; the rms non-cooperatively set prices pti for their in-
dividual licenses; the prots of the pool are then shared according to the agreed
rule.
44It can be checked that the rms cannot gain from asking the pool to o¤er unbundled prices as well.
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We characterize below the set of equilibria that are sustainable through a pool subject
to independent licensing; comparing it to the equilibria without a pool, or sustainable
through a pool not subject to independent licensing, leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 29 (screening through independent licensing) Independent licensing
provides a useful but imperfect screen:
(i) Appending independent licensing to a pool is always welfare-enhancing.
Relative to the absence of a pool:
(ii) In case of complementors, a pool with independent licensing enables the rms to
achieve perfect cooperation, which is welfare-enhancing.
(iii) In case of rivalry, if some collusion is already sustainable without a pool, then a
pool with independent licensing enables the rms to collude more e¢ ciently, which
results in lower prices and is thus welfare-enhancing; however, there exists R (e),
which increases from R (0) = 1=2 to 1 as e increases from 0 to pM , and lies strictly
below R (e) for e 2  0; pM, such that, for  2 [R (e) ; R (e)), the pool raises prices
by enabling the rms to collude.
To establish this Proposition, we rst characterize the scope for tacit coordination
for rival and complementary patents, before drawing the implications for the impact of a
pool subject to independent licensing.
N.1 Rivalry: e < pM
The rms can of course collude as before, by not forming a pool or, equivalently, by
setting the pool price P at a prohibitive level (P  V , say); rms can then collude on
selling the incomplete technology if   R (e). Alternatively, they can use the pool to
sell the bundle at a higher price:
Lemma 11 In order to raise rmsprots, the pool must charge a price P P > 2pN = 2e.
Proof. Suppose that the pool charges a price P P  2e, and consider a period t, with
individual licenses o¤ered at prices pt1 and p
t
2. Let p
t = min fpt1; pt2g denote the lower one.
 Users buy the complete technology from the pool only if P P  pt + e; the industry
prot is then P PD
 
P P
  2N = 2 (e), as the aggregate prot function PD (P ) is
concave and maximal for 2pM > 2e  P P .
 Users buy the complete technology by combining individual licenses only if pi  e for
i = 1; 2, in which case p1 +p2  2e and the industry prot is (p1 + p2)D (p1 + p2)  2N .
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 Finally, users buy an incomplete version of the technology only if pt+e  P P , which
in turn implies pt  e (as then pt  P P   e, and by assumption P P  2e); the industry
prot is then ptD (pt + e)  (pt + e)D (pt + e)  2N , as pt + e  2e.
Therefore, the industry prot can never exceed the static Nash level.
Thus, to be protable, the pool must adopt a price P P > 2e. This, in turn, implies
that the repetition of static Nash outcome through independent licensing remains an
equilibrium: If the other rm o¤ers ptj = e for all t  0, buying an individual license from
rm j (corresponding to quality-adjusted total price 2e) strictly dominates buying from
the pool, and so the pool is irrelevant (rm i will never receive any dividend from the
pool); it is thus optimal for rm i to set pti = e for all t  0. Furthermore, this individual
licensing equilibrium, which yields  (e), still minmaxes all rms, as in every period each
rm can secure eD
 
e+ min

e; ptj
	   (e) by undercutting the pool and o¤ering an
individual license at price pti = e.
Suppose that tacit coordination enhances prots: v > N =  (e), where v denotes
the maximal average discounted equilibrium per rm payo¤. In the associated equilib-
rium, there exists some period   0 in which the aggregate prot, 1 + 2, is at least
equal to 2v. If users buy an incomplete version of the technology in that period, then
each rm can attract all users by undercutting the equilibrium price; the same reasoning
as before then implies that collusion on pti = ~p
M (e) is sustainable, and requires   R (e).
If instead users buy the complete technology in period  , then they must buy it from
the pool,45 and the per-patent price pP  P P=2 must satisfy:
2
 
pP

= 1 + 

2  2v > 2 (e) ;
implying pP > e. In order to undercut the pool, a deviating rm cannot charge more for
its individual license than pD, the price that leaves users indi¤erent between buying the
incomplete technology from the rm and buying the complete technology from the pool;
that is, the price pD is such that:
(V   e)  pD = V   2pP ;
or pD = 2pP   e (> e); by o¤ering its individual license at this price, the deviating rm
obtains a prot equal to:
D =
 
2pP   eD  2pP  =   pP +  pP   eD  2pP  >   pP  : (28)
45Users would combine individual licenses only if the latter were o¤ered at prices not exceeding e;
hence, the total price P would not exceed 2e. But PD (P ) = 1 + 

2  2v > 2 (e) implies P > 2e.
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Thus, for the price pP to be sustainable, there must exist continuation payo¤s
 
v+11 ; v
+1
2

such that, for i = 1; 2:
(1  ) i + v+1i  (1  ) [
 
pP

+
 
pP   eD  2pP ] +  (e) :
Combining these two conditions and using v
+1
1 +v
+1
2
2
 v  1+2
2
= 
 
pP

yields:

 
pP
  (1  )[  pP +  pP   eD  2pP ] +  (e) : (29)
Conversely, a pool price pP 2 (e; pM ] satisfying this condition is stable: a bundle price
P P = 2pP , together with an equal prot-sharing rule and rms charging high enough
individual prices (e.g., pti  V for all t  0), ensures that no rm has an incentive
to undercut the pool, and each rm obtains 
 
pP

. To see this, it su¢ ces to note
that the expression of D given by (28) represents the highest deviation prot when
pP  pM , as the deviating prot pD (p+ e) is concave and maximal for ~pM (e) = r (e),
and e+ ~pM (e) = e+r (e)  0+r (0) = 2pM implies ~pM (e) > 2pM e  2pP  e. Building
on this insight yields:
Proposition 30 (pool in the rivalry region) Suppose e  pM . As before, if  
R (e) the rms can sell the incomplete technology at the monopoly price ~pM and share
the associated prot, ~M . In addition, a per-license pool price pP , yielding prot 
 
pP

,
is stable if (29) holds. As a result:
(i) Perfect collusion (i.e., on a pool price pP = pM) is feasible if
  P (e)  1
2  e
pM e
D(2e) D(2pM )
D(2pM )
;
where the threshold P (e) is increasing in e.
(ii) If the rms can already collude without a pool (i.e., if   R (e)), then the pool
enables them to sustain a more protable collusion, which benets consumers as
well.
(iii) There exists R (e), which coincides with R (e) for e = 0, and lies strictly below
R (e) for e > 0, such that some collusion (i.e., on a stable pool price pP 2 (e; pM ])
is feasible when   R (e).
Proof. (i)We have established that a pool price pP is stable if and only if L
 
pP ; e; 
  0,
where
L (p; e; )  (p)  (1  ) [ (p) + (p  e)D (2p)]   (e)
= pD (2p)  (1  ) (p  e)D (2p)  eD (2e) :
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In the particular case of perfect substitutes (i.e., e = 0), this expression reduces to
(2   1)  (p)  0. Therefore, any pool price pP  0 is stable including the monopoly
price pM if and only if   1=2. For e > 0, sustaining a price pP 2 (e; pM ] requires
 > 1=2:
L (p; e; ) = (2   1) [pD (2p)  eD (2e)] + (1  ) e [D (2p) D (2e)] ;
where the second term is negative and, in the rst term,  (p) >  (e).
In particular, collusion on pM is feasible if L
 
pM ; e; 
  0, or:
  P (e) =
 
pM   eD  2pM
(pM   e)D (2pM) + M    (e) =
1
2  e
pM e
D(2e) D(2pM )
D(2pM )
;
where
d
P
de

e; 
P
(e)

=  
@L
@e

pM ; e; 
P
(e)

@L
@

pM ; e; 
P
(e)
 :
Clearly @L=@ > 0. Furthermore
@L
@e

pM ; e; 
P
(e)

= [1  P (e)]D(2pM)  P (e)0(e):
Using the fact that L

pM ; e; 
P
(e)

= 0,
@L
@e

pM ; e; 
P
(e)

/ [M   (e)  (pM   e)0(e)] < 0;
from the concavity of . And so
d
P
de
> 0:
(ii) In the absence of a pool, collusion is ine¢ cient (users buy only one license) and is
therefore unprotable (and thus unsustainable) when ~M (e)  2N = 2 (e) (i.e., e  e).
When instead
~M (e) > 2N = 2 (e) ; (30)
then (i) ine¢ cient collusion on p 2 (e; ~pM (e)] is protable for p close enough to ~pM (e);
in this case, maximal collusion (on ~pM (e)) is sustainable whenever some collusion is
sustainable, and it is indeed sustainable if   R (e). We now show that the pool then
enables the rms to sustain a more e¢ cient and more protable collusion, which benets
consumers as well as the rms. To be as protable, the pool must charge a price P P
satisfying:
P PD
 
P P
  ~M (e) :
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Let ~P (e) denote the lowest of these prices, which satises ~PD

~P

= ~M (e).46 The pool
price ~p (e) = ~P (e) =2 is stable if and only if L (~p (e) ; e; )  0, which amounts to:
0  G (e; )  ~p (e)D

~P (e)

  (1  ) (~p (e)  e)D

~P (e)

  eD (2e)
= (2   1)

~M (e)
2
   (e)

+ (1  ) e
h
D

~P (e)

 D (2e)
i
:
We have:
@G
@
(e; ) = ~p (e)D

~P (e)

+ (~p (e)  e)D

~P (e)

  eD (2e)
=

~M (e)
2
   (e)

+

1  e
~p (e)

~M (e)
2
> 0;
where the inequality follows from ~M > 2 (e) (using (30)), which in turn implies e < ~p (e)
(as 2~pD (2~p) = ~M > 2 (e) = 2eD (2e), and the prot function PD (P ) is concave); as
G (e; 1=2) =
e
2
h
D

~P (e)

 D (2e)
i
< 0 < G (e; 1) =
~M (e)
2
   (e) ;
where the inequalities follow again from ~M (e) > 2 (e) and e < ~p (e), then some collusion
is feasible if  is large enough, namely, if   R1 (e), where:
R1 (e) 
[~p (e)  e]D

~P (e)

~M (e)   (e)  eD

~P (e)
 :
From the proof of Proposition 25, the ine¢ cient collusion on ~pM (e) is instead sus-
tainable (i.e.,   R (e)) when:
0  ~G (e; )  (2   1) ~
M (e)
2
   (e) :
In the case of perfect substitutes, this condition boils down again to   1=2. Therefore,
when collusion is sustainable without the pool, the pool enables the rms to sustain per-
fect e¢ cient collusion. Furthermore, for e > 0, G (e; )  ~G (e; ) = (1  ) eD

~P (e)

> 0
and thus, if some collusion is sustainable without a pool, then the pool enables again the
rms to sustain a more e¢ cient and more protable collusion: as G (e; ) > 0 in this case,
it follows that a pool price pP slightly higher (and thus more protable) than ~p is also
46In the rivalry region, we have that e < pM < p^ < r (e) = ~pM (e); hence, the left-hand side increases
from
2N = 2eD (2e) < 2~M (e) = 2r (e)D (e+ r (e))
to M = 2M > ~M (e) as P increases from 2e to 2pM ; there thus exists a unique P 2  2e; 2pM
satisfying PD (P ) = ~pM (e)D
 
~pM (e) + e

.
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stable. Finally, note that the (quality-adjusted) price is lower when collusion is e¢ cient:
the most protable sustainable price lies below PM ,47 and
PM = 0 + r (0) < e+ r (e) = ~pM (e) + e:
(iii) Note that L (e; e; ) = 0 for all e. Therefore, some collusion is sustainable (i.e.,
there exists a stable pool price pP 2 (e; pM)) whenever I(e) > 0, where
I(e; )  @L
@p
(e; e; ) = (2   1)D(2e) + 2eD0(2e):
We have:
@I
@
(e; ) = 2 [D(2e) + eD0(2e)] > 0;
where the inequality follows from e < r (e) (as here e < pM (< p^)); as
I (e; 1=2) = eD0 (2e) < 0 < I (e; 1) = D(2e) + 2eD0 (2e) ;
where the last inequality stems from e < pM , then some collusion is feasible if  is large
enough, namely, if   R2 (e), where:
R2 (e) 
1
2
1
1 + eD
0(2e)
D(2e)
: (31)
Furthermore:
@I
@e
(e; ) = 2(3   1)

D0(2e) +

3   12eD
00(2e)

:
But D0(2e) + 2eD00(2e) < 0 from Assumption B and =(3  1) < 1 from  > 1=2; and so
@I
@e
(e; ) < 0;
implying that the threshold R2 (e) increases with e; it moreover coincides with 
R (0) =
1=2 for e = 0, and is equal to 1 for e = pM (in which case D(2e) + 2eD0(2e) = 0, and
thus I(pM ; ) =   (1  )D(2pM)).
To conclude the argument, it su¢ ces to note that the statement of part (iii) holds for
R (e) = min

R1 (e) ; 
R
2 (e)
	
:
 For e = 0, perfect collusion is sustainable for   1=2, which coincides with the
range where ine¢ cient collusion at ~pM (e) would be sustainable without a pool.
47A price PP > PM cannot be the most protable stable price:
L
 
pM ; e; 
  L  pP ; e;  = (2   1) M     pP + (1  ) e D  PM D  PP  ;
which is positive for PP > PM , as M    PP  and D  PM > D  PP . Hence, whenever a pool price
PP > PM is stable, then P = PM is also stable.
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 For e 2 (e; e) (in which case, without a pool, ine¢ cient collusion at ~pM (e) is
sustainable if and only if   R (e)), R (e)  R1 (e) < R (e).
 Finally, for e 2 [e; pM ], no collusion is sustainable in the absence of a pool, whereas
a pool enables the rms to collude on some price pP 2 (e; pM ] whenever   R (e),
where R (e)  R2 (e) < 1.
Remark: If D00  0, then L is concave in p.48 Hence, in that case, some collusion is
feasible if and only if   R2 (e), where R2 (e) lies strictly below R (e) for e 2
 
0; pM

and increases from R (0) = 1=2 to 1 as e increases from 0 to pM .
N.2 Weak or strong complementors: pM  e
In case of complementary patents, a pool enables the rms to cooperate perfectly:
Proposition 31 (pool with complements) With weak or strong complementors, a
pool allows for perfect cooperation (even if independent licensing remains allowed) and
gives each rm a prot equal to M .
Proof. Suppose that the pool charges PM = 2pM for the whole technology and shares
the prot equally. No deviation is then protable: as noted above, the best price for an
individual license is then ~p = 2pM   e (that is, the pool price minus a discount reecting
the essentiality of the foregone license), which is here lower than pM (since pM  e) and
thus yields a prot satisfying:
 
2pM   eD  2pM < pMD  2pM = M :
N.3 Impact of a pool subject to independent licensing
Comparing the most protable equilibrium outcomes with and without a pool (subject
to independent licensing) yields the following observations:
 In the rivalry region, a pool can only benet users whenever some collusion would
already be sustained in the absence of a pool (i.e., when   R (e)). In this case, a
pool enables the rms to sustain a more e¢ cient collusion, which is more protable but
also benets users: they can then buy a license for the complete technology at a price
48As pD (2p) is concave from Assumption B and  > 1=2, we have:
@2L
@p2
(p; e; ) = (2   1)(pD(2p))00 + 4(1  )eD00(2p) < 0:
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P  PM = 2pM , which is preferable to buying a license for the incomplete technology at
price ~pM (e): as r0 () >  1,
e+ ~pM (e) = e+ r (e) > 0 + r (0) = PM = 2pM :
 By contrast, when collusion could not be sustained in the absence of a pool (i.e.,
when  < R (e)), then a pool harms users whenever it enables the rms to sustain some
collusion, as users then face an increase in the price from pN (e) = e to some p > e. This
happens in particular when  2 [R (e) ; R (e)) (if D00 ()  0, it happens only in this
case), where R (e) increases from R (0) = 1=2 to 1 as e increases from 0 to pM , and lies
strictly below R (e) for e 2  0; pM.
 With weak or strong complementors, a pool enables perfect cooperation and benets
users as well as the rms: in the absence of the pool, the rms would either not cooperate
and thus set p = pN (e) = min fp^; eg > pM , or cooperate and charge per-license price
p 2 [pM ; pN), as opposed to the (weakly) lower price, pM , under a pool.
Finally, note that, in the absence of the independent licensing requirement, a pool
would always enable the rms to achieve the monopoly outcome. Appending independent
licensing is therefore always welfare-enhancing, as it can only lead to lower prices in the
case of rivalry, and does not prevent the rms from achieving perfect cooperation in the
case of complementors.
O Proof of Proposition 15
We start by noting that, if all patents are priced below ~p, then technology adopters
acquire all licenses:
Lemma 12 O¤ering each license i at a price pi  ~p induces users to acquire all of them.
Proof. Without loss of generality, suppose that the patents are ranked in such a way
that p1  :::  pn. If users strictly prefer acquiring only m < n licenses, we must have:
V (m) 
mX
k=1
pk > V (n) 
nX
k=1
pk ()
nX
k=m+1
pk > V (n)  V (m) :
From from the denition of ~p, we also have:
V (n)  n~p  V (m) m~p () V (n)  V (m)  (n m) ~p:
Combining these conditions yields:
nX
k=m+1
pk > (n m) ~p;
79
implying that some licenses are priced strictly above p. Conversely, if all licenses are
priced below ~p, users are willing to acquire all of them.
To establish part (i) of Proposition 15, suppose that pN < pM (which implies pN = ~p
and N = ~pD (n~p)), that each rm faces a given price cap pi, and consider a stationary
symmetric path in which all rms repeatedly charge the same price p (which thus must
satises p  pi for i 2 N ), and obtain the same prot  > N = ~pD (n~p). We rst note
that this last condition requires selling an incomplete bundle:
Lemma 13 When pN < pM , generating more prot than the static Nash level requires
selling less than n licenses.
Proof. Suppose that a price prole (p1; :::; pn) induces users to acquire all n licenses. The
aggregate prot is then  (P ) = PD (P ), where P =
Pn
k=1 pk denotes the total price.
But this prot function is concave in P under Assumption B, and thus increases with P
in the range P  PM = npM . From Lemma 12, selling all n licenses require P  n~p,
where by assumption n~p < PM ; therefore, the aggregate prot PD (P ) cannot exceed
that of the (unconstrained) static Nash, n~pD (n~p).
From Lemma 13,  > N implies that users must buy m < n patents; Lemma 12
then implies p > ~p; the per-rm equilibrium prot is then:
 =
m
n
pD (mp + V (n)  V (m)) :
Furthermore, as pi  p > ~p for all i 2 N , the price caps do not a¤ect the static Nash
equilibrium, in which all rms still charge pN = ~p. The price p can therefore be sustained
by reversal to Nash if and only if:
  (1  ) D (p) + N ;
where N = ~pD (n~p) and D (p) denotes the most protable deviation from p, subject
to charging a price pD  pi. But as the deviating price must lie below p (otherwise,
the members patent would be excluded from usersbasket), it is not constrained by the
price cap pi  p; therefore, the deviation cannot be less protable than in an alternative
candidate equilibrium in which, in the absence of price caps, all members would charge
p. Hence, price caps cannot sustain higher symmetric prices than what the rms could
already sustain in a symmetric equilibrium in the absence of price caps.
To establish part (ii) of the Proposition, suppose that all rms face the same price cap
p = pM < pN = min f~p; p^g. As no rm can charge more than p < ~p, Lemma 12 implies
that, by charging pi = pM , each rm i can ensure that technology adopters acquire its
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license, and thus secure a prot at least equal to:
i = p
MD(pM +
X
j2Nnfig
pj)  pMD(pM + (n  1) p) = M = pMD
 
PM

:
As each rm can secure M , and the industry prot is maximal for PM , it follows that
the unique candidate equilibrium is such that each rm charges p = pM . Conversely, all
rms charging pM indeed constitutes an equilibrium: a deviating rm can only charge a
price p < p = pM , and the deviating prot is thus given by:
pD
 
p+ (n  1) pM :
The conclusion then follows from the fact that this prot is concave in p, and maximal
for (using r0 () < 0 and pM < p^):
r
 
(n  1) pM > r ((n  1) p^) = p^ > pM = p:
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